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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on greenhouse 
gas emission disclosure and the extent to which the disclosure of greenhouse gas 
emission information is associated with earnings management and the liquidity of 
firms’ shares. The sample for this study is drawn from Australian publicly listed 
firms that voluntarily disclosed their greenhouse gas emission information through 
voluntary disclosure channels such as the Carbon Disclosure Project, annual reports, 
standalone sustainability reports, and corporate websites between 2006 and 2009. 
This study adopts the Carbon Disclosure Project 2010 scoring methodology to 
measure the quality of greenhouse gas emission disclosure. A content analysis was 
used to score the quality of voluntary disclosures in annual financial and 
sustainability reports, and the information provided on company websites.   
 
In this thesis, two competing views: the stakeholder value maximisation view and the 
shareholder expense view are examined in relation to the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on greenhouse gas emission disclosures and the extent to 
which the disclosure of greenhouse gas emission information is associated with 
earnings management. The stakeholder value maximisation view predicts that firms 
engage in socially responsible initiatives such as greenhouse emission reduction 
strategies and targets associated with climate change to fulfil the legitimate interests 
of stakeholders. On the other hand, the shareholder expense view suggests that firms 
engage in socially responsible initiatives such as greenhouse gas emission reduction 
initiatives at the expense of shareholders. 
 
This research contributes several new findings to the literature. Firstly, with regards 
to the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and voluntary 
disclosure, this thesis has found that effective corporate governance mechanisms 
such as greater board independence, the absence of Chief Executive Officer duality, 
the presence of board gender diversity, decrease in directors’ share ownership, 
increase in institutional ownership and smaller size of the audit committee drive 
voluntary greenhouse gas emission disclosure.  These results suggest that firms with 
effective corporate governance mechanisms focus on the legitimate interests of a 
broader group of stakeholders with regards to climate change, particularly 
greenhouse gas emission mitigation targets.  This is consistent with the stakeholder 
value maximisation view of firms which is based on stakeholder theory and 
legitimacy theory as opposed to the shareholder expense hypothesis which is based 
on agency theory. These results are robust to control for self-selection using the 
Heckman two-stage sample selection procedure. Our results are also robust to the 
exclusion of financial sector firms which arguably could be affected by the Global 
Financial Crisis.  
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Secondly, this research finds a weak negative relationship between voluntary 
disclosure of greenhouse gas emission disclosure and earnings management. This 
study has found only weak support for the stakeholder value maximisation view, 
suggesting that stakeholder-focused firms are less likely to engage in earnings 
management. In addition, Australian firms are trying to maintain a balance between 
the quality of greenhouse gas emission disclosure and the quality of financial 
reporting. As a result, they have difficulty satisfying multiple objectives 
simultaneously. These results are robust for endogeneity controls using the two-stage 
least squares method. 
 
Thirdly, this study has found that the voluntary disclosure of greenhouse gas 
emission information by firms has an impact on the liquidity of that firm’s shares. 
This suggests that firms that disclose more greenhouse gas emission information 
voluntarily experience improved liquidity of their shares.  These results support the 
view of Balakrishnan et al. (2013) that managers’ decisions to disclose more 
voluntary information could directly affect the  liquidity of their firms’ shares. 
Managers may shape the liquidity of their firms’ shares by providing more 
greenhouse gas emission information voluntarily through the Carbon Disclosure 
Project and their corporate reporting channels.  
 
Finally, larger and more visible firms tend to provide more information regarding 
climate change related due to social pressures.  Firms with higher growth 
opportunities tend to provide less greenhouse gas emission information. Firm 
leverage and age are positively associated with the quality of greenhouse gas 
emission disclosure; indicating that longer-established firms with more leverage may 
disclose more the quality of greenhouse gas emissions in order to maintain their 
reputation among the stakeholders. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background  
Extreme weather events around the world have increased public awareness about 
climate change. There is growing scientific evidence indicating that human-made 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions exacerbate global warming and business activities 
potentially inducing severe climate change (IPCC 2007; Liao, Luo & Tang 2014; 
Saka & Oshika 2014). Demands from a variety of stakeholders have resulted in firms 
disclosing climate change-related information, particularly GHG emission 
information. Climate change issues represent a vital part of a firm’s corporate 
governance agenda for managing stakeholders’ demands and enhancing 
organisational climate change-related legitimacy. Australia’s per capita GHG 
emissions is not only the highest in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries but also among all developed countries (Garnaut 
2008). Therefore, corporate decisions regarding GHG emissions disclosure by listed 
entities in the Australian stock exchange forms the focus of this study.  
 
GHG emission information has emerged as an important dimension of corporate 
voluntary disclosure practice. Firms may engage in GHG emission disclosure to meet 
the needs of a diverse group of current and future stakeholders. Most importantly, 
institutional investors demand that firms disclose GHG emission information in order 
to assess the impact of climate change-related risks and opportunities on their 
investments. In this setting, firms have incentives to use sustainability disclosure as a 
competitive device as well as a strategy that can be used for image building. Firms 
with more concentrated focus on meeting stakeholders’ expectation need to disclose 
more information regarding sustainability in order to honour their commitment to 
sustainability (Ullmann 1985).  
 
Disclosure of climate change related information provides risks and opportunities for 
firms and gives corporate managers disclosure challenges (Aggarwal & Dow 2012). 
A broader group of stakeholders, namely, institutional investors, regulators, and 
public groups have been demanding disclosures of climate change related 
information particularly GHG emissions information from firms’ operations. Firms 
that are disclosing sustainable information to the public have both advantages 
(opportunities) and disadvantages (risks).  The opportunities of disclosing sustainable 
information are  competitive advantage (Rankin, Windsor & Wahyuni 2011), 
positive image of firm (Lyon & Maxwell 2011), positive market responses (Griffin & 
Sun 2013), relevant information to investors (Dhaliwal et al. 2012), and reduction in 
cost of capital (Dhaliwal et al. 2011; El Ghoul et al. 2011). The risks of disclosures 
of such information are increasing operating cost (CERES 2011), reduction in market 
value (Aggarwal & Dow 2011), and engaging in earnings management (Prior, 
Surroca & Tribó 2008). 
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Firms can provide their GHG emission information through two channels: voluntary 
and mandatory disclosures. Voluntary disclosures of GHG emission information 
includes disclosures in GHG emission information in corporate reports such as 
annual reports, sustainability reports, participating in voluntary disclosure programs, 
and through press releases. Mandatory GHG emission disclosures include reporting 
GHG emission information as a result of regulatory requirements, for example, the 
introduction of the National Greenhouse Energy Reporting Act (the NGER Act) in 
Australia.  GHG emission disclosures are a specific form of environmental disclosure 
that addresses business risks and opportunities, strategies to reduce GHG emissions 
and reporting information that is associated with climate change. Although 
Australian Government introduced the NGER Act on 29 September 2007, Australian 
firms were not required to report their GHG emission information until the 2009 
financial year (Choi, Lee & Psaros 2013). GHG emission information reporting was 
mostly voluntarily before implementation of the NGER Act in Australia. Most 
importantly, this study focuses on a timeframe before implementation of the NGER 
Act that ensured that Australian firms provided GHG emission information through 
their reporting channels on a voluntary basis. 
 
This thesis builds on three strands of prior research. Firstly, we build on prior 
research that suggests that firms may use their corporate governance mechanisms for 
managing stakeholders’ demands and enhancing organisational legitimacy via 
monitoring GHG emissions and climate change risks and providing related 
information. Prior research suggests that effective corporate governance mechanisms 
are more likely to be associated with implementation of strategies that increase GHG 
emission disclosures in order to manage stakeholders’ expectations concerning 
climate change risks and reduce legitimacy gap between the firm and its society 
(Khan, Muttakin & Siddiqui 2013; Peters & Romi 2014). In contrast, Prado-Lorenzo 
and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) argue that firms’ corporate governance mechanisms do 
not play a monitoring role in disseminating GHG emission information. Rodrigue, 
Magnan and Cho (2013) find evidence to suggest that corporate governance 
mechanisms play only a symbolic role (rather than a substantive role) as a strategic 
driver of environmental activities.  This creates a need to understand the role of 
corporate governance mechanisms in addressing climate change risks. 
 
In the Australian context, using corporate governance quality as a composite 
measure, Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni (2011) found that firms with higher 
corporate governance quality were more likely to disclose credible GHG emission 
information. Kohl and Schaefers (2012) argued that the composite measure of 
corporate governance quality is an inadequate proxy for corporate governance 
because of the possibility of ignoring important corporate governance characteristics. 
The impact of corporate governance on a manager’s choice to disclose voluntary 
GHG emission information is limited and needs to be analysed further using a range 
of corporate governance mechanisms. This study adds new evidence by investigating 
the impact of specific corporate governance mechanisms on voluntary GHG 
emission disclosure.  
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The second strand of research pertains to the relation between voluntary GHG 
disclosure and earnings management. Stakeholders of a firm grant unwritten 
authority to the managers to do business as long as they are seen as good corporate 
citizens. If firms breach social responsibility,  they will lose their license to operate 
(Brine, Brown & Hackett 2006). Socially responsible firms are less likely to engage 
in negative social activities which could damage their reputation and public trust 
because good corporate citizens are less likely to experience negative social events 
(Laksmana & Yang 2009). Kim, Park and Wier (2012) posit that managers may use 
sustainability disclosure as a reputational sign and constrain earnings management to 
maintain the reputation of the firm.  Socially responsible firms have incentives to 
cultivate a long-term relationships with their stakeholders in order to gain 
competitive advantages (Choi, Lee & Park 2013) .  
 
The separation of ownership and control creates a conflict between managers and 
shareholders that drives managers to pursue their personnel rent-seeking behaviour at 
the expense of shareholder interests. (Jensen & Meckling 1976).  Salewski and Zülch 
(2014) argue that firms that engage in earnings management may use sustainability 
disclosure as a mean to cover up their opportunistic behaviour. Kim, Park and Wier 
(2012) argue that firms may buy a form of reputational insurance by providing more 
detailed sustainability information to the stakeholders, which gives them a license to 
manage earnings. Prior, Surroca and Tribó (2008) argue that managers disclose 
generous quantity of sustainability information as a tool to get support from major 
stakeholders when they engage in earnings management.  
 
The existing literature provides conflicting findings on the link between earnings 
management and corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure (Choi, Lee & Park 
2013; Kim, Park & Wier 2012; Prior, Surroca & Tribó 2008; Salewski & Zülch 
2014).  No empirical evidence on the link between earnings management and 
voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information is found in the existing literature. 
Australian firms may use GHG emission disclosure as either a strategic device or 
opportunistic purpose. In this juncture, corporate governance mechanisms may play a 
vital role to constrain or support engaging in earnings management. This study 
contributes to the literature by re-examining this issue in the context of Australian 
firms.   
 
The third strand is the impact of voluntary disclosure of GHG information on a 
firms’ stock liquidity. Information asymmetry creates agency problems between 
managers and outside investors, thereby impacting a firm’s share trading.  Voluntary 
disclosure of high quality information may reduce information asymmetry and firms 
with more voluntary disclosure and increased quality of information may experience 
greater liquidity, lower cost of transactions and more demand for the firms’ shares 
(Cho, Lee & Pfeiffer 2013; Diamond & Verrecchia 1991). Balakrishnan et al. (2013) 
argue that managers actively shape their information environment by voluntarily 
disclosing more information and this effort improves liquidity of the firms’ shares.  
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One of the benefits of voluntary disclosure is the increase in liquidity of a firm’s 
shares. A greater  quality information reduces the levels of adverse selection in the 
market, thereby increasing the liquidity of shares (Bardos 2011). Prior research 
suggests that better disclosure quality increases market liquidity (Healy, Hutton & 
Palepu 1999; Heflin, Shaw & Wild 2000). This study argues that voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emission information quality may impact the liquidity of a firm’s 
shares. Currently there is no research on the link between voluntary disclosure of 
GHG emission information and stock market liquidity. Therefore, in this research, 
we shed light on the unexplored link between voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information and liquidity of firms’ shares.  
1.2. Research question 
Shareholders are primarily concerned with financial performance of the firm.  
Non-investing stakeholders focus on issues related to environmental, social, and 
other issues (Rupley, Brown & Marshall 2012). Firms can use effective corporate 
governance mechanisms that induce managers to act in the best interest of 
stakeholders when there is a conflict between shareholders and non-investing 
stakeholders. Under effective corporate governance mechanisms, managers may use 
socially responsible engagement to resolve conflicts among stakeholders to maximise 
the shareholders’ wealth (Harjoto & Jo 2011). Consistent with this view, socially 
responsible activities would be positively related to more effective corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
 
Since risk management associated with climate change is a crucial aspect of a firm’s 
strategic decision making and since corporate governance mechanisms play a crucial 
role in meeting stakeholder concerns, this thesis examines the role of corporate 
governance.   Firms with good corporate governance are expected to improve 
voluntary disclosure of information and reduce opportunistic behaviour by 
management (Chen, Chen & Wei 2009; Lo, Wong & Firth 2010). Since corporate 
governance mechanisms are involved in monitoring and determining a firm’s overall 
disclosure policy, it is expected that corporate governance mechanisms will enhance 
disclosure quality while constraining earnings management.  
 
In the absence of effective corporate governance mechanisms, managers may 
disclose information voluntarily to a wide range of stakeholders to camouflage their 
opportunistic behaviour while they engage in earnings management. In addition, one 
of the capital market benefits of voluntary disclosures of GHG emissions is its 
impact on market liquidity. The main research question is: What are the 
determinants of voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information and what is 
the impact of voluntary disclosure on the liquidity of a firm’s shares? 
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To answer this main question, several sub-research questions will be addressed. 
1. What are the impacts on corporate governance attributes of the disclosure of 
voluntary GHG emission information? 
2. What is the relationship between the voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information and earnings management and to what extent do corporate 
governance mechanisms affect the above relationship? 
3. Do Australian firms with higher voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information have increased the liquidity of the firms’ shares? 
 
Since the theoretical framework to explain voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information of firms is limited, the issue is being explored by using two competing 
views based on existing theories. The first view, labelled as the stakeholder value 
maximisation view, posits that managers of the firms may provide transparent and 
credible GHG emission information to have a long-term relationship with 
stakeholders. The second view, termed the shareholder expense view, suggests that 
opportunistic managers are incentivised to disclose GHG information to favour other 
stakeholders at the expense of shareholders (Deng, Kang & Low 2013).  
 
The objectives of this research are threefold. First, this study explores the impact of a 
firm’s corporate governance mechanisms on voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information. Second, this research also examines the extent to which voluntary GHG 
emission disclosures are associated with earnings management with and without 
controls for corporate governance characteristics. Finally, this research investigates 
the effects of voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information on the liquidity of 
firms’ shares. 
 
A firm’s information disclosure about its ability to manage the risks and 
opportunities associated with climate change is of interest to investors and others. 
GHG emissions, through human activities and natural processes, have been growing 
rapidly in this century. Human-induced GHG emissions are expected to generate 
risks of dangerous climate change. GHG emissions of carbon dioxide, namely (CO2), 
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and fluorinated gases (IPCC 2007), are thought 
to be the most relevant.  Most GHGs are emitted from fossil fuel combustion and 
industrial processes. Recent studies indicate that investors have started incorporating 
firm’s GHG emission information when making decisions about which companies to 
invest in (Chapple, Clarkson & Gold 2013; Griffin & Sun 2013; Matsumura, Prakash 
& Vera-Muñoz 2014). 
 
This study is driven by four motivations. Firstly, many studies use multidimensional 
perspectives of CSR which makes it hard to reach concrete conclusions. Since the 
different types of CSR can cater to different stakeholders, it follows that the 
motivations of different aspects of CSR may be different. Moser and Martin (2012) 
suggest that when researchers develop and test research questions regarding the 
effects of CSR on other variables of interest, the different types of CSR should be 
examined separately. Therefore, the narrow aspect of sustainability disclosure, viz., 
GHG emission disclosure, is used in this study. 
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Secondly, GHG emission disclosures are specific environmental disclosures that 
address business risks and opportunities associated with climate change. Although 
the Australian Government introduced the NGER Act on 29 September 2007, 
Australian firms were not required to report their GHG emission information until 
the 2009 financial year (Choi, Lee & Psaros 2013). GHG emission information 
reporting was mostly voluntary prior to the implementation of the NGER Act in 
Australia. Interestingly, the ASX corporate Government Council proposed a series of 
recommendations to strengthen firms’ corporate governance.  Thus Australia had a 
relatively weak disclosure regime for GHG emissions while having a relatively 
strong corporate governance system. Therefore, Australia provides a unique 
institutional setting within which to examine the role of corporate governance 
mechanisms on voluntary GHG emission disclosures.  
 
Thirdly, prior studies have examined various incentives and determinants of firms’ 
voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information (Cotter & Najah 2012; Luo, Lan 
& Tang 2012; Matsumura, Prakash & Vera-Muñoz 2014; Prado-Lorenzo et al. 
2009). Very little research has investigated the impact of corporate governance 
quality on voluntary GHG emission information in Australia (Rankin, Windsor & 
Wahyuni 2011). This research extends the literature by investigating the impact of a 
range of corporate governance characteristics on voluntary disclosure of GHG 
emission information and the relationship between voluntary disclosure of GHG 
emission information and earnings management controlling for corporate governance 
characteristics in Australia. 
 
Finally, extant literature examines the association between different types of 
voluntary disclosures and liquidity. There is as yet no empirical study on the 
relationship between the voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information and 
liquidity in the literature. As far as the author is aware, this study is the first to 
investigate the impact of voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information on the 
liquidity of a firm’s shares. 
1.3. Contributions of the study 
This study makes three key contributions to the literature. Firstly, existing research 
on the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on corporate sustainability 
reporting, particularly GHG emission disclosure, is limited. This empirical study 
examines the relationship between the extent and quality of voluntary disclosure of 
GHG emissions and a range of corporate governance mechanisms. Previous studies 
have investigated the impact of firm specific variables as well as industry specific 
variables on disclosure of GHG information ignoring a range of corporate 
governance attributes. This research will be useful to the Australian Stock Exchange 
Corporate Governance Council (ASXCGC) and other regulatory bodies in terms of 
identifying good corporate governance attributes that work in the Australian setting.  
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Secondly, this research extends the literature on voluntary disclosure and earnings 
management by investigating whether managers use voluntary disclosure of GHG 
emission ethically or opportunistically. By explicitly incorporating corporate 
governance mechanisms, this study is able to provide a nuanced view of the 
managerial motivation behind voluntary disclosure of GHG information. Finally, this 
research contributes to the literature by examining the impact of voluntary disclosure 
of GHG emission on liquidity. Previous studies indicate that voluntary disclosure can 
enhance transparency and quality of information, thereby improving the liquidity of 
firms’ shares (Kim 2014).  
1.4. Methodology 
Voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information is measured in two ways. First, it 
is measured as a dummy variable based on firms’ choice to voluntarily respond to the 
CDP annual questionnaires. Second, the quality of GHG emission disclosure is 
measured on the basis of a company’s annual report, sustainability report, and 
corporate website using the CDP 2010 scoring methodology. Corporate governance 
characteristics were hand-collected from annual reports available from the 
DatAnalysis database.  Discretionary accruals proxy for earnings management and 
the required accounting data were collected from DatAnalysis and FinAnalysis 
databases. Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure and bid-ask spreads are proxies for 
liquidity of firms’ shares and data for these variables were collected from the 
DataStream database.  
 
This study addresses the potential endogeneity problem arising from a selection bias 
in analysing the relationship between corporate governance, voluntary disclosure of 
GHG emission information and earnings management in three ways. Firstly, this 
study incorporates lagged independent and control variables, addressing the 
simultaneity aspect of endogeneity. Secondly, this study incorporates year and 
industry dummies to deal with time-specific and industry related aspects of 
endogeneity.  Finally, this thesis corrects potential selection bias using Heckman 
two-stage estimations to control for endogeneity. 
1.5. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 provides an introduction of the study. 
Chapter 2 reviews existing literature on voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information, corporate governance, earnings management, and stock market 
liquidity. Chapter 3 explains theories used in this research and develops the 
hypotheses. Chapter 4 describes the research methods of the study. Chapter 5 
discusses descriptive statistics. Chapter 6 provides the empirical findings and 
discusses the results. Chapter 7 draws conclusions and provides recommendations 
and suggestions for future research. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This Chapter provides the background of the study, research questions and objectives 
of the study, motivations and methods of the study. Finally, this Chapter also 
provides the structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
8 
 
 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
This Chapter reviews existing literature related to this study. This section provides an 
overview of Australian legislations and voluntary initiatives on GHG emission 
reporting. It discusses the internal as well as external corporate reporting channels of 
GHG emission disclosure information. Further, this Chapter provides a discussion 
managerial motivation with respect to the decision to disclose voluntarily GHG 
emission information.  The material provided in this Chapter helps one to understand 
the existing relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, voluntary GHG 
emission disclosure, earnings management and stock market liquidity.   
 
Chapter 3: Theories and hypotheses development 
This Chapter provides theoretical discussions on how corporate governance 
mechanisms and earnings management practices impact on GHG emission 
disclosure. Stakeholder theory, agency theory and legitimacy theory are used in this 
research. Further, this Chapter develops hypotheses based on two competing views, 
namely, the stakeholder value maximisation and shareholder expense views.  
 
Chapter 4: Data and methodology 
This Chapter provides details of sample selection and research methods used in this 
study. Then, our dependent, independent and control variables are described. 
Additionally, this Chapter addresses procedures to correct endogeneity and sample 
selection bias.  
 
Chapter 5: Descriptive analysis 
This Chapter explains in detail the descriptive statistics of dependent, independent 
and control variables. In this Chapter, descriptive statistics are provided for all 
variables for the full sample, disclosing and non-disclosing sub-samples, the CDP 
reporting years and industry classifications.  
 
Chapter 6: Empirical findings and discussions 
This Chapter reports on the empirical findings and provides discussions of the 
results.  The empirical findings and discussions are divided into three main sections. 
Firstly, this study provides the empirical findings and discussions for the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on voluntary GHG emission disclosure. Secondly, 
this study conducts an analysis and discussion of the relationship between earnings 
management and voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information with and 
without controls for corporate governance mechanisms. Finally, this Chapter studies 
the effects of voluntary GHG emission disclosure on stock market liquidity. 
 
Chapter 7: Summary and conclusions 
This is the final Chapter of this thesis. This Chapter draws conclusions from the 
empirical findings provided in Chapter 6.  Additionally, there is a discussion of the 
theoretical and practical implications of the research findings. This Chapter also lists 
the limitations of the study, and offers suggestions for future research.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
Managers have a choice regarding whether or not to disclose GHG emission 
information, which can significantly impact upon a broad group of stakeholders. As a 
result, voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information has been a topic of interest 
for academics in terms of theoretical and empirical investigations over recent years. 
This literature review consists of three key sections. The first section reviews the 
existing literature on voluntary disclosure of GHG emission with regards to the 
Australian institutional setting, examines the incentives of GHG emission disclosure 
and evaluates the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
voluntary disclosure of social and environmental information including GHG 
emissions. The second section reviews the relationship between earnings 
management and voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information with and 
without corporate governance mechanisms. The third section summarises the 
literature on the association between voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information and stock market liquidity. 
2.2. An overview of Australian legislation on   
 GHG reporting 
Australian regulators, industry groups, and voluntary initiatives incentivise 
Australian firms to disclose environmental and GHG emission information 
voluntarily.  Frost (2007, p. 193) postulates that “while Australian regulators have 
not been active in introducing mandatory environmental reporting within the 
corporate annual report, there are several guidelines on the voluntary inclusion of 
environmental information in the annual report”. These  reporting guidelines have 
been developed by Australian Government and industry groups such as New South 
Wales Environmental Protection Authority,1997; Victoria Public Accounts and 
Estimates Committee, 1998, 1999; Commonwealth of Australia, 2000; the Mineral 
Council of Australia code for Environmental management, 2000 (Choi, Lee & Psaros 
2013; Frost 2007). 
 
Additionally, a variety of other legislations and initiatives with regards to 
environmental and GHG emission information disclosure has also arisen. These 
include  the section of 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Law,  the Greenhouse Challenge 
Plus, the Kyoto Protocol, the National Pollution Inventory, the National Greenhouse 
and Energy Act, and carbon tax, which provide to impetus firms to disclose  
environmental information as well as GHG emissions and  management strategies. 
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The introduction of section 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Law was the first statutory 
requirement for specific environmental reporting introduced in 1998 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2005), which requires Australian company directors to 
disclose their company’s environmental performance. Prior Australian studies on 
environmental and GHG emission disclosure note that there is an increase in 
voluntary environmental information in annual reports because of  the introduction of 
section 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Law (Choi, Lee & Psaros 2013; Frost 2007). 
Section 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Act 2001 requires companies whose operations 
are subject to “any particular and significant environmental regulation” to include 
in its directors’ report details of the entity’s information in relation to such  
regulation over the financial year (Gibson & O'Donovan 2007).  
 
Frost (2007) notes that there has been an increased level of environmental disclosure 
in annual reports due to the introduction of section 299(1)(f) of the Corporation Law 
and the firms disclosing environmental information have considerable variation in 
their reporting, most significantly, firms that breach environmental regulations avoid 
having to provide a stand-alone sustainability report. Choi, Lee and Psaros (2013) 
note that although introduction of section 299(1)(f) increases environmental 
disclosure among Australian firms, this legislation is ineffective and ambiguous from 
the perspective of Australian legal practitioners.  
 
The Greenhouse Challenge Plus is a voluntary initiative, which may help Australian 
firms to disclose their GHG emission reduction strategies in their corporate reporting 
channels. It was a joint voluntary initiative between Australian Government and 
industry, which began in 1995. The objectives of this initiative are to (i) encourage 
abatement,  (ii) improve GHG emission management, (iii) improve emissions 
measurement and monitoring, (iv) strengthen information sharing between 
government and industry (DepartmentoftheEnvironment 2009).  More than 700 firms 
with excellent coverage of GHG emission in Australian industry participated in this 
program. To reduce GHG emissions, firms were encouraged to invest in new 
technologies, process, energy, efficiency improvement, and fuel switching. This 
program ceased on 1 July, 2009. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement introduced under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Kyoto, Japan in 1997 
(DepartmentofClimateChange 2010).  The objective of this agreement is to reduce 
human-induced GHG emissions of developed countries by at least 5 percent below 
1990 levels during 2008 to 2012. Australia ratified the Kyoto Protocol on 3 
December 2007 and its terms came into effect on 11 March 2008. Freedman and 
Jaggi (2011) note that the number of firms disclosing voluntary GHG emission 
information is higher in countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Australian 
Government proposed the GHG emission reporting Act after ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
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The National Pollution Inventory (NPI) is an Internet database designed for larger 
Australian facilities that are required to estimate and report annually their GHG 
emissions.  Australian industrial facilities that exceed the thresholds for 93 NPI 
substances are legally required to report emissions to their state or territory 
environmental agency annually.  Work and consultation on the NPI started in 1995 
and in 1996 (DepartmentoftheEnvironment 2009). The objective of NPI is to inform 
the community which has a right to know about GHG emissions. Cowan and Deegan 
(2011) suggest that the NPI is a driver for GHG emission disclosure and previous 
Australian studies ignored to the existence of the NPI.  
 
Many firms around the world are required by investors and regulators to report on 
their GHG emissions. For example, all firms listed on the main market of the London 
Stock Exchange are required to report their GHG emission levels in their annual 
reports staring from April 2013. The US firms are required to comply with their 
GHG emission disclosure obligation issued by Securities and Exchange Commission 
in February 2010 (Matisoff 2013). In Australia, the National Greenhouse and Energy 
Act (the NGER Act) was introduced in mid-2007. Firms satisfying a threshold level 
of emissions were required to report GHG emissions and energy use information 
starting from the 2009 financial year (Choi, Lee & Psaros 2013).  
 
The NGER Act requires reporting its GHG emissions under Scope 1, 2 and 3. Scope 
1 is direct GHG emissions from sources that is owned or controlled by the firm, e.g. 
emissions from combustion in owned or controlled boilers, furnaces and vehicles. 
Scope 2 accounts for GHG emissions from the generation of purchased electricity by 
the company. Scope 3 allows for the treatment of all other indirect emissions and it is 
an optional reporting category. It includes business related travel, disposal of waste 
to landfill and use of paper. Fig 2.1 is a pictorial depiction of GHG emissions under 
Scopes 1, 2, and 3.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Total GHG emissions 
 
Scope 3: 
Inirect fuel 
consumption and 
on-site fuel use 
Scope 2: 
Indirect emissions 
from electricity 
consumption 
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Direct fuel 
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The Australian Government enacted a legislation to introduce a carbon tax with 
effect from 1 July 2012. It was expected that the carbon tax would have a significant 
impact on the monitoring and reporting of GHG emissions by Australian entities 
(Choi, Lee & Psaros 2013).  From a political perspective, the carbon tax became a 
very sensitive issue in Australia. The new Australian Government has decided to 
remove the carbon tax from 1 July 2014.  For this purpose, the new Government, as 
promised, introduced the Clean Energy Legislation (Carbon Tax Repeal) Bill 2013 
on 13
th
 of November 2013 (ParliamentofAustralia 2013).           
2.3. Voluntary GHG emission disclosure 
medium 
A firm’s first step in addressing climate change-related issues is to measure and 
report its GHG emissions, emission reduction strategies, and investments. Wade, 
Dargusch and Griffiths (2014) indicate that the majority of larger Australian firms 
have at least accomplished the first step towards best practice of GHG emission 
management. Firms can achieve competitive advantages by using better strategies in 
their management of GHG emission reduction initiatives and investments, which will 
help to assess their  impact on their profitability (Wade, Dargusch & Griffiths 2014). 
Information about a firm’s strategies and activities with regards to GHG emission 
reduction initiatives is important for the decisions of stakeholders (Liao, Luo & Tang 
2014).  
 
Australian firms have been disclosing their GHG emission disclosure voluntarily to 
the external reporting programs such as the CDP, and their corporate reporting 
channels such as annual reports, standalone sustainability reports, and corporate 
websites in addition to mandatory GHG emission disclosure. As such, Australian 
firms mainly use four reporting channels to disseminate their GHG emission 
information to their stakeholders.  Firstly, Australian firms respond to the CDP 
questionnaire to disclose GHG emission information. The CDP is an independent 
not-for-profit organisation that surveys companies globally about their emissions and 
associated risks, opportunities, strategies in relation to climate change (Armstrong 
2011). Since 2003, the CDP sends the world’s largest firms a questionnaire on the 
risks and opportunities associated climate, GHG emissions, emission reduction plans, 
targets and strategies, emission intensity, and communication on behalf of 722 
institutional investors with combined assets of US$87 trillion. Australian firms were 
requested to respond the CDP questionnaire since 2006. The CDP sends its 
questionnaire to the Australian firms in February and firms are required to respond to 
it by May each year. 
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Secondly, annual reports are another major channel for the communication of 
information from corporations to their stakeholders (Gibson & O'Donovan 2007), 
which have information about climate change related information; particularly a 
firm’s strategies and activities of  GHG emission reduction initiatives. Prior research 
on social and environmental disclosure suggests that corporate annual reports are 
major sources of social and environmental information provided by companies 
(Haque & Deegan 2010). The ASXCGC recommended that: “one way to 
demonstrate good corporate governance is to use the annual report to disclose 
information to all legitimate stakeholders” (Gibson & O'Donovan 2007, p. 944). 
GHG emission information in corporate annual report is seen as firms’ effort to 
legitimise their activities by aligning their corporate goals with those of the society in 
which they are operating.   
 
 
Thirdly, corporate responsibility reporting has traditionally been voluntary.  
However, government and regulatory bodies around the world are increasingly 
imposing mandatory reporting requirements (KPMG 2013). Currently, there is no 
legislated requirement for Australian firms to produce  yearly sustainability reports 
(Wade, Dargusch & Griffiths 2014).  Australian firms’ corporate sustainability 
reporting rate has increased to 82 percent in 2013, particularly in annual reports. A 
majority of firms include corporate sustainability information in annual reports 
separately (KPMG 2013).  According to Figure 2, the quality of corporate 
responsibility reporting in Australian firms is higher than that of American or 
Japanese firms. The quality of corporate responsibility reports have been measured 
by using seven criteria based on current guidelines: (i) strategy, risk and 
opportunities, (ii) materiality, (iii) targets and indicators, (iv) suppliers and the value 
chain, (v) stakeholder engagement, (vi) governance of corporate responsibility, and 
(vii) transparency and balance. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Quality of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 
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Source: KPMG International, The KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility 
Reporting 2013, December, 2013 
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The above figure indicates that Australian firms’ sustainability reporting quality is 
lower than that of firms in Italy, Spain and UK but higher than firms in Germany, 
Switzerland, South Korea, Japan, USA and China/Hong Kong. Australian firms 
report their GHG emissions and their strategies and activities in relation to emission 
reduction initiatives  voluntarily in their annual and sustainability reports in addition 
to formal reporting of GHG emissions to the Australian Government (Wade, 
Dargusch & Griffiths 2014).  
 
Finally, corporate websites may be used as a medium to enhance the flow of 
voluntary disclosure to the stakeholders (Trabelsi, Debreceny & Lymer 2014). Patten 
and Crampton (2003) posit that there are indeed differences in the type of 
environmental information companies are choosing to disclose on their websites 
relative to annual reports. They further add that firms may use corporate websites to 
disclose their environmental information and attempt to legitimise their activities 
rather than for corporate accountability purposes. Villiers and van Staden (2011) note 
that managers choose to disclose their environmental information on their corporate 
websites and annual reports to satisfy different types of stakeholders. KPMG (2013, 
p. 68) states: “today’s businesses operate in the age of transparency, where the 
Internet and social media have created a global community of active and engaged 
stakeholders.” 
2.4. Voluntary disclosures of GHG emission  
  information 
There has been a wide consensus that climate change caused by human-induced 
greenhouse gas emissions may impair output and productivity  (Eyraud et al. 2011). 
Firms increasingly face climate change risk (CDP 2013) and it is a major concern for 
a broad group of stakeholders of firms (Busch & Hoffmann 2011).  GHG disclosure 
represents ‘proprietary non-financial information about the firm’s exposure to 
climate-change risks, resulting from the firm’s operations and related to future 
profitability over time’ (Peters & Romi 2014, p. 2). GHG emission disclosure refers 
to “organisations’ disclosure of information about emissions of carbon dioxide and 
other GHGs resulting from their operations, as well as the strategies they have in 
place to manage and reduce these emissions” (Armstrong 2011, p. 29). GHG 
emission disclosure information has both information that relates to the risks and 
opportunities posed to business operations from climate change-related activities.   
 
There is significant pressure on firms to disclose information about regulatory, 
physical, and other risks and opportunities associated with climate change, GHG 
emissions, GHG emission reduction plan, targets, and strategies, GHG emission 
intensity, and communication. GHG emissions are released as a result of 
manufacturing processes and the burning of fossil fuels. The GHG emission 
information includes details of emission and management of numerous items 
including carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydro 
fluorocarbons (HFCs), per fluorocarbons (PFCs) sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) and other 
fluorinated gases (Peters & Romi 2014).  
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Firm’s climate change related information particularly GHG emission reduction 
initiatives are necessary for investors to use when making their investment decisions. 
Disclosing information on GHG emissions in the annual and sustainability reports, 
on the company’s website, and participating in the voluntary reporting program 
could be used by the institutional investors and stakeholders to assess a company’s 
risks and opportunities with regards to climate change. A broader group of 
stakeholders are demanding not only current emissions levels and quality but also 
future strategies to mitigate GHG emissions.  
 
Most of the empirical research, using firm responses to CDP questionnaire on carbon 
disclosure, is limited either to the US market or a broad global context. Stanny and 
Ely (2008) investigate factors associated with US S&P500 firms’ decisions to 
voluntarily disclose GHG emissions. They document that size, previous disclosures 
and foreign sales are positively associated with disclosures of GHG emissions. 
Stanny (2010) investigated voluntary disclosure of GHG emissions by US S&P500 
firms that responded to the CDP. She provided support for legitimacy theory and 
found that the majority of firms responded to the questionnaire but did not disclose 
their emissions. Reid and Toffel (2009) examined the impact of regulatory threat and 
shareholder resolutions on disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions by US S&P500 
firms that responded to the CDP and found a positive association between them. 
 
Using the CDP data for FT 500 firms,  Kolk, Levy and Pinkse (2008) examined the 
extent to which the CDP provided information on GHG emissions reductions to 
enable various interest groups of a firm to make decisions regarding a firm. They 
reported that using institutional investors, the CDP urged firms to disclose extensive 
information about GHG emissions. Peters and Romi (2009) investigated whether or 
not cross-country differences influenced the level of corporate GHG emission 
disclosures by firms that responded to the CDP in a global context. They found that 
the country of origin of a firm embodied certain characteristics that influenced the 
level of GHG emission disclosures.  
 
Luo, Lan and Tang (2012) examined the impact of economic, regulatory, social and 
financial market factors by Global 500 companies reporting to the CDP on voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emissions. They find that larger firms that face direct economic 
consequences have a significant positive association on GHG emission disclosures. 
They suggested social or political pressure played an important role for larger 
companies with greater propensity to disclose more detailed information on GHG 
emissions. Cotter and Najah (2012) investigated the influence of institutional 
investors on the voluntary disclosure of information about climate change using 
Global 500 firms as a sample.  
 
Armstrong (2011) argued that it was not necessary for companies to participate in a 
third-party voluntary reporting program, for example through the CDP, in order to 
externally report their GHG emission. They could do so by other means, such as on 
their corporate websites and in annual and sustainability reports. Managers choose to 
disclose voluntary environmental information for several reasons. Peters and Romi 
(2014) argued that sustainability officers and environmental committees in a firm 
have motivations to disclose more GHG emission information voluntarily. They 
found that the existence of a chief sustainability officer and an environmental 
committee were positively related to voluntary GHG emission disclosures.  
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Freedman and Jaggi (2011) argued that GHG disclosures were a function of GHG 
emissions, emission standards, environmental settings and disclosure requirements in 
the countries in which firms operate. They argued that firms from European Union 
countries, Canada and Japan, which have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, will have to 
meet certain emission standards and limits which will provide the basis for GHG 
emission disclosures. They document that there is a higher level of voluntary GHG 
emission disclosure by firms from countries such as European Union countries, 
Canada and Japan than firms in the United States which has not yet ratified the 
Protocol. 
 
Aggarwal and Dow (2011) argued that when the board of directors created a 
committee that monitored  GHG emission risks and opportunities, the risks and 
opportunities were less likely to be identified. They explained that board 
involvement was directed at managing disclosures of GHG emission information in 
order not to reduce firm value.  The same finding was first identified by Prado-
Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010).  
 
Aggarwal and Dow (2012) suggested that there were five factors that induced a firm 
to reduce GHG emissions. Firstly, reduction in GHG emissions at a firm level would 
lead to higher profits. Secondly, pressure from mandatory regulations convinced a 
firm to reduce GHG emissions at a firm level. Thirdly, buyers preferred to buy goods 
and services that had a lower carbon footprint. Fourthly, firms invested their money 
in cost-effective climate change mitigation equipment and machinery. The final 
factor was pressure from major shareholders; that is, institutional investors demanded 
a firm to disclose transparent climate change risk information such as GHG emission 
information. They further suggested that failure to respond effectively would reduce 
firm’s value and increase the firm’s cost of capital in this regard. 
2.5. GHG emission disclosure and firm value 
GHG emissions can have a significant impact on business activities, and few studies 
have so far examined the effects of GHG emissions disclosure on firm value (Saka & 
Oshika 2014). Although GHG emission disclosure-related research is still at an 
initial stage in the academic literature, the existing literature provides some insights 
into whether disclosure of GHG emission information enhances firm value. These 
capital market effects are relevant to our understanding of determinants of GHG 
emission disclosure and its consequences.  
2.5.1. Capital market effects 
The existing research has analysed the share market price reaction around the 
announcement of GHG emission disclosure and regulation. Griffin and Sun (2013) 
have examined shareholders’ responses to a unique set of disclosures about climate 
change made by the US firms through CSR newswire service. They found that 
managers’ voluntary GHG emission disclosure decisions produced positive returns 
for shareholders. In addition, their findings showed that shareholders of smaller 
companies with limited public information availability benefited the most from 
voluntary GHG emission disclosures, since in these settings investors have fewer 
other channels and less access to competing information.  
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Hsu and Wang (2013) examined market reaction around carbon emission disclosure 
announcements using a sample of firms with news coverage in Wall Street Journal 
during the period 1989-2008. They found that socially responsible action to tackle 
climate change is costly to the investors.  Lee, Park and Klassen (2013) examined the 
relationship between climate change disclosure and shareholder value using a sample 
of Korean firms from 2008 to 2009, with data drawn from Korean newspapers. They 
found a negative association between the announcement of climate disclosure and 
shareholder wealth, suggesting that shareholders perceived climate change 
announcements as a bad news that were destroying shareholder wealth maximisation.  
 
Griffin, Lont and Sun (2012) examined the relationship between voluntary GHG 
emission disclosures and company stock prices using the even study method. They 
found that GHG emission levels were associated negatively with stock price and that 
the relationship was stronger for carbon-intensive companies. They suggested that 
investors view GHG mission information as value relevant and consequential for 
stock price and hence, and were potentially useful for capital market decision 
making. Chapple, Clarkson and Gold (2013) investigated the capital market effects 
of the proposed Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) in an Australian setting. They find 
evidence that capital markets responded negatively to ETS announcements and the 
negative market responses are larger for firms that operated in carbon-intensive 
sectors. 
2.5.2. GHG emission disclosure and firm value 
Existing studies on the effects of GHG emission levels and disclosure of GHG 
emission information on firm values provide very little evidence. The levels or 
volume of GHG emissions have a negative impact on firm value whereas, disclosure 
of GHG emission information on emission mitigation initiatives have a positive 
impact on firm value. Matsumura, Prakash and Vera-Muñoz (2014) examined the 
impact of volume of GHG emissions and voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information on firm value using all the S&P500 firms. They find a negative 
association between volume of GHG emissions and firm value and a positive relation 
between managers’ decision to disclose GHG emission information and firm value. 
Their findings indicate that the capital market penalise non-disclosing firms, which is 
an adverse signal about lack of commitment to reduce GHG emissions.   
 
Saka and Oshika (2014) examined the impact of volume of GHG emissions and 
disclosure of GHG emission management information on firm value using a sample 
of 1,094 Japanese firms. For this study, the volume of GHG emissions and corporate 
GHG emission management disclosure were collected from Japanese Government 
mandatory reporting files and the CDP database respectively.  Their results show that 
corporate GHG emission volume has a negative relation with firm value and 
voluntary disclosures of GHG emission information have a positive relationship with 
firm value. In addition, they found that the positive relation between the voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emission information and firm value was stronger when firms had 
a larger volume of GHG emissions.   
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Aggarwal and Dow (2011) examined the impact of GHG emission levels on firm 
value for a sample of over 600 larger firms from the US, Canada, and Europe. They 
find a negative association between volume of GHG emissions and firm value. They 
were unable to document that GHG mitigation actions add to firm value.  Eccles, 
Serafeim and Krzus (2011) examine GHG emission information have an impact on 
capital market. They find that equity investors and analysts perceived GHG 
emissions disclosure as risky to a firm as it can potentially affect equity prices. More 
specifically, they found that investment analysts incorporate GHG emission 
information in their investment recommendations.  
2.5.3. GHG emission disclosure and firm financial   
  performance  
Prior research investigated the effect of firms’ financial performance on disclosure of 
GHG emission information.  It is argued that more profitable firms allocate greater 
resources to engage in more socially responsible initiatives to meet stakeholder 
pressure. Therefore, it is expected that there would be a positive relationship between 
profitability and GHG emission disclosure. Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez 
(2010) found a positive association between profitability and GHG emission 
disclosure for the Global 500 firms. Ben-Amar and McIlkenny (2014) found a 
positive association between firms’ profitability and managers’ decision to disclose 
GHG emission information for Canadian firms. They found an insignificant 
relationship between firms’ financial performance and GHG emission disclosure 
transparency for the same sample firms.  
 
On the other hand, Liao, Luo and Tang (2014) found a negative relationship between 
firm profitability and GHG emission disclosure for UK firms, and the negative 
relationship is more severe for firms with carbon intensive industry. There were more 
recent studies, which find insignificant association between profitability and GHG 
emission disclosure, Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni (2011) and Choi, Lee and Psaros 
(2013) for Australian firms, and  Chu, Chatterjee and Brown (2013) for Chinese  
firms. 
 
The announcement effects of GHG emission disclosure have both positive and 
negative market reactions, which indicate that investors perceive the GHG emission 
disclosure information as value relevant for their decision making. The findings from 
Matsumura, Prakash and Vera-Muñoz (2014) and Saka and Oshika (2014) suggest 
that disclosure of GHG emission information has a positive impact on firm value. On 
the other hand, the volume of GHG emissions has negative impact on firm value. 
The evidence on the effects of disclosure of GHG emission information on financial 
performance is mixed. Therefore, it is not yet clear that GHG emission information 
destroys or enhances firm value. 
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2.6. Incentives for voluntary GHG emission  
  information 
Corporate voluntary disclosure is defined as: “disclosures in excess of requirements, 
representing free choices on the part of company managements to provide 
accounting and other information deemed relevant to the decisions needs of users of 
their annual reports” (Meek, Roberts & Gray 1995, p. 555).  Managers have several 
reasons for making voluntary disclosures. Prior research identified some of the 
incentives related to voluntary disclosures. Healy and Palepu (2001) identified six 
incentives or reasons that influence managers to make voluntary disclosures. These 
factors are capital market transactions, corporate control contests, stock 
compensation, litigation, proprietary costs and management talent signalling.  An, 
Davey and Eggleton (2011) constructed a theoretical framework for explaining 
voluntary disclosures regarding intellectual capital and identified three motivations 
for voluntary intellectual capital disclosures by organisations.  The motivations are: 
to reduce information asymmetry, to be accountable to all shareholders, and to show 
their quality by signalling firms’ legitimacy and excellence to the society. 
 
Deegan (2002) argued that there were a variety of motivations for managers to 
voluntarily disclose social and environmental information. They were (i) compliance 
with legal requirements, (ii) economic rationality considerations, (iii) a belief in an 
accountability to report, (iv) compliance with borrowing requirements,  (v) meeting 
community expectations, (vi) threats to firm’s legitimacy, (vii) manage powerful 
stakeholders, (viii) attract social investment fund,  (ix)  compliance with industry 
requirements and (x) win environmental awards.  
 
Solomon and Lewis (2002) suggested that managers had four incentives to disclose 
environmental information voluntarily. These incentives are market, social, political 
and accountability incentives. Luo, Lan and Tang (2012)  proposed four hypotheses 
in their research based on four motivations which were to induce managers to 
disclose voluntary GHG emissions information through the CDP. These hypotheses 
were economic, regulatory, social and financial market factors that motivated 
managers to disclose voluntary GHG information.  Armstrong (2011) argued that 
firms face growing stakeholder pressure to disclose GHG emissions. She suggested 
that firms had four drivers which induced managers to disclose voluntary GHG 
emission information. They were institutional investors’ pressure, supply-chain 
pressure, the desire to get ahead of the legislative curve and business development 
strategy.  
 
Porter and Kramer (2006) identified four motives for companies engaging in social 
responsible disclosure: a moral obligation, firm’s stewardship of the environment and 
the community, a license to operate, and reputation.  Adams and Zutshi (2004) 
suggested that a firm could achieve four benefits if it acted in a socially and 
environmentally responsible manner: improved corporate image and relations with 
stakeholders, better recruitment and retention of employees, improved decision 
making and cost-savings, and improved financial returns. 
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Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) suggested that there were country and 
firm-level factors that induced managers to voluntarily disclose more detailed GHG 
emission information. Pressure from the general public and interest groups, the legal 
system of a country and a firm’s corporate governance systems motivated firms to 
disseminate information on GHG emissions. They argued that the characteristics of 
board of directors such as board independence, CEO duality and the diversity of a 
board, as well as other country-level factors, played a significant role in encouraging 
the disclosure of GHG emissions information. This study has analysed the following 
incentives in relation voluntary GHG emission disclosures: reduction in information 
asymmetry, political costs avoidance, good corporate governance, competitive 
advantage, compensation for earnings management, stakeholders’ demands and 
increases in stock liquidity.  
 
2.6.1. Reduction in information asymmetry 
One of the main incentives for firms to make voluntary disclosures is a reduction in 
information asymmetry. Managers of firms may disclose additional pieces of GHG 
emission information to investors in order to make their investment decisions. The 
separation of ownership and control of a firm can create an information asymmetry 
problem which can be reduced by making voluntary GHG emission disclosures.  
Managers have incentives to disclose more voluntary GHG emission information to 
reduce agency problems between managers and investors. Firms with superior 
environmental information have incentives to make more voluntary environmental 
disclosures (Clarkson et al. 2008). Dye (1985) suggested that firms with good news 
have incentives to disclose more information to differentiate themselves from firms 
with bad news in order to reduce information asymmetry. He predicted that high 
quality firms would disclose their information more completely so as to differentiate 
themselves from low quality firms.  
 
Voluntary disclosures can be a critical device to moderate the information 
asymmetry between different types of shareholders (Allegrini & Greco 2013). These 
disclosures are mostly made at managers’ discretion so that managers can choose 
how much importance they give to the disclosures. Villiers and van Staden (2011) 
argue that firms with bad environmental reputations use their annual reports to 
explain how they are managing these issues in order to reduce information 
asymmetry. They find that firms that have bad environmental reputations disclose 
more voluntary environmental information in their annual reports. Krishnamurti, 
Sevic and Sevic (2005) suggest that firms from emerging markets that issue 
American Depository Receipts (ADR) have incentives to make more voluntary 
disclosures to have a lower level of information asymmetry.  
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Lundholm and Van Winkle (2006) argued that primary goal of voluntary disclosure 
is to reduce information asymmetry between investors and managers. They noticed 
that there was conflict between these two parties when managers made decisions 
whether or not to disclose particular information to the investors. They concluded 
that voluntary disclosure could be employed as a means to reduce information 
asymmetry. Cho, Lee and Pfeiffer (2013) argued that firms were using good and bad 
CSR performance to mitigate information asymmetry between investors and the firm. 
They suggest that CSR performance played a positive role in mitigating the 
information asymmetry faced by investors. 
 
Peters and Romi (2014)  posited that information asymmetry between the managers 
and stakeholders of a firm provided incentives for voluntary disclosure decisions or 
actions to increase the quality of disclosure of the firm. Given that sustainability-
focused governance mechanisms have incentives to provide quality GHG emission 
information in order to reduce information asymmetry between managers and 
stakeholders; firms can enhance their environmental legitimacy and use GHG 
emission disclosure as a strategic device for managing the firm’s environmental 
reputation.  
2.6.2. Political costs avoidance 
The second incentive of voluntary disclosure is a reduction in political cost.  Political 
cost theory argues that managers make more detailed environmental disclosures in 
order to avoid political cost (Healy & Palepu 2001; Watts & Zimmerman 1978). 
Voluntary environmental disclosures, such as GHG emissions disclosures made by a 
firm in relation to its positive or negative impact on its physical environment, may be 
a technique that can be used to reduce political cost. Firms will voluntarily disclose 
more environmental information in order to have a better relationship with the 
government and public sectors, that will lead to reduced political costs and to gaining 
some advantages such as subsidies, and positive outcomes in legal actions. As a 
result, political costs may avoid the shifting of a firm’s wealth towards the public and 
political sectors. Villiers and van Staden (2011)  predicted that firms with bad 
environmental reputations used their websites to explain how they were managing 
these issues in order to reduce political costs. They found that firms that had 
experienced environmental disasters were more likely to disclose more 
environmental related information on their websites.  
 
2.6.3. Good corporate governance  
The third incentive for firms to voluntarily disclose GHG emissions information is 
good corporate governance. Corporate governance is defined as the rules and 
practices that govern the relationship between managers, boards and shareholders 
that guides the extent and method of information disclosed by organisations (Jensen 
& Meckling 1976). The board of directors has fiduciary duty to protect the 
shareholders’ wealth by managing long-term risks and opportunities.   The key 
responsibility of the board of directors is to monitor what senior management is 
doing with regard to climate change.  It is their duty to deal with GHG emission 
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information disclosure to manage the pressure emerging from different stakeholder 
groups.  Therefore, board of directors were accountable to ensure transparency and 
quality of GHG emission information (CERES 2006). Haigh and Shapiro (2011) 
found that investors could assess a firm’s corporate governance quality using GHG 
emission disclosure.  
 
Firms that have good corporate governance are more likely to disclose GHG 
emissions information voluntarily in their reports and company website. Good 
corporate governance includes more independent directors on a board, having 
different people serving as the CEO and chairman of the board, an independent 
chairman on the board, female directors on the board, lower managerial share 
ownership, higher institutional shareholdings, more audit committee meetings in a 
financial year, and a smaller sized audit committee. These good corporate 
governance variables compelled managers to voluntarily disclose more GHG 
emissions information in their reporting channels. 
 
A study by Peters and Romi (2014) argued that environmental committees took more 
proactive interest in disclosing greater levels of GHG emission information as part of 
the firms’ overall strategy.  In addition to that, they argued that the existence of 
sustainability officers would be associated with sustainability initiatives and 
monitoring; and therefore they are able to disclose more GHG emission information. 
Environmental committees and sustainability officers within the board of directors 
may encourage a company’s board to disclose greater amounts of GHG emission 
information.  
2.6.4. Competitive advantage 
Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni (2011) found that some proactive but pragmatic 
Australian firms were disclosing GHG emissions information voluntarily in order to 
gain a competitive advantage. Dye (1985) argues that higher quality firms disclosed 
more information to differentiate themselves from low quality firms. Porter and 
Kramer (2006) contended that social issues significantly affected the fundamental 
motives of a firm’s competitiveness in the locations where it operated. Disclosing 
environment related information such as GHG emissions from a firm’s operations 
may lead to gains in competitive advantage over a firm that was not disclosing such 
information. Disclosing GHG emission information may be a powerful tool to create 
a positive image of a firm that differentiated it from other firms and contributed to 
increase in social value.  A firm can use the voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information as a strategic device to manage stakeholders’ demands with regards to  
climate change related risks and opportunities (Peters & Romi 2014).  
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2.6.5. Compensation for earnings management 
Another incentive for voluntary GHG emissions information is compensating the 
stakeholders through earnings management. Voluntary environmental information 
may be used as a compensation for engaging in earnings management. Prior, Surroca 
and Tribó (2008), Sun et al. (2010) and Cespa and Cestone (2007) argued that 
managers who engaged in earnings management may use voluntary environmental 
information as a device to divert stakeholders’ attention to their socially responsible 
activities. Managers of these firms may therefore have incentives to compensate 
stakeholders through environmental information when they manage earnings 
opportunistically. Disclosing environmental information of a firm may help build a 
positive image among different interest groups. These positives can be used by a 
manager to get supports from all stakeholders. There may be a possibility to use 
these supports as a tool to distract stakeholders’ attention for engaging earnings 
management. Prior, Surroca and Tribó (2008, p. 161)  noted that: “as a defense 
against stakeholder activism and vigilance, which could cost a manager his job and 
damage the firm’s reputation, managers have incentives to compensate stakeholders 
through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practice”.  
  
In line with the above argument,Mallin, Michelon and Raggi (2013) contended that 
managers used CSR as an entrenchment strategy to gather support from stakeholders. 
Based on this entrenchment strategy, managers and stakeholders had very strong 
collaboration that could not be easily blocked by individual shareholders. Therefore, 
managers had incentives to improve corporate social performance while they had the 
intention to manipulate earnings.  
2.6.6. Stakeholders’ demands 
Managers have another incentive to disclose GHG emission information through 
various channels to meet and fulfil the demands or needs of a diverse group of 
stakeholders. Huang and Kung (2010) posited that pressure from various 
stakeholders such as investors, customers employees, regulatory bodies, induced a 
firm to disclose environmental information. In a country where stakeholders were 
seen as legitimate, a greater level of interest in firms’ activities meant that they were 
more likely to disclose CSR information (Dhaliwal et al. 2012). Moser and Martin 
(2012) argued that managers engaged in some CSR activities at the expense of 
shareholders in order to meet the demands of a larger group of stakeholders. 
Therefore, CSR activity would help to fulfil the demands of a larger group of 
stakeholders than by providing value-relevant information to shareholders. They 
defined “at the expense of shareholders” to mean the overall costs of CSR activity to 
the firm would exceed the benefits to the firm. To strengthen stakeholders’ demands 
to disclose sustainable information requests, Kim, Park and Wier (2012) supported 
the premise that socially responsible firms that seek to make an investment on CSR 
activity in order to meet ethical expectations of stakeholders in society  provide more 
transparent and reliable financial information to investors while simultaneously 
constraining opportunistic managers who engaged in earnings management.  
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2.6.7. Increases in liquidity 
Healy and Palepu (2001) summarised three capital market consequences from 
voluntary disclosure, including improved stock liquidity, reduced cost of capital, and 
increased information intermediation. Managers’ incentives to disclose more 
information voluntarily could affect liquidity. Most recently, researchers have 
analysed various aspects of disclosure quality in relation to stock market liquidity. 
They found that the quality of information disclosure improved stock market 
liquidity (Balakrishnan et al. 2013; Bardos 2011; Lang & Maffett 2011; Ng 2011). 
Balakrishnan et al. (2013) argued that when managers had a choice about whether or 
not to shape information through voluntary disclosure activity, such activity 
improved their liquidity. They find that liquidity improved as a result of voluntary 
disclosure. Lang and Maffett (2011) found evidence that firms with greater 
transparency in earnings management and accounting standards disclosure 
experienced greater market liquidity. Ng (2011) found that quality of information 
disclosure was associated with lower liquidity risks; which, in turn, lowered the cost 
of capital. In line with these findings, Bardos (2011) found that the quality of 
financial information improved firms’ liquidity. 
 
2.7. Definitions of corporate governance 
Although corporate governance has been widely researched, there is no universally-
acceptable corporate governance definition to address social responsibility issues. 
Cadbury (1992) defined corporate governance as: “the system by which companies 
are directed and controlled”. Some researchers traditionally defined corporate 
governance as “the defense of shareholders’ interests” (Tirole 2001). For example, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737) defined corporate governance as: “the way in 
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on 
their investment” and  La Porta et al. (2000, p. 4) as “ a set of mechanisms through 
which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by managers and 
controlling shareholders”. The above definitions primarily focussed on the interests 
of shareholders whilst ignoring the interests of non-investing stakeholders. 
 
On the other hand, others broaden their definition to include stakeholders. From a 
stakeholder perspective, Tirole (2001, p. 4) defines corporate governance as: “the 
design of institutions that induce or force management to internalise the welfare of 
stakeholders”. OECD (2004, p. 11) defines corporate governance “a set of 
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and 
other stakeholders”. This definition specifically focuses on inter-relationship with 
various stakeholders. Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008, p. 416) defined corporate 
governance as: “a set of corporate governance mechanisms that is specially designed 
to monitor and ratify managerial decisions and to ensure the efficient operation of a 
corporation on behalf of its stakeholders.” This definition concentrates on 
monitoring managers on behalf of stakeholders. In the view of  Solomon (2010, p. 6) 
corporate governance is: “the system of checks and balances, both internal and 
external to companies, which ensures that companies discharge their accountability 
to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their 
business activity”.  This definition includes economic, social, and ethical 
responsibility of directors. 
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Corporate governance has shifted from shareholder-focused to stakeholder focused 
paradigm following recent financial scandals around the world. Given that, the 
corporate governance system of a firm may be biased either towards shareholders 
alone (shareholder-focused corporate governance) or towards a broader stakeholder 
groups (stakeholder-focused corporate governance) and this bias will have 
implications for a firm’s disclosure practices. In shareholder-focused corporate 
governance, corporate directors and managers have fiduciary duties to run the firm 
for its shareholders only. Shareholder-focused corporate governance system focuses 
only on the issues that resolve agency conflicts among managers and owners. 
Consequently, shareholder-focused corporate governance concentrates on 
maximising shareholder value, rather than having a relationship with a variety group 
of stakeholders. 
 
By contrast, in stakeholder-focused corporate governance, board members and 
managers may clearly consider a broader group of stakeholders when making 
decisions. (Devinney, Schwalbach & Williams 2013). Stakeholder-focused corporate 
governance is a set of corporate governance mechanisms that  seek to maximise 
value for shareholders while satisfying the legitimate demands of stakeholders 
(Durden 2008).  It concentrates on the issues that go beyond traditional view to touch 
upon corporate ethics, accountability, disclosure, and reporting for the interests of 
other stakeholders.  “Stakeholder-focused corporate governance leads to higher 
investor confidence, more stable earnings, and a better share price”, says Jim 
Roger, Chairman, President, and CEO of Duke Energy. Jim Roger proposes four 
aspects to be stakeholder-focused corporate governance: create sustainable 
stewardship, be thoughtful and sceptical, create an environment of engagement, and 
talk to others. 
2.7.1. Corporate governance in Australia 
The ASX formed its Corporate Governance Council (CGC) in Australia in 2002 and 
published its “Principles of Good Governance and Best Practice Recommendations” 
in 2003.  The ASX CGC defines corporate governance as: “the system by which 
companies are directed and managed” (ASXCGC 2003, p. 2). In addition, the 
ASXCGC revised its recommendations in 2007 and 2010. The Council revised its 
corporate governance as: “the framework of rules, relationships, systems and 
processes within and by which authority is exercised and controlled in corporations” 
(ASXCGC 2007, p. 3). 
 
The ASXCGC developed  28 recommendations based on  ten essential principles of 
good corporate governance (Gibson & O'Donovan 2007).  A firm should (i) lay solid 
foundations for management and oversight, (ii) structure the board to add value, (iii) 
promote ethical and responsible decision-making, (iv) safeguard integrity in financial 
reporting, (v) make timely and balanced disclosure, (vi) respect the rights of the 
shareholders, (vii) recognise and manage risk, (viii) encourage enhanced 
performance, (ix) remunerate fairly and responsibly and (x) recognise the legitimate 
interests of stakeholders (ASXCGC 2007, p. 3).   
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
26 
 
The AXSCGC expects that Australian firms with good corporate governance should 
be structured as follows: (i) a majority of the board should be independent directors, 
(ii) the chairperson should be an independent director, (iii) the roles of chairperson 
and chief executive officer should not be exercised by the same individual, (iv) the 
board should establish an audit committee, which comprises only non-executive  
directors, a majority of whom are independent directors, (v) the board or appropriate 
board committee should establish policies on risk oversight and management, and 
(vi) establish and disclose a code of conduct to guide compliance with legal and 
other obligations to legitimate stakeholders (ASXCGC 2007, p. 3). 
 
Australian firms adopt Anglo-based corporate governance mechanisms, which is 
market-based and primarily focus on interests of shareholders (Young & Thyil 
2013).  Although Australian firms follow Anglo-based corporate governance, over 
the past few years, stakeholder perspectives have increasingly been included in 
Australian corporate governance mechanisms (Young & Thyil 2013). According to 
Pham et al. (2012) “Australian corporate system offers a unique environment for 
assessing the impact of corporate governance mechanisms” (Pham, Suchard & Zein 
2012, p. 84). There are significance institutional differences between Australia and 
countries such as UK and US with regards to stock market development, ownership 
concentration, and institutional shareholding.  Overall, it is not clear if Australian 
firms’ corporate governance mechanisms are on the whole shareholder-focussed or 
stakeholder-focussed.  
 
Firstly, although Australian companies have corporate governance mechanisms that 
are similar in design to those in the UK and US, with regards to stock market 
development to GDP index, UK and US firms have higher values than those in 
Australia. Corporations in UK and US were much more active in corrective 
mechanisms against managerial entrenchment and corporate failure than Australia 
(Pham, Suchard & Zein 2012). Secondly, Australian firms have higher concentration 
of blockholders ownership and lower institutional shareholding as compared with 
UK and US firms (Pham, Suchard & Zein 2012). These differences in Australian 
firms provide a unique institutional setting within which to test the impact of 
corporate governance on voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information. 
2.8. Voluntary disclosure and corporate     
  governance quality 
The Triple Bottom Line (TBL) reporting of financial, social and environmental 
issues has emerged since 1990s and since then, many firms have been disclosing 
separate standalone sustainability reports and additional complementary information 
in their annual reports voluntarily around the world (Gibson & O'Donovan 2007).  
Firms make use of the TBL reporting to legitimise their operations in terms of 
sustainability (Rao, Tilt & Lester 2012). Based on the prior literature, voluntary 
disclosure can be divided into four groups: financial voluntary disclosure, corporate 
sustainability voluntary disclosure, environmental voluntary disclosure and GHG 
emission voluntary disclosure.  
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A large body of research has extensively investigated the role of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the firm’s voluntary financial disclosures (see for 
instance, Forker (1992), Klein (2002), Eng and Mak (2003), among others). In this 
strand, there are several empirical studies which seek to show relationships between 
corporate governance mechanisms and corporate disclosures such as CSR, 
environmental disclosure, and GHG emission disclosure.  Firstly, this study 
summarises the literature on the link between corporate governance mechanisms and 
CSR. Secondly, this study reviews the literature on the relationship between 
environmental disclosure and corporate governance. Finally, the relationship 
between climate change disclosure particularly GHG emission disclosure and 
corporate governance are reviewed. 
 
2.8.1. Corporate governance and CSR 
A limited number of studies have empirically examined how corporate governance 
mechanisms influence CSR (Harjoto & Jo 2011; Jo & Harjoto 2012; Mallin, 
Michelon & Raggi 2013; Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013). Harjoto and Jo (2011) studied 
four competing hypotheses: namely conflict resolution, overinvestment, strategic 
choice, and product-signalling to examine the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on CSR. The conflict resolution hypothesis assumes that managers may 
use CSR to reduce conflict among various stakeholders. The overinvestment 
hypothesis predicts that firms with effective corporate governance mechanisms were 
less likely to engage in CSR; the strategic-choice hypothesis suggests that managers 
strategically use CSR to increase their job security; and finally, the product-
signalling hypothesis proposes that there is no association between corporate 
governance mechanisms and CSR. They found that firms used corporate governance 
mechanisms and CSR in order to reduce conflict among stakeholders, which, in turn, 
tended to increase the firm’s value.  
 
Jo and Harjoto (2012) investigated the empirical association between corporate 
governance and CSR. They introduced two competing hypotheses: the conflict-
resolution hypothesis based on stakeholder theory and the overinvestment hypothesis 
based on agency theory.  They argued that there was a positive association between 
corporate governance and CSR according to the conflict-resolution hypothesis and a 
negative association according to the overinvestment hypothesis.  In addition, if 
managers used effective corporate governance mechanisms together with CSR to 
resolve conflict among stakeholders, then there was a positive relationship between a 
firm’s profitability and CSR according to the conflict-resolution hypothesis. Their 
results support the conflict-resolution hypothesis supporting stakeholder theory.  
 
Mallin, Michelon and Raggi (2013) have divided corporate governance mechanisms 
into two broader perspectives: stakeholder-orientation corporate governance based 
on stakeholder theory and monitoring intensity of corporate governance based on 
agency theory. They found that stakeholder-orientation of corporate governance 
influenced CSR.  Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) investigated whether corporate 
governance mechanisms could influence the contributions of CSR to corporate 
financial performance. They find that board independence, board size, board 
diversity, government ownership were positively related to CSR, and blockholders’ 
ownership and institutional ownership were both negatively related to CSR.  
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2.8.2. Corporate governance and environmental     
  disclosure 
The association between corporate governance and voluntary environmental 
disclosure is another issue that is broadly investigated in the existing literature. For 
example, Rupley, Brown and Marshall (2012) examined the relationship between 
corporate governance, media coverage and voluntary environmental disclosure using 
127 US firms for the period of 2000 to 2005. They introduced multi-stakeholder 
governance mechanisms aspects with the quality of voluntary environmental 
disclosure. The variables of multi-stakeholder governance mechanisms included in 
their study were board independence, gender diversity, multiple directorships, 
separation of the CEO from the board chairman, and the existence of environmental 
committee. They found that board independence, gender diversity, and multiple 
directorships had a positive influence, whilst media coverage negatively impacted on 
the quality of the voluntary environmental disclosure. 
 
Buniamin et al. (2008) investigated the relationships between a set of separate 
corporate governance variables: board independence, CEO duality, managerial share 
ownership, and board size, and levels of voluntary environmental disclosures in 
annual reports. They used content analysis of 243 companies listed in Malaysia. 
They found a positive association between board size and levels of voluntary 
environmental disclosure. They did not find an association between board 
independence, CEO duality, and managerial share ownership and levels of voluntary 
environmental disclosure in annual reports. 
2.8.3. Corporate governance and GHG emission   
  disclosure 
Research on voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information is a very new 
concept and the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure 
of GHG emission information was rarely studied in the prior literature. The study by 
Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) is an exception and they focussed on 
voluntary disclosures of GHG emissions and corporate governance variables. They 
specifically examined the relationship between board independence, CEO duality 
and diversity, and levels of information disclosures about GHG emissions. They did 
not find a significant relationship between voluntary disclosure of GHG emissions 
and board independence. Moreover, a significant positive relationship between CEO 
duality and disclosures of GHG emissions disappeared when controlling for the 
intensity of GHG emissions. They found that boards of directors were more focused 
on creation of economic value than on the disclosure of GHG emission information. 
Peters and Romi (2014) examined whether or not environmental corporate 
governance characteristics associated with voluntary GHG emission disclosure by 
using a sample of firms participating in the CDP from 2002 to 2006. They argued 
that environmental corporate governance participants view GHG emission 
disclosures as a potentially important strategic device for meeting the environmental 
information demands of stakeholders. To address this issue, they took two broad 
theoretical views: an economic perspective and an ethics-based perspective. The 
economic-based approach is that the firm makes GHG emission disclosure decisions 
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primarily focused on its investors due to economic pressure. Given that, the firm may 
analyse its costs and benefits with regards to decisions about voluntary disclosure 
decision of GHG emission information.  On the other hand, the ethical-based 
approach views the firm’s GHG emission disclosure decisions as a broader response 
to the demands of stakeholders. They focus on the relationship between voluntary 
GHG emission disclosure and environmental committee, the existence of a 
sustainability officer, the size of the environmental committee size the existence of 
sustainability officer as factors.   
 
 
They found that the presence of an environmental committee, committee size, 
number of committee meetings, expertise of committee members, existence of a 
sustainability officer, and overlap between the environmental committee and audit 
committee was positively associated with the probability of GHG emission 
disclosure. In addition, they found that the presence of a sustainability officer and the 
level of expertise of the environmental committee were positively associated with 
GHG emission disclosure transparency, and the existence of a larger environmental 
committee was negatively associated with the transparency of GHG emission 
disclosures.  
 
Ben-Amar and McIlkenny (2014) examined the relationship between board of 
directors’ effectiveness and voluntary GHG emission disclosure using a sample of 
200 publicly listed companies on the Toronto Stock Exchange for the period of 2008 
to 2011. They measured voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information based 
primarily on CDP questionnaires. Board effectiveness is an index as a measure of the 
effectiveness of the board of directors used by the University of Toronto’s Clarkson 
Centre of Business Ethics and Board Effectiveness. They found a positive 
relationship between board effectiveness and voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information in Canadian firms.  
 
Liao, Luo and Tang (2014) examined the impact of corporate board’s characteristics 
on the voluntary disclosure of GHG emissions in the form of a CDP questionnaire 
using a sample of 329 largest firms in the UK. They primarily focussed on three 
corporate governance variables such as gender diversity, board independence, and 
the presence of environmental committee. They argued using legitimacy and 
stakeholder theories that GHG emission reduction strategies and initiatives involving 
large investment had complex and vague consequences that may affect a variety of 
stakeholders. Therefore, an effective board may have power to address issues raised 
by various stakeholders. They have found that gender diversity, board independence 
and the presence of an environmental committee have an impact on voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emissions without considering endogeneity and selection bias 
issues.  
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2.9. Voluntary disclosure and corporate  
   governance in Australia 
Since climate change differentially impacts countries (Aggarwal & Dow 2012) the 
country of origin of a firm has an impact in determining the level of disclosure 
(Adams 2002). Therefore, research on the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information using a single 
country may provide greater insights. As Australian listed firms have unique 
institutional background compared to the US and the UK, the above relationship may 
provide clear picture as far as Australian firms concerned. There are only a limited 
number of research studies in the Australian market. 
 
Clarkson, Overell and Chapple (2011) claim that first Australian study that 
investigates environmental disclosure is the study by Deegan and Rankin (1996).  
Australian listed companies have had a tendency to disclose excessive amounts of 
positive environmental data (Cowan & Gadenne 2005). A content analysis was used 
in this study to investigate environmental disclosures in annual reports of the 
companies during the period 1998 to 2000. Gibson and O’Donovan (2007) using 
content analysis have documented that the percentage of environmental disclosures 
in annual reports has increased over a 21-year period (1983- 2003). Frost (2007) 
argued that while Australian regulators have not been active in introducing 
mandatory environmental reporting in annual reports, there has been some 
consideration of releasing a number of guidelines for voluntary environmental 
disclosures developed by the Australian government. He has noted that Australian 
firms have disclosed an increased amount of environmental information in annual 
reports and standalone sustainability reports. He found that voluntary reporting 
provides more consistent substantial information on environmental performance. 
Previous Australian studies on environmental disclosures have focused only on 
annual reports as a source of getting data about environmental disclosures. 
 
Chan, Watson and Woodliff (2014) analysed the relationship between corporate 
governance quality and CSR disclosures using the annual reports from a sample of 
222 Australian listed firms. They argue that firms with good corporate governance 
should theoretically be better corporate citizens and more socially and 
environmentally responsible than firms with poor corporate governance, therefore, 
they expected that there would be a strong positive association between corporate 
governance quality and voluntary disclosure of CSR. Their argument is based on 
stakeholder and legitimacy theories. Using Horwath ranks to test for corporate 
governance quality, they found that Australian firms with corporate governance 
quality were positively related with voluntary disclosure of CSR.   
 
Recently, Rao, Tilt and Lester (2012) examined the association between corporate 
governance mechanisms and voluntary environmental disclosure using a sample of 
96 large firms in Australia. They argued that characteristics such as board 
independence, board size, and female director on the board influence the voluntary 
disclosure of environmental information. They did find that board independence, 
female director on the board, and board size had positive influence on the voluntary 
disclosure of environmental information in Australia.  
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Rankin, Windsor & Wahyuni (2011) examined the relationship between voluntary  
GHG disclosures, internal organisational systems and private regulation that have 
guided GHG disclosures as evidence of reported corporate response to climate 
change. Institutional governance theory (Griffiths, Haigh & Rassias 2007) has been 
used  to explain voluntary GHG reporting in the context of a market governance 
system in the absence of climate change public policy. They argued that the 
institutional environment would impact upon the quality of climate change 
governance, and encourage firms to be proactive in pursuing avenues to address 
climate change.  
 
They construct a  voluntary GHG emissions disclosure index from the GHG 
reporting standard measured based on ISO 14064-1 items for a sub-sample of 80 
disclosing firms. Corporate governance quality is measured as a composite measure 
based on the Howarth reports. Their final sample of ASX firms consists of 187 firms 
including 80 firms that report GHG emissions information in their 2007 company 
reports. They found firms that voluntarily disclosed GHG emissions data had 
environmental management systems, higher corporate governance quality and 
publicly report to the CDP, tended to be larger and were in the energy and mining 
industrial sectors. They recommended that the extent and credibility of voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emissions were greater for firms that reported their GHG 
emission through the CDP.  
 
Borghei-Ghomi and Leung (2013) investigated the determinants of GHG emission 
voluntary disclosure based on a sample of 151 Australian firms. They measured the 
GHG emission disclosure index using only annual reports of firms based on GRI 
guidelines. They included a single corporate governance variable, which is the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board. They found a positive association 
between the proportion of non-executive directors on the board and voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emission information.  
 
The above two Australian studies by Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni (2011) and 
Borghei-Ghomi and Leung (2013) investigated the relationship between corporate 
governance and voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information in an Australian 
setting.  Rankin, Windsor and Wahyuni (2011) adopt corporate governance quality 
ranked by the Howarth reports.  Kohl and Schaefers (2012) argued that researches 
based on self-constructed or professionally prepared corporate governance quality, 
were more likely to be inadequate proxies for corporate governance for three  
reasons.  
 
Firstly, there was the possibility of avoiding important corporate governance 
characteristics in their calculations. Secondly, the construction of corporate 
governance quality was necessarily biased to the extent that weights were more or 
less arbitrarily assigned to certain corporate governance variables.  Finally, 
professional agencies have not delivered reliable and accurate corporate governance 
ratings (Sonnenfeld 2004). Sonnenfeld (2004, p. 108)  criticises professional rating 
agencies’ scoring of corporate governance effectiveness based solely on public 
records using simplistic checklists of standards or metrics based heavily upon myths, 
rather than genuine research. Beekes, Brown and Zhang (2014) noted that the 
Horwath corporate governance ratings focus on key features of corporate governance 
that were not all encompassing measures.  
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Additionally, a single corporate governance attribute does not give a full picture of a 
firm’s corporate governance practices. A wide range of corporate governance 
attributes was needed to see the better corporate governance practices. This research 
gap between broad ranges of corporate governance attributes and voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emission information will be filled by this research.  
 
It is argued that firms with better corporate governance quality disclose higher levels 
of voluntary information. In Australia, a few studies have documented the 
relationship between board characteristics and voluntary disclosures in annual 
reports. Beekes and Brown (2006) examine the association between corporate 
governance quality rating and disclosures of information in relation to price sensitive 
announcements using a sample of 250 Australian firms. They find that better 
corporate governance firms do make more informative disclosures.  Lim, Matolcsy 
and Chow (2007) examined the association between board composition and 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports for 2001 by 181 Australian companies. Firstly, 
they found a positive association between board composition and voluntary 
disclosure of information. Secondly, they found a more positive association between 
board independence and forward-looking and strategic disclosures.  The above 
studies did not examine the relationship between voluntary GHG emissions 
disclosures, corporate governance and earnings management. 
 
One of the key purposes of this study is to provide an explanatory association 
between levels of voluntary disclosures and a set of separate corporate governance 
variables. A number of studies document the relationship between overall corporate 
governance quality and voluntary disclosure in annual reports in different markets 
with mixed findings (Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010; Baek, Johnson & Kim 2009; Chau 
& Gray 2010; Gul & Leung 2004; Ho & Wong 2001). This research, therefore, 
examines specific corporate governance variables (in the following sections) and 
their relationship to voluntary disclosure of GHG emissions. 
2.9.1. Board independence 
The board of directors is referred to as an internal governance mechanism that tends 
to ensure that the interest of shareholders and managers are closely monitored and 
controlled. Fama and Jensen (1983) posit that the board of directors is the internal 
governance mechanism accountable for observing actions by the top management. 
The role of the board of directors is to provide final approval of each firm’s strategy, 
monitor and control senior executive’s performance and their implementation 
strategy, approval of financial and other reports. The boards of directors generally 
consist of executive and non-executive directors. Executive directors are elected at 
shareholders’ meetings and are employed by a firm. Non-executive directors are also 
elected by board and not employed by the firm. An executive director who has a 
relationship with firm other than his position as a non-executive director such as a 
substantial shareholder, as a management consultant or advisor, as a supplier or 
customer, will not be treated as an independent director. Independent non-executive 
directors have no other relationship with the firm other than as non-executive 
directors. 
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Corporate governance is deemed to be effective if the firm has a majority of 
independent directors who monitor and control senior management in order to reduce 
the self-serving actions of senior management executives and reduce information 
asymmetry by disclosing relevant information in their periodic reports and on their 
websites.  The ASXCGC (2007) recommends that a majority of the board should be 
independent (Recommendation 2.1). When determining the independent status of a 
director the board should consider whether a director:  
I. is a substantial shareholder of the company or an officer of, or otherwise 
associated directly with, a substantial shareholder of the company 
II. is employed, or has previously been employed in an executive capacity by the 
company or another group member, and there has not been a period of at least 
three years between ceasing such employment and serving on the board 
III. has within the last three years been a principal of a material professional 
adviser or a material consultant to the company or another group member; or 
an employee materially associated with the service provided 
IV. is a material supplier or customer of the company or other group member, or 
an officer of or otherwise associated directly or indirectly with a material 
supplier or customer 
V. has a material contractual relationship with the company or another group 
member other than as a director (extracted from the ASXCGC, 2007:17). 
 
An independent director is a non-executive director who is not a member of 
management and who is free of any business or other relationship that could 
materially interfere with the independent exercise of their judgment (ASXCGC 
2007) Fama and Jensen (1983) have argued that independent directors have 
incentives to develop their reputations as experts in monitoring managers because 
value of their human capital depends preliminary on their performance as internal 
managers in other organisation. They have further argued that independent directors 
can reduce the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. 
Beasley (1996) has found that the existence of independent directors on the board 
reduces the likelihood of financial statement fraud. All non-executive directors on 
the board of directors are not independent directors. Non-executive directors can be 
classified as independent and grey directors. An independent director is a non-
executive director who has no affiliation with the firm than the affiliation from being 
on the board of directors. A ‘grey director’ is not a current employee of the firm and 
has a potential source of violation of board independence because of their other 
affiliations with management (Beasley 1996) 
 
Rupley, Brown and Marshall (2012) have argued that independent directors are on 
the boards to monitor, influence, and provide outside perspective to assist a firm in 
attaining their strategic goals. They have further argued that independent directors 
were more likely to disclose more transparent and quality environmental information. 
They found that a positive association existed between voluntary environmental 
disclosure and the board independence. 
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 Independent directors can play a major role in making decision with regards to a 
firm’s voluntary disclosure (Ajinkya, Bhojraj & Sengupta 2005). Recently, Ben-
Amar and Zeghal (2011) examined the relationship between board independence and 
level of executive compensation disclosures for firms listed on Toronto Stock 
exchange. They argued that an independent board has the ability to monitor 
managers in disclosing higher levels of executive compensation information and 
package to motivate executives. They have found a positive association between 
board of directors’ independence and executive compensation disclosure. More 
independent directors on a board are needed to monitor and control the actions of 
internal managers and limit inside members ‘opportunistic behaviours’ (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976).  Earnings management creates information asymmetry between 
contracting parties, and it tends to decrease shareholders’ wealth (Park & Shin 2004).  
Firms with more independent directors on the board are more likely to constrain 
earnings management (Peasnell, Pope & Young 2005; Xie, Davidson III & DaDalt 
2003). 
 
A number of studies found a significant positive association between the proportion 
of independent directors on the board and the levels of voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports (Chau & Gray 2010; Huafang & Jianguo 2007). On the other hand,  Eng and 
Mak (2003), Gul and Leung (2004) Haniffa and Cooke (2005) found that the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board has been negatively associated 
with the levels of voluntary disclosures. In addition, Barako, Hancock and Izan 
(2006a) and Ho and Wong (2001) did not find an association between board 
independence and voluntary disclosure.  
2.9.2. CEO duality 
The ASX recommends that the chairperson should be an independent director. The 
role of the chairman of the board is to lead board meetings, and supervise the process 
of recruiting and sacking, evaluating, compensating the CEO. These critical roles can 
only be performed by an independent chairperson (Jensen 1993). Subramaniam, 
McManus and Zhang (2009) argued that independent chairmen monitor the board 
and the CEO to keep their reputations. Since an independent chairman does not have 
any material relationship with the firm, he or she can lead the board very 
successfully. They found that a firm with an independent chairman induces the board 
to create a risk management committee. CEO duality is the practice of one person 
serving both as a firm’s CEO and board chair (Peng, Zhang & Li 2007).  Effective 
corporate governance does not allow an individual to serve as CEO and chair of the 
board of director. The CEO is a firm’s chief strategist, who is in charge of initiating 
and implementing company-wide plans and policies, while the role of the 
chairperson is to ensure that the board works effectively in advising and monitoring 
the CEO (Chancharat, Krishnamurti & Tian 2012). Agency theory predicts that the 
power of CEO duality may reduce the intensity of monitoring. As a result, firms may 
disclose less information which leads to increase information asymmetry (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976).  Chau and Gray (2010) argue that the CEO duality prevents him/her 
from running a firm effectively. The presence of an independent director on the 
board induces managers to release more voluntary information to the outsiders. They 
found a positive relationship between the existence of an independent chairman and 
levels of voluntary disclosure in their study. 
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Gul and Leung (2004) argued that since firms with concentrated power of CEO 
duality are less likely to be effective in monitoring management and disclosing a 
higher level of voluntary information, therefore, there might be a negative 
association between CEO duality and levels of  voluntary disclosures. They reported 
that CEO duality is negatively associated with levels of voluntary disclosures. Forker 
(1992) found a negative association between CEO duality and disclosure of share 
options. In contrast, Ho and Wong (2001) and Barako, Hancock and Izan (2006a) did 
not find an association between levels of voluntary disclosures and CEO duality. 
This study expects to find a negative relationship between levels of voluntary 
disclosures of GHG emissions and CEO duality. 
2.9.3. Board gender diversity 
The ASXCGC (2014, p. 11) recommends (3.3) that ‘companies should disclose in 
each annual report the measurable objectives for gender diversity set by the board in 
accordance with the diversity policy and progress with achieving them’. Women and 
men have different motivations in social responsibility (Post, Rahman & Rubow 
2011).  In this context, the presence of women on the board of directors is expected 
to have an impact on social responsible disclosure. Since women on boards have 
more social empathic and caring qualities (i.e., female stereotypical behaviour), they 
are more socially responsible (Boulouta 2013).    
 
Rupley, Brown and Marshall (2012) have argued that female directors on a board are 
more likely to disclose more environmental information to the public. They find that 
the gender diversity has an impact on voluntary environmental disclosure.   Rao, Tilt 
and Lester (2012) argue that board diversity has an impact on the disclosure of 
environmental information. They found that women directors on boards are 
positively associated with voluntary environmental disclosure. Bear, Rahman and 
Post (2010) suggested that firms may use the number of women on the board as a 
signal to stakeholders that they are socially responsible firms. They find a positive 
association between the number of women on the board and community and 
diversity dimensions of CSR.   
 
Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero and Ruiz (2012) investigated the board gender diversity 
and CSR and found that the board with three or more women members have 
disclosed more CSR information. Amran, Lee and Devi (2014) investigated the role 
of the board gender diversity in sustainability reporting quality in the Asia-Pacific 
region. They argue that the presence of female directors on the board was more likely 
to result in an enhancement in the quality of sustainability information. However, 
they found no relationship between the board gender diversity and quality of 
sustainability disclosure.   
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Liao, Luo and Tang (2014) argued that female directors on the board were more 
likely to be assigned and to accept roles that were related to sustainability 
development matters; therefore, the presence of women on the board would increase 
the voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information. They found a positive 
association between the proportion of women directors on the board and voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emission information for the UK firms. Prado-Lorenzo and 
Garcia-Sanchez (2010) argued that women members of the board of directors were 
more likely to disclose higher GHG emission information. However, they found no 
relationship between the board gender diversity and disclosure of GHG emission 
information. Overall, there is mixed evidence regarding the role of gender diversity 
on GHG emissions disclosure.  
2.9.4. Directors’ share ownership 
Managerial share ownership is the percentage of ordinary shares owned by both 
executive and non-executive directors.  Equity-based compensation is a corporate 
governance device that attempts to constrain managers’ self-serving activities. Jensen 
(1986) has predicted that external directors have less incentives to constrain 
managers when they have low managerial share ownership. A few studies focus on 
the relationship between percentage of managerial share ownership and levels of 
voluntary disclosures and find mixed findings. Arcay et al. (2005) found a positive 
association in the relationship, while Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) and Eng and 
Mak (2003) found a negative relationship between managerial share ownership and 
levels of voluntary disclosures. Agency theory predicts that a firm’s top management 
should have a significant equity-based ownership in order to act on behalf of owners. 
It is believed that managers may disclose a greater amount of GHG emission 
information voluntarily to show that they work in the interest of shareholders. 
 
 Li and Qi (2008) examined managerial share ownership and voluntary disclosure for 
Chinese listed firms and found a positive association between the two variables. 
They argue that managers with high share ownership were more likely to disclose 
more voluntary information to avoid high agency costs. This was because managers 
were concerned about shareholders’ benefit and stock options, and this may provide 
an incentive to managers for them to disclose more voluntary information. Therefore, 
based on theory, this research expects a positive relationship between levels of 
voluntary disclosures of GHG emissions and the percentages of managerial share 
ownership. The Corporation Act 2001 requires every director of a listed company to 
notify the ASX about holdings and changes to relevant interests in securities (ASIC 
2008). Directors’ shareholding is measured by ratio of directors’ shareholding 
(direct, indirect, and beneficial holding) to total share outstanding (Koh 2005). 
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2.9.5. Institutional share ownership 
Institutional share ownership is the percentage of ordinary shares held by 
institutional investors. Institutional investors include insurance companies (life and 
non-life), superannuation and pension funds, investment trusts (including investment 
trust), financial institutions (bank and bank nominee companies, finance companies, 
building societies and credit cooperatives), investment companies, and other nominee 
companies associated with the  above categories of institutions (Koh 2003). 
Institutional investors demand GHG emission information to assess the risk and 
opportunities associated with climate change. Corporate directors, therefore, need to 
disclose such information voluntarily, even in the absence of any mandatory 
requirement industry-wide. Aggarwal and Dow (2011) found that institutional 
investors do not exert direct influence on decisions regarding adoption of GHG 
emission mitigation strategies at the firm level. Their pressures seem more dedicated 
at influencing public policy such as promoting GHG emission disclosure through the 
CDP. 
 
Attig et al. (2012) argued that long-horizon institutional investors have greater 
efficiency and incentives to engage in effective monitoring. They found that 
institutional investors with long-term investment horizon played an efficient 
governance role to mitigate information asymmetry and agency problems as opposed 
to investors with a short-term horizon. Ismail and Rahman (2012) suggested that 
institutional investors are playing more effective roles in monitoring company’s risk 
management disclosure compared to the board of directors. 
 
Marshall, Brown and Plumlee (2011) examined the relationship between different 
types of intuitional investors and the quality of a firm’s voluntary environmental 
disclosures. They argued that the types of institutional investors provide different 
levels of monitoring and controlling. They divide the institutional investor into two 
groups such as short-horizon institutional investors and long-horizon institutional 
investors. Long term institutional investors were more likely to engage with 
management whereas short-term institutional investors were less likely to engage in 
activities that influenced managerial decision making. They find that short-term 
institutional investors may limit the extent of voluntary disclosure of environmental 
information. They suggested that voluntary environmental disclosure was likely to be 
perceived as a long term issue.  
 
Hsu and Koh (2005) suggest that long-term oriented institutional investors can act as 
a corporate governance mechanism to mitigate managerial rent-seeking activities. 
Voluntary disclosure reduces information asymmetries between management and 
outside investors and among different types of investors. This, in turn, improves 
liquidity in a firm’s stock and makes it more attractive to institutional investors. 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) find a positive association between institutional 
shareholding and financial reporting quality. They recommended that disseminating 
more information can reduce information asymmetry between parities that also 
reduce risk associated with them.  
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Sharma (2004) argued that since Australian institutional investors have larger 
concentrated share ownership than the US they have more incentives in monitoring 
top management. She found a positive relation between the institutional shareholding 
and fraud. Institutional investors were more likely to use their shareholding to 
influence the board (Lau, Sinnadurai & Wright 2009). Koh (2003) suggested that 
institutional investors with high share ownership were more likely to use their power 
to monitor CEOs. 
 
Institutional investors with substantial investment in a firm’s ordinary shares have 
strong incentives to monitor firm management.  Thus, managers may disclose more 
voluntary information to meet the expectations of larger institutional shareholders 
(Barako, Hancock & Izan 2006b). Institutional investors play an important role in 
inducing firms to disclose a great amount of GHG emissions information. 
Institutional investors facilitate climate change information through the CDP. 
Harmes (2011) suggested that institutional investors incorporate climate change 
information into their investment decision-making and promote climate change 
mitigation by switching their investments from poor to good climate performers by 
putting direct pressure on corporate managers. 
 
Cotter and Najah (2012) found that the institutional investors positively influenced 
the disclosure of GHG emissions information.  Bushee and Noe (2000) find that 
institutional investors were attracted to firms with greater levels of disclosure.  Baek, 
Johnson and Kim (2009) found a positive association between voluntary disclosure 
and institutional share ownership. Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) found an 
insignificant relationship between voluntary disclosures and institutional share 
ownership.  This research expects that firms with higher institutional share 
ownership may experience more intensive monitoring. As a result, a firm with higher 
proportion of institutional share ownership may disclose more voluntary GHG 
emissions information. 
2.9.6. Frequency of audit committee meetings 
The  ASXCGC (2007) recommended that the audit committee should meet often 
enough to undertake its role effectively.  Abbott, Park and Parker (2000) argued that 
an audit committee that meets frequently was more likely to perform their duties 
effectively. Chung, Ho and Kim (2004) suggest that the presence of an audit 
committee serves as a means of mitigating agency cost, managerial opportunism, and 
improving disclosure quality. Xie, Davidson III and DaDalt (2003)  argued that an 
audit committee that seldom met may be less likely to engage in a monitoring role. A 
more active committee that met more often should be in a better position to engage in 
a monitoring role. This research will use frequency of audit committee meetings as a 
proxy for the levels of audit committee activities. Previous studies find a positive 
association between frequency of audit committee meetings and levels of 
information disclosure (Allegrini & Greco 2013; Ho & Wong 2001; O’Sullivan, 
Percy & Stewart 2008). However, Forker (1992) does not find an association 
between disclosure and the presence of an audit committee. 
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2.9.7. Size of audit committee 
The ASXCGC (2007) states that audit committee should have at least three members 
to do its duty. The maximum numbers of members of an audit committee is not 
limited by ASXCGC. Previous study between the size of audit committee and quality 
of its disclosure has produced mixed results. Some researchers argue that having 
larger audit committees tended to carry out its responsibilities more effectively; and 
therefore, this has an impact on disclosure quality. Pucheta-Martínez and De Fuentes 
(2007) argued that the more members there are in an audit committee, the more 
likely it is to put pressure on managers to disclose quality financial information. 
They found a positive association between the size of the audit committee and 
financial reporting quality. Felo, Krishnamurthy and Solieri (2003) argued that a 
larger audit committee is likely to spend adequate time and effort to ensure the 
quality of financial reporting. They found a positive association between the size of 
the audit committee and quality of financial disclosure.  
 
Lin, Xiao and Tang (2008) argued that, since audit committees with more members 
were not necessarily functioning very effectively rather; they tended to spend their 
time and effort arguing on trivial matters. This may lead to ineffective decision 
making which has an impact on disclosure quality. Scarbrough, Rama and 
Raghunandan (1998) argued that an audit committee with skilled members was more 
likely associated with the objectives of audit functions. Karamanou and Vafeas 
(2005, p. 458) argued that: “larger audit committees had a wider knowledge base on 
which to draw but were likely to suffer from process losses and diffusion of 
responsibility”.  Beasley et al. (2009) found that audit committee members provided 
effective monitoring of financial reporting and acted as an active member of an audit 
committee.  
2.10. Voluntary disclosures and earnings    
   management 
Earnings management studies “examine whether managers act as if they believe 
users of financial reporting data can be misled into interpreting reported accounting 
earnings as equivalent to economic profitability” (Fields, Lys & Vincent 2001, p. 
279). The opportunities for earnings management arise because of the flexibility 
permitted by generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Earnings 
management is more likely to occur when managers have the motivation to mislead 
their financial statement users by exercising discretion over accounting choices or 
real activities manipulation in financial reporting.  
 
Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) argued that “earnings management occurs when 
managers use judgment in the financial reporting and in structuring transactions to 
alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reporting accounting numbers”. Schipper (1989, p. 92) define earnings 
management as “a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting 
process, with the intent to obtain some private gain”.  
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Managers have several incentives to distort the true financial performance of the 
firm. Managers’ earnings management practice is associated with risks and costs. 
Prior research has identified several incentives for earnings management. Managers 
manage earnings to increase their compensation (Burns & Kedia 2006),   increase 
equity price (Burghstahler, Hail & Leuz 2006), and  reduce tax (Jones 1991). 
Although managers have various motivations for managing earnings, another motive 
is that managers manage earnings management while they engage in social 
responsible initiatives (Gargouri, Shabou & Francoeur 2010; Prior, Surroca & Tribó 
2008; Salewski & Zülch 2014). 
 
Zhou and Lobo (2001) note that: “corporate disclosure and earnings management 
are both subject to managers’ discretion; therefore, managers are likely to consider 
their interaction when exercising managerial discretion.” Voluntary disclosure of 
GHG emissions may contain both positive and negative information as well as 
current emissions and future strategies related to a firm operation. Mangers may have 
incentives to create a positive image about firm’s emission management. Decision to 
disclose voluntary GHG emission mostly depends on at managers’ discretion. 
Mangers may create positive image regarding their GHG emission related activities 
sometimes referred to as ‘greenwashing’. Greenwashing is defined by Lyon and 
Maxwell (2011, p. 9) as “selective disclosure of positive information about a 
company’s environmental or social performance without full disclosure of negative 
information on these dimensions, so as to create an overly positive image.”  
2.10.1. CSR and earnings management 
The relationship between earnings management and CSR disclosure can be analysed 
based on different perspectives such as whether or not the managers’ incentives are 
ethical or opportunistic. It is expected that firms with a higher ethical orientation are 
more likely to report accurate and reliable financial information. Ethical managers 
believe that socially responsible firms prefer to have long-term relationship with their 
stakeholders and therefore these managers provide more value-relevant information 
to the stakeholders in order to make their decisions correctly (Choi, Lee & Park 
2013). Kim, Park and Wier (2012) have argued that if managers engaged in 
sustainability disclosure focusing on the ethical commitment perspective, they were 
less likely to engage in earnings management; that would in turn to lead an accurate 
and high quality financial reporting.  Under this theory, firms with high level of 
ethical commitment would provide high quality of financial reporting than firms with 
lower ethical commitment (Choi & Pae 2011). Socially responsible firms are less 
likely to engage in negative social activities which could damage their reputation and 
public trust because good corporate citizens are less likely to experience negative 
social events (Laksmana & Yang 2009). In addition, Brine, Brown and Hackett 
(2006) have stated that the stakeholders grant the firms an unwritten authority to do 
business. If firms fail to manage their responsibility to society, they will lose their 
license to operate. If managers are ethical then they disclose more reliable and 
transparent CSR information as well as financial information. There should be a 
negative relationship between CSR disclosure and earnings management. In 
supporting this view, previous research has found a significant negative association 
between sustainability disclosure and earnings management (Cho, Lee & Pfeiffer 
2013; Heltzer 2011; Hong & Andersen 2011; Kim, Park & Wier 2012). 
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The separation of ownership and control creates a conflict between managers and 
shareholders that drives managers to pursue their personnel’s rent-seeking behaviour 
at the expense of shareholder interests. (Jensen & Meckling 1976).  Salewski and 
Zülch (2014) argue that firms that engage in earnings management may use 
sustainability disclosure as a means to cover up their opportunistic behaviour. If 
firms use sustainability disclosure as a means to cover up their de facto socially 
irresponsible behaviour, it may be actively engaged in earnings management. Kim, 
Park and Wier (2012) support this view by stating that firms may buy a form of 
reputational insurance by providing more sustainability information to the 
stakeholders, which gives them a license to manage earnings. Prior, Surroca and 
Tribó (2008) argue that managers disclose a generous amount of sustainability 
information as a tool to get support from major stakeholders of firms when they 
engage in earnings management.  Managers believe that investing more on 
sustainability disclosure is worthwhile in order for them to meet the demands of a 
broad group of stakeholders when they engage in earnings management. This action 
leads to disclosure of sustainability information at the expense of shareholders. 
Managers of those firms destroy shareholders’ value by making an investment 
decision based on sustainability disclosure. 
 
If managers are opportunistic, then they use sustainability disclosure as a device to 
mask their opportunistic behaviour. There is a positive relationship between 
sustainability disclosure and earnings management.  Recent researchers find a 
positive association between sustainability disclosure and earnings management 
(Prior, Surroca & Tribó 2008; Salewski & Zülch 2014). 
 
Hong and Andersen (2011) investigated the relationship betwee CSR and earnings 
management using  a sample of 8,078 US firm year observations. They proposed two 
conflicting arguments with respect to the association between CSR and earnings 
manahement. The first argument is based on ethical values and long-term 
profitability, where firms are relectant to engage in earnings manangement. The 
second argument is that firms use social responsibility as a license to operate when 
they engage in earnings management.  They found that more socially responsible 
firms had less earnings management. 
 
Kim, Park and Wier (2012) investigated whether or not socially responsible firms 
behaved in a responsible manner to constrain earnings management. Did firms 
disseminate transparent and reliable financial reporting to investors or were socially 
responsible firms disseminating transparent CSR to mislead stakeholders behind the 
appearance of transparency while engaging in earnings management? They argue 
that if managers engaged in CSR in a socially responsible manner, they were more 
likely to constrain earnings management and to make responsible operating 
decisions, thereby maintaining transparency in financial reporting. Therefore, a 
negative relationship will be observed between CSR and earnings management. On 
the other hand, if managers engage in CSR, managers of these firms are more likely 
to mislead stakeholders as to the value of the firms and financial performance.  
Therefore, a positive relationship will prevail between CSR and earnings 
management.  They found that CSR firms were less likely to engage in earnings 
management. They also found evidence that top executives of the CSR firms were 
less likely to be involved in Security Exchange Commission (SEC) investigations. In 
addition to the ethical commitment point of view, Kim, Park and Wier (2012) offer 
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two more explanations with regards to the relationship between sustainability 
disclosure and earnings management.  Firstly, to maintain the reputation of the firm, 
managers may use sustainability disclosure as a reputational signal and constrain 
earnings management. Secondly, firms with more economic slack are less likely to 
engage in earnings management and greater sustainability disclosure.    
 
Prior, Surroca and Tribó (2008) examined the relationship between CSR and 
earnings management using 593 international industrial firms in the 2002 – 2004 
period. They found a positive association between CSR and earnings management 
practices. Their study examines the relationships between voluntary disclosure of 
GHG emissions and earnings management without considering the moderating effect 
of corporate governance quality.  
 
There are a few studies that document the relationship between CSR and earnings 
management with mixed findings. Chih, Shen and Kang (2008) examined the 
relationship between earnings management and CSR using four different hypotheses 
namely myopia avoidance hypothesis, predictable earnings hypothesis, multiple 
objectives hypothesis, and institutional hypothesis. The myopia avoidance hypothesis 
posits that a socially responsible firm will not hide unfavourable earnings realisations 
so that they will not engage in earnings management. The relationship between CSR 
and earnings management will be negative according to the myopia avoidance 
hypothesis. The predictable earnings hypothesis predicts that firms with a high 
degree of CSR may tend to smooth earnings to ensure that reported earnings are 
more predictable. Therefore, the relationship between CSR and earnings 
management will be positive.  The multiple objectives hypothesis suggests that firms 
with high CSR may tend to manage earnings when managers try to serve all 
stakeholders in a firm. There will be a positive relationship between CSR and 
earnings management when they hold the multiple objectives hypothesis. The 
institutional hypothesis argues that there is no relationship between CSR and 
earnings management.  
 
Chih, Shen and Kang (2008)measure earnings management using earnings 
smoothing, earnings aggressiveness, and earnings losses and decreased avoidance. 
They find a negative association between CSR and earnings smoothing and losses 
and decreases and a positive association between CSR earnings aggressiveness 
suggesting that multiple objectives hypotheses holds.  Heltzer (2011) examined the 
relationship between earnings management and a sub-sample of CSR items using 
2171 US firms. He found that firms with environmental concerns exhibited higher 
earnings management than other sampled firms. 
 
Scholtens and Kang (2013) have investigated how earnings management is 
associated with CSR and investor protection using a sample of 139 firms in ten Asian 
countries for the period of 2004-2009. They argue that managers have incentives to 
disclose more CSR information to mitigate agency conflict between managers and 
shareholders.  As a result, CSR disclosure may reduce the incentives to engage 
earnings management. Two different methods of earnings management, namely 
earnings smoothing and earnings aggressiveness, are used in their studies to measure 
earnings management. Moreover, they expect that there is an inverse relationship 
between CSR and earnings management. They find that firms with good CSR are 
engaged significantly less in earnings management.  
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Yip, van Staden and Cahan (2011) examined the relationship between CSR and 
earnings management and whether or not the relationship was mitigated by political 
cost considerations or by the firm’s ethical predisposition using US listed firms from 
the food and oil and gas industries. They argued that the relationship between CSR 
and earnings management is affected by political environment. They found a 
negative relationship between CSR and earnings management for environmentally 
sensitive industries such as the oil and gas industry. In addition, they found a positive 
relationship between CSR disclosure and earnings management within the food 
industry. 
 
Gargouri, Shabou and Francoeur (2010) examined the relationship between corporate 
social performance (CSP) and earnings management using a sample of 109 Canadian 
companies for the years 2004 and 2005. They found a positive association between 
the level of CSP and earnings management.  Particularly, their findings show that 
environmental aspects of CSP were positively and significantly related with earnings 
management. They explained that such environmental activities contributed to 
significant costs that reduced financial performance, which appears to prompt 
managers to engage in earnings management. 
Rahmawati and Dianita (2011) examined the relationship between earnings 
management, CSR and financial performance for firms listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange during the years 2006-2008. They argued that managers who had 
incentives to manage earnings are very proactive in their public disclosure advertise 
through CSR activities, especially for companies with strict supervision. Conversely, 
companies with low levels of earnings management had little incentive to get a 
public response by promoting CSR activities. Empirically, they found that engaging 
in earnings management had no influence on CSR activities.  
 
Using Korean firms from 2002 to 2008, Choi, Lee and Park (2013) examined the 
relationship between CSR and earnings management with two different ownership 
models - concentrated and institutional shareholding. They argued that firms that 
focussed on the long-term perspective were more likely to provide transparent and 
quality CSR to investors, while constraining earnings management. Therefore, there 
would be negative association between CSR disclosure and earnings management. 
On the other hand, firms with managerial rent seeking behaviours were more likely 
to provide CSR activity for their opportunistic earnings management. A positive 
association between CSR and earnings management would therefore exist. They 
found support for the long-term perspective that a negative association exists 
between CSR disclosure and earnings management for all firms. Firms with highly 
concentrated ownership were using CSR as a tool to hide their managerial rent 
seeking activity. On the other hand, firms with higher levels of institutional 
investors’ shareholdings had lower incentives to use CSR as tool for hiding their 
opportunistic actions. 
 
Martínez-Ferrero, Garcia-Sanchez and Cuadrado-Ballesteros (2013) investigated the 
association between CSR and earnings management using a sample of 747 
international listed non-financial firms for the period 2002-2010. Following Francis, 
Nanda and Olsson (2008), they proposed two opposing views on the relationship 
between CSR and earnings management -  complementary and substitute relations. 
The complementary relationship viewpoint predicts that firms with good quality 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
44 
 
financial information (less earnings management) have incentives to disclose all 
kinds of CSR information. On the other hand, the substitutive relationship model 
posits that firms’ quality of financial reporting (more earnings management) and 
disclosed CSR information act as substitutes. They find that firms with high quality 
of financial information were more likely to report high quality sustainability 
information supporting a complementary relationship. 
2.10.2. Environmental disclosure and earnings  
     management 
Previous research extensively investigated a broader discussion of how CSR impacts 
on earnings management and findings are mixed. One potential explanation of these 
mixed results is that a broader perspective of CSR measures comprised of different 
aspects. Brammer and Millington (2008) note CSR is a “multidimensional construct 
that encompasses a large and varied range of corporate behaviour in relation to its 
resources, processes, and outputs”. Researchers will need to separate single 
component of CSR when developing and testing hypothesis with regards to CSR on 
other variables of interest (Moser & Martin 2012). Consequently, a border 
perspective of CSR may cause conflicting results on the association between CSR 
and earnings management (Litt, Sharma & Sharma 2014).   
 
Patten and Trompeter (2003) examined the relationship between the level of pre-
event environmental disclosure and the extent of earnings management in response to 
regulatory threat for a sample of 40 US chemical firms. They argued that managers 
believed environmental disclosure was an effective tool for reducing exposure to 
potential regulatory costs and decisions to manipulate earnings are tied to a larger 
corporate strategy for dealing with political pressures. They found a positive 
relationship between environmental disclosure and earnings management.  
 
Litt, Sharma and Sharma (2014) investigated the association between environmental 
disclosure and earnings management using a sample of, 2095 US firms for the period 
2004-2010. They source environmental disclosure data from KLD database. They 
argue that firms with environmental disclosures were associated with less earnings 
management based on an external monitoring theory and an internal corporate 
cultural theory.  The external theory predicts that environmentally responsible firms 
were less likely to engage in earnings management because these firms are closely 
monitored by external stakeholders such as regulators, investors, society, and media. 
Internal culture theory implies that since environmentally responsible firms 
incorporate good corporate cultures, they encourage employees to act less out of self-
interest. They have found that firms engaged in environmental initiatives were less 
likely to practice earnings management. 
  
Sun et al. (2010) investigated the association between environmental disclosures and 
earnings management using a sample of 245 UK firms for the financial year ending 
in March 2007. They argued that managers’ motivations with regards to voluntary 
environmental information acted as a signal to attract investors, enhancing their 
positive corporate image when they try to practice earnings management. They do 
not find a significant association between earnings management and corporate 
environmental disclosures. It is suspected that managers who engage in earnings 
management have incentives to disclose voluntarily generous amount of socially 
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responsible information such GHG emissions to get the grant support from 
environmental defence pressure groups. Prior research has supported this view 
(Cespa & Cestone 2007; Choi, Lee & Park 2013; Pagano & Volpin 2005; Prior, 
Surroca & Tribó 2008; Rahmawati & Dianita 2011; Sun et al. 2010). Sun et al. 
(2010) argued that managers had incentives to disclose voluntary environmental 
disclosures as a signal to attract existing and potential investors and to enhance 
positive corporate images when they attempted to engage in earnings management. 
Patten and Trompeter (2003) argued that managers had incentives to disclose 
environmental information that was an effective tool for reducing exposure to 
potential costs and decisions to manipulate earnings tied to a larger corporate 
strategy for dealing with political pressures. Based on the previous work on the 
relationship between social responsibility disclosures and earnings management, this 
research argues that firms may disclose higher quality of GHG emissions information 
in annual and sustainability reports and on their website as a consequence of earnings 
management. Therefore, it is expected that there will be a positive relationship 
between voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information and earnings 
management. The following table provides a brief description of previous research 
on the relationship between disclosure and earnings management. 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
46 
 
Table 2.1 Sustainability disclosure and earnings management 
 
 
Authors 
(year) 
Sustainability 
Disclosure 
Measure 
Earnings 
Management 
Measures 
Sample 
Period 
 (Size) 
Country Findings 
Patten and 
Trompeter 
(2003) 
Environmental 
disclosure 
Discretionary 
accruals 
1984 
(40) 
US Positive 
realtionship 
Chih, Shen 
and Kang 
(2008) 
The 
FTSE4Good 
Global 
Index 
Earnings 
smoothing, 
earnings 
aggressiveness, 
and earnings 
losses and 
avoidance 
1993-
2002 
(1,653) 
46 
countries 
Mixed 
relationship  
Prior, 
Surroca 
and Tribó 
(2008) 
CSR scores 
SiRi ProTM 
data 
Performance 
adjusted 
modified Jones 
mode  
2002-
2004 
(593) 
26 
countries 
Positive 
relationship 
Laksmana 
and Yang 
(2009) 
Dummy variable 
takes one if a 
firm is one of 
the 100 Best 
Corporate 
Citizen (BCC) 
by Business 
Ethics 
Magazines 
Earnings 
persistence, 
predictability, 
smoothness and 
accrual  
2001-
2002 
(1,778) 
USA Negative 
relationship 
Gargouri, 
Shabou 
and 
Francoeur 
(2010) 
Corporate social 
performance as 
provided by 
Michael Jantzi 
Research 
Associates –
Canadian Social 
Investment 
Database 
Modified Jones 
discretionary 
accruals  
2004-
2005 
(109) 
Canada Positive 
relationship 
Sun et al. 
(2010) 
Corporate 
environmental 
disclosure 
Performance 
adjusted 
discretionary 
accruals 
2007 
(245) 
UK No 
relationship 
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Authors 
(year) 
Sustainability 
Disclosure 
Measure 
Earnings 
Management 
Measures 
Sample 
Period 
 (Size) 
Country Findings 
Choi and 
Pae (2011) 
Ethical 
commitment 
index 
Discretionary 
accruals, 
accounting 
conservatism 
and accrual 
quality 
1998-
2008 
(242) 
Korea Negative 
relationship 
Heltzer 
(2011) 
Dummy variable  Discretionary 
accruals by 
modified Jones 
model 
2007 
(2,171) 
USA Negative 
relationship 
Hong and 
Andersen 
(2011) 
CSR score using 
KLD data 
Accrual  and 
real earnings 
management 
1995-
2005 
(8,078) 
USA Negative 
relationship 
Rahmawati 
and 
Dianita 
(2011) 
CSR score Modified Jones 
discretionary 
accruals   
2006-
2008 
(27) 
Indonesia No 
relationship 
Kim, Park 
and Wier 
(2012) 
CSR Score 
using KLD data 
Discretionary 
accruals, 
activity-based 
earnings 
management 
and SEC 
investigation 
1991-
2009 
(23,391) 
USA Negative 
relationship 
Choi, Lee 
and Park 
(2013) 
CSR rating by 
the Korean 
Economic 
Justice institute 
Modified Jones 
discretionary 
accruals   
2002-
2008 
(2,042) 
Korea Negative 
relationship 
Pyo and 
Lee (2013) 
Dummy variable 
takes 1 if a firm 
disclose CSR 
reports filed 
with GRI 
Modified Jones 
discretionary 
accruals  and 
Performance 
matched 
discretionary 
accruals 
2004-
2010 
(4,198) 
Korea Negative 
relationship 
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Authors 
(year) 
Sustainability 
Disclosure 
Measure 
Earnings 
Management 
Measures 
Sample 
Period 
 (Size) 
Country Findings 
Salewski 
and Zülch 
(2014) 
CSR Score base 
on the 
Kirchhoff 
Consult AG 
‘Good 
Company 
Ranking’ 
Performance 
adjusted 
modified Jones 
mode (Kothari, 
Leone and 
Wasley (2005) 
2005 to 
2009 
(258) 
European 
Blue Chips 
Positive 
relationship 
Scholtens 
and Kang 
(2013) 
the CSR score 
according to 
Asia 
Sustainability 
Research 
Earnings 
smoothing and 
earnings 
aggressiveness 
2009 
(139) 
10 
countries 
Negative 
relationship 
Martínez-
Ferrero, 
Garcia-
Sanchez 
and 
Cuadrado-
Ballesteros 
(2013) 
An ordinal 
variable takes 
values between 
0 and 3 if a firm 
disclose CSR 
reports with 
GRI guidelines 
Modified 
Jones 
discretionary 
accruals  and 
Performance 
adjusted 
modified Jones 
mode (Kothari, 
Leone and 
Wasley (2005) 
2010-
2010 
(747) 
25countries Negative 
relationship 
Litt, 
Sharma 
and 
Sharma 
(2014) 
Environmental 
disclosure 
(KLD) 
Performance 
adjusted 
modified Jones 
mode (Kothari, 
Leone and 
Wasley (2005) 
2004-
2006 
(2,095) 
USA Negative 
relationship 
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2.10.3. Voluntary disclosure, corporate governance  
     and earnings management 
 
The role of effective corporate governance is to mitigate the opportunistic behaviour 
of managers, improve firms’ reporting quality and increase firm value. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) stated that board of directors monitors each firm’s management in 
order to protect shareholder interests. Managers have incentives to engage in self-
serving managerial activities. Numerous researchers have found that managers can 
benefit from manipulating earnings for several reasons. Managers manipulate their 
earnings to capital market pressure (Healy & Wahlen 1999; Ho 2005) to increase 
their compensation (Cornett, Marcus & Tehranian 2008) and for job security, while 
Hazarika, Karpoff and Nahata (2012) indicate that board of directors have ability to 
act and discipline managers proactively who engage earnings manipulation for their 
self-interest. Several studies have found that an effective corporate governance 
mechanism can limit manager engage self-serving managerial activities (Dechow, 
Sloan & Sweeney 1996; Klein 2002).  
 
Prior research on the relationship between voluntary disclosure GHG and earnings 
management ignores the influence of a firm’s corporate governance variables such as 
moderating variables that can constrain the ability of managers to engage in earnings 
management. Until now, there is only one research that focused on the relationship 
between levels of disclosures of GHG emissions information, corporate governance 
and earnings management. Sun et al. (2010) investigated the association between 
corporate governance variables, corporate environmental disclosures and earnings 
management for the financial year ended on March 2007. They argued that managers 
had incentives to disclose voluntary environmental disclosures as a signal to attract 
existing and potential investors and to enhance a positive corporate image when they 
attempted to engage in earnings management. They did not find a significant 
association between earnings management and corporate environmental disclosures. 
However, they did find that the relationship between corporate environmental 
disclosures and earnings management was affected by dummy variables of board size 
and the total number of audit committee meetings.  
2.11. Voluntary disclosure and liquidity 
“Liquidity is believed to a cornerstone of the well-functioning capital market since it 
enhances the value of investors’ assets and lowers the cost of capital of firms” (Ali, 
Zhongzhi & Trabelsi 2013). The link between voluntary disclosure and liquidity of 
firms’ shares has received considerable attention in recent years (Balakrishnan et al. 
2013; Cho, Lee & Pfeiffer 2013; Haggard, Martin & Pereira 2008). Voluntary 
disclosure is a channel by which firms can improve their information quality which 
in turn can enhance liquidly of firms’ shares.  Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) show 
that managers’ choice of disclosing information voluntarily reduces information 
asymmetry between firms and investors which lowers the firms’ cost of capital. 
Healy and Palepu (2001)  provide a framework of managers’ voluntary disclosure 
choice in a capital market setting. They identify that voluntary disclosure improves 
stock liquidity, reduces cost of capital, and enhances information intermediation. 
Previous studies find support for a positive relationship between voluntary disclosure 
and liquidity. 
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Stock market liquidity is affected by information asymmetry. Information asymmetry 
creates agency conflicts between managers and outside investors as well as between 
informed and uninformed investors. Chen et al. (2007) argue that firms with poor 
information quality and disclosure practices experience serious information 
asymmetry problems. Managers may use voluntary disclosure and increased 
information quality to mitigate information asymmetry and therefore experience a 
decrease in agency conflicts. This action in turn increases the firm’s stock liquidity 
(Beyer et al. 2010; Cho, Lee & Pfeiffer 2013; Diamond & Verrecchia 1991).  
 
Kim (2014) investigates that whether firms’ voluntary commitment to disclose 
information affects the liquidity of the firm’s shares. He finds a positive effect on the 
liquidity of these firms. Using CSR scores, Cho, Lee and Pfeiffer (2013) investigate 
whether CSR performance affect liquidity of firms’ shares. They find that CSR is 
playing a positive role for investors reducing information asymmetry thereby 
enhancing liquidity. They further add to the existing literature by investigating the 
role of institutional ownership on the relationship between CSR and bid-ask spread 
and find that when there is a higher proportion of institutional ownership the degree 
of reduction in information asymmetry is reduced suggesting that informed investors 
may exploit CSR information advantages.  Bardos (2011) investigates the 
relationship between liquidity and quality of financial information and find a positive 
relationship between quality of financial information and liquidity. 
 
Managers may have incentives to disclose information voluntarily, which improve 
liquidity of firms’ shares that raises that increase a firm’s market value by lowering 
its cost of capital. Balakrishnan et al. (2013) examine whether managers have a 
choice to shape information voluntarily to improve their liquidity in order to increase 
firm value. They argue that managers may use voluntary disclosure of information as 
a means to influence the liquidity of their shares. They find that mangers can actively 
influence liquidity by providing information voluntarily. Agarwal et al. (2013) show 
that mandatory portfolio disclosure improves stock liquidity but imposes costs on 
informed investors. 
 
Stock market liquidity is an economic outcome that is commonly required by many 
regulators through the policy of disclosure regulation. Dhaliwal et al. (2014) suggests 
that the quality of information disclosure can reduce non-diversifiable risk in four 
ways. Firstly, the quality of information disclosure reduces information asymmetry 
between stakeholders. As a result, investors show greater willingness to trade, which 
leads to increased liquidity of the firms’ shares. Secondly, transparent disclosure 
lessens risks associated with estimation by investors. Thirdly, transparent disclosure 
reduces the monitoring cost. Finally, a higher level of disclosure increases investors’ 
recognition, which will result in enhanced risk sharing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
51 
 
Dhaliwal et al. (2014) argued that managers of stakeholder-oriented countries will be 
more responsive to the information demands of the stakeholder groups and will 
therefore provide high quality of information disclosure. They found that when a 
firm belongs to stakeholder-oriented country, the firm provides transparent and 
information of high quality and therefore enjoys lower cost of capital. Bischof and 
Daske (2013) argued that firms expect to have a positive liquidity change when they 
provide voluntary transparent risk disclosure as a commitment. They used firms’ 
share liquidity to assess the economic consequences of increased risk disclosure. 
 
Han, Tang and Yang (2014) proposed that voluntary disclosure has been suggested 
as the basis of regulatory requirement. This is generally believed to have positive 
implications for market liquidity and efficiency, which are two critical indicators of 
well-functioning capital markets and reduce risks faced by traders as a result of 
improved market liquidity. Huang, Hugon and Hui (2014) argued that a conservative 
disclosure policy will increase the liquidity of firms’ shares and lower the cost of 
capital as it limits a manager’s ability to disclose information opportunistically. They 
find that firms with conservative disclosure policy experience higher liquidity and 
lower cost of cost of capital in the presence of higher uncertainty and weak 
monitoring. 
 
Several studies examined the relation between corporate governance and stock 
market liquidity (Bacidore & Sofianos 2002; Chung, Elder & Kim 2010; 
Kanagaretnam, Lobo & Whalen 2007; Lei, Lin & Wei 2013). Empirical studies 
argued that effective corporate governance mechanisms limit management 
information distortion and managerial actions based on self-interest. As a result of 
the improved financial and operational transparency, information asymmetries 
between insiders, outside investors as well as among investors are reduced. Since 
effective corporate governance is strongly related to quality and transparent 
information disclosure, it is believed to have greater level of stock market liquidity. 
On the other hand, poor corporate governance can result in the use of inside 
information for the self-benefit of management, manipulation of earnings and 
conflict of interest, which lead to lower liquidity of firms’ shares. Chung, Elder and 
Kim (2010)  investigated the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on stock 
market liquidity and they found that firms with effective corporate mechanisms 
exhibit greater liquidity of firms’ shares that mitigate information asymmetry among 
stakeholders.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first to study the impact of 
voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information on stock liquidity.  
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2.12. Research gap in the literature 
The existing literature on voluntary disclosures, corporate governance, earnings 
management and liquidity were surveyed.  The relationship between a set of separate 
corporate governance variables, levels and quality of voluntary disclosures of GHG 
emissions, and earnings management is little researched, and in Australia still 
unexplored. In recent years, ASX Corporate Governance Council is committed to 
implementing good corporate governance practices. An investigation of the impact of 
corporate governance on the relationship between the levels and quality of voluntary 
disclosures of GHG emissions and earnings management appears not to be studied. 
In addition, this thesis tries to see the relationship between voluntary disclosure of 
GHG emission information and liquidity. The findings of this research could provide 
useful outcomes for institutional investors and regulators in Australia. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
3.1. Introduction 
This Chapter presents the theories and develops hypotheses used in this thesis. 
Section 3.2 describes theories which are relevant for this study. Section 3.3 lists 
research questions used in this research. Section 3.4 outlines the two competing 
views; stakeholder value maximisation and shareholder expense, which are relevant 
to our study. Section 3.5 contains the development of hypotheses. Finally, section 3.6 
concludes the chapter. 
3.2. Theoretical framework 
No single theory can explain the relationship among corporate governance, GHG 
emission disclosure and earnings management. It is suggested here that multiple 
theories are needed to explain the inter-relationship of these factors. Liao, Luo and 
Tang (2014) argued that although agency theory and legitimacy theory have been 
applied to a GHG emission disclosure setting, they are insufficient to explain issues 
pertaining to voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information. Borghei-Ghomi 
and Leung (2013) have argued that prior studies on the determinants of voluntary 
GHG emission information disclosure did not use a comprehensive theoretical 
framework. In this study, consideration is given to stakeholder theory, agency theory 
and legitimacy theory to support the central arguments. Stakeholder theory suggests 
that a variety of stakeholder groups make demands on firms to disclose GHG 
emission information in order to assess firms’ climate change strategies. Agency 
theory predicts that firms provide GHG emission information to mitigate information 
asymmetry and agency cost. Legitimacy theory posits that firms should disclose 
GHG emission information to legitimise their activities due to a social contract 
between the firm and its society.  These theories are discussed more fully in the 
following subsections.  
3.2.1. Stakeholder theory 
Freeman (1984, p. 46) defined a ‘stakeholder’ as: “any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives”. 
Stakeholder theory states that “managers should make decisions that take account of 
the interests of all the stakeholders in a firm” (Jensen 2010, p. 32). Stakeholders 
include all interested or concerned parties in an organisation including shareholders, 
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managers, employees, creditors, supplies, union, government agencies, and the 
society from which a business gets its resources. Stakeholder theory assumes that an 
organisation is a part of the broader social system in which a diverse group of 
stakeholders have different interests, so organisations should consider the multiple 
demands of a broader group of stakeholders in order to achieve its goals (Freeman 
1984). 
 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) unpacked the stakeholder theory into descriptive or 
managerial, instrumental, and normative aspects. “The descriptive aspect of 
stakeholder theory describes and explains past, present, and future states of affairs 
of corporation and its stakeholders” (Donaldson & Preston 1995, p. 71). The 
instrumental branch of this theory concentrates on stakeholders as well as 
conventional corporate objectives such as profitability (Donaldson & Preston 1995; 
Kaler 2003). The normative dimension of stakeholder theory states that companies 
should follow moral and philosophical guidelines with respect to its operations and 
management (Donaldson & Preston 1995; Kaler 2003). The instrumental aspect of 
stakeholder theory suggests that firms should engage in socially responsible activities 
not only for making profit for their shareholders but also for focusing on other 
stakeholders’ interests (Carroll 1999; Donaldson & Preston 1995). 
 
Environmental disclosure represents a form of fulfilment of the demands of a broader 
group of stakeholders (Ullmann 1985). Stakeholder theory suggests that the pressure 
from stakeholders induces a firm to be environmentally sustainable, because 
environmental disclosure is a means for firms to show social responsibility. Peters 
and Romi (2014) have argued that the firm’s corporate governance mechanisms may 
facilitate the use of GHG emission disclosure as a vital strategic device for meeting 
the stakeholders’ demands, given that firms may need to provide quality climate 
change-related information from firms’ operations in order to help stakeholders’ 
decision making process.   
 
Stakeholder theory recommends that if firms try to operate in a socially responsible 
manner, they should consider a broader group of stakeholders’ needs. Such firms 
should have corporate governance mechanisms which reflect shareholder orientation. 
Hence, corporate governance directs managers towards a wider range of 
stakeholders, which leads firms to focus on social responsibility. Since different 
stakeholders have different expectations from the firms, such firms should have good  
corporate governance that reconcile the interests of different stakeholder groups (Lai 
and Chen (2014). This theory postulates that firms should use effective corporate 
governance mechanisms in order to provide managers with incentives to socially 
engage in responsible activities and at the same time resolve conflicts among various 
stakeholders in order to maximise stakeholder wealth (Jo & Harjoto 2012; Lai & 
Chen 2014). The author therefore considers the instrumental aspects of stakeholder 
theory to be the most relevant for this study and suggests that corporate governance 
mechanisms are a means to align the firm with stakeholders’ interests.  
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3.2.2. Agency theory 
Agency theory mainly focuses on the agency relationship which is defined by 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976, p. 308) as “a contract under which one or more persons 
(the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their 
behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent”. The 
agency relationship between the principals (shareholders) and the agent 
(management) are commonly refereed as a principal-agent relationship.  The 
principal-agent relationship depends on the assumption that the principals and the 
agents are focusing on maximising their utility and may not be aligned. This 
assumption posits that both parties have their own interest and maximise their utility, 
which may lead to conflict between the two parties. The conflicts between the 
principals and the agents are regarded as an outcome of the agency problem. 
 
Since managers run the day to day business operations of firms, they know the 
quality of the firm better than shareholders. In a situation where managers have more 
information regarding their firms than investors, there will be an information 
asymmetry which will lead to agency conflict.  Therefore, voluntary disclosure of 
information in annual and sustainability reports and on the websites can be used as a 
tool to reduce the agency conflict between these two parties. Agency theory offers a 
framework connecting voluntary GHG emission disclosure to corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
 
Agency theory suggests that there is a potential conflict of interest arising with the 
separation of ownership and control, when managers act on behalf of firm and 
investors (Fama & Jensen 1983; Jensen & Meckling 1976).  The basic assumption of 
agency theory is that managers will act for their personal interest opportunistically. 
Agency theory predicts that corporate governance mechanisms such as board 
independence and the separation of the CEO and the Chairman can play an active 
role to solve the agency problem. In addition, rent-seeking managers may use 
socially responsible activities as a strategy to mask their opportunistic behaviour 
(Choi, Lee & Park 2013; Prior, Surroca & Tribó 2008). In this situation, agency 
theory proposes that effective corporate governance mechanisms of the firm may 
produce strong incentives to hamper managers from pursuing their personal motives 
at the expense of shareholders. 
 
Ho and Wong (2001) have proposed that agency theory may act either in 
complementary or substitutable ways with regards to the role of corporate 
governance mechanisms in determining disclosure policy (Kelton & Yang 2008). 
Complementary agency theory predicts that effective corporate governance 
mechanisms strengthen a firm’s internal control to reduce managerial opportunistic 
behaviour and information asymmetry. As a result, mangers will not withhold 
information for their personal interests under effective corporate governance 
mechanisms, and therefore tend to provide more quality information. On the other 
hand, according to  substitute agency theory, a firm’s corporate governance 
mechanisms may attempt to mitigate managerial opportunistic behaviour and 
information asymmetry resulting in a decrease in the need for more monitoring and 
disclosure (Ho & Wong 2001; Kelton & Yang 2008). 
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3.2.3. Legitimacy theory 
Legitimacy theory is based on the notion of a social contract between a firm and the 
society in which it operates.  Legitimacy is defined as: “generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values beliefs and definition” (Suchman 
1995, p. 574). Organisational legitimacy implies that: “organisations seek to 
establish congruence between the social values associated with or implied by their 
activities and the norms of acceptable behavior in the larger social system of which 
they are a part” (Dowling & Pfeffer 1975, p. 122). Legitimacy theory assumes that 
there is a social contract between the firm and society. Therefore, firms should 
operate within bounds and norms of the society in which it operates.  
 
Legitimacy theory holds that voluntary disclosures can be used as a tool to enforce 
social contracts.  Firms may use voluntary environmental disclosures to obtain 
legitimacy by mitigating social and political pressures (Cho et al. 2012). According 
to Deegan (2009),  legitimacy theory stresses that the firm must consider the right of 
the public at large, not merely of its investors. He further asserts that the failure to 
comply with social contract may lead to sanctions being imposed by society.  
 
Legitimacy theory suggests that firms disclose social and environmental information 
in response to social, institutional and political pressures to legitimise their activities. 
Legitimacy gap exists when there is a threat to the entity’s legitimacy. When an 
actual or potential disparity exists between organisational and social values, 
organisational legitimacy will be jeopardised giving rise to a legitimacy gap (Khan, 
Muttakin & Siddiqui 2013). O'Donovan (2000) has suggested that if a firm identifies 
a legitimacy gap, then that firm needs to assess its social values and attempt to 
correct the perception of the firms or existing social values by introducing different 
legitimacy strategies.  
 
Organisations may adopt four strategies when firms are faced with threats to their 
legitimacy (Dowling & Pfeffer 1975; Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995; Lindblom 1994). 
Organisations may (i) educate and inform its relevant stakeholders about changes in 
its performance and activities, (ii) change the perception of the relevant stakeholders 
but not their actual behaviour, (iii) manipulate the perception of their stakeholders 
regarding the issue of concern by diverting their attention from one issue to another, 
and (iv) change external expectations of its performance. These strategies may be 
either proactive or reactive. It is proactive when a firm attempts to gain or maintain 
the support of community. On the other hand, it is reactive when a firm tries to repair 
its legitimacy threats (Lu & Abeysekera 2014). 
 
Therefore, legitimacy theory predicts that managers are responsible to recognise the 
legitimacy gap and take necessary action to narrow the gap. In this situation, 
corporate governance mechanisms can play an effective role to reduce the legitimacy 
gap between organisation and society by pressuring managers to disclose high 
quality GHG emission information.  
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3.3. Research question 
The main research question of this study is “What are the determinants of 
voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information and what is the impact of 
voluntary disclosure on the liquidity of a firm’s shares?” 
 
To answer this main question, the following sub-research questions will be 
addressed. 
1. What are the impacts on corporate governance attributes of the disclosure of 
voluntary GHG emission information? 
2. What is the relationship between the voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information and earnings management and to what extent do corporate 
governance mechanisms affect the above relationship? 
3. Do Australian firms with higher voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information have increased the liquidity of the firms’ shares? 
 
3.4. Stakeholder value maximisation vs.  
  shareholder expense views 
This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance, voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emission information, earnings management based on managerial 
motivations under the stakeholder value maximisation and the shareholder expense 
views. Stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory are used in this research to develop 
the stakeholder value maximisation view whereas agency theory is the basis for 
supporting the shareholder expense view.  
3.4.1. Stakeholder value maximisation view 
The stakeholder value maximisation view implies that managers engage in socially 
responsible activities to fulfil the interests of other stakeholders in order to have  
positive effects on shareholder wealth (Deng, Kang & Low 2013). For example,  
firms that invest and report more on socially responsible activities may gain a strong 
reputation for keeping stakeholders commitment, subsequently  stakeholders of these 
firms are more likely to have strong incentives to contribute resources and efforts to 
the firms in order to contribute to firms’ long-term profitability  
(Carroll 1999; Deng, Kang & Low 2013; Freeman, Wicks & Parmar 2004).  
 
Firms cannot maximise their value by ignoring stakeholders’ interests. The long-term 
value maximisation of a firm depends on its ability to serve different stakeholder 
groups. According to Jensen (2010, p. 33) “in order to maximise value, corporate 
managers must not only satisfy, but enlist the support of, all corporate stakeholders – 
customers, employees, managers, suppliers, local communities”. He has further 
suggested that corporate managers should have an effective leadership role in 
creating and implementing sustainable projects to maximise their wealth for the long-
term. 
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Firms may engage in voluntary disclosure information to legitimise their operations 
in terms of sustainability (Rao, Tilt & Lester 2012). Sustainability mostly relates to 
long-term profitability for shareholders by focusing on the interests of other 
stakeholders. Sustainability refers to: “the corporate practice of creating long-term 
shareholder value by focusing corporate strategy around economic, environmental, 
and social endeavors which includes the management of GHG emissions”  
(Peters & Romi 2014, p. 2).  
 
This view may be applied to the relationship between corporate governance, 
voluntary disclosure of GHG emission and earnings management. The stakeholder 
value maximisation view may entail that managers’ decision to provide high quality 
GHG emission information is more likely to be relevant to meet the needs of a 
diverse group of stakeholders in order to get their long-term support. As a result, 
firms may enjoy long-term profitability in the future. The quality of GHG emission 
and financial reporting can be seen as an outcome of firms’ effective corporate 
governance effort that  confirm firms’ sustainability through better business practices 
and the promotion of accountability and transparency not only to shareholders but 
also to other stakeholders (Jo & Harjoto 2012). Firms with better corporate 
governance mechanisms are more likely to engage in more socially responsible 
agenda such as GHG emission reduction initiatives (Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013).  
 
Stakeholder theory stresses that a firm should have a corporate governance system, 
which is stakeholder-focused. Under this corporate governance system, board 
members and managers may clearly consider a broader group of stakeholders when 
making decisions (Devinney, Schwalbach & Williams 2013). Stakeholder-focused 
corporate governance is a set of corporate governance mechanisms that  seek to 
maximise value to shareholders while satisfying the legitimate demands of 
stakeholders (Durden 2008).  It concentrates on the issues that go beyond traditional 
views to include corporate ethics, accountability, disclosure, and reporting in the 
interests of other stakeholders. Rupley, Brown and Marshall (2012) introduce a 
multi-stakeholder governance model and define it as “a broad range of monitoring 
mechanisms pressuring management to act in the best interests of shareholders and 
society”. The stakeholder value maximisation view suggests that stakeholder-focused 
corporate governance mechanisms encourage managers to provide sustainability 
disclosure to meet the demands of a broader group of stakeholders as firms’ ethical 
and social efforts and achieve the firm’s goals. 
 
The instrumental aspect of stakeholder theory proposes that firms should focus on 
socially responsible activities to meet the wider range of stakeholders’ demands 
while making profit for their shareholders (Carroll 1999; Donaldson & Preston 
1995). Focusing on a stakeholder approach to running firms’ businesses is an equally 
good or even better way of achieving conventional corporate objectives (Kaler 
2003). This is because firms conduct business with stakeholders on the basis of 
mutual trust and engage in socially responsible activities with sincere commitment 
which enables them to achieve competitive advantages (McWilliams & Siegel 2001). 
Consequently, firms can enjoy long-term profitability. In addition to the instrumental 
aspect of stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory postulates that firms can use effective 
corporate governance to narrow the legitimacy gap between organisation and society 
by forcing managers to disclose quality GHG emission information (Khan, Muttakin 
& Siddiqui 2013). 
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3.4.2. Shareholder expense view 
The shareholder expense view proposes that managers involve in socially responsible 
activities to support other stakeholders at the expense of shareholders (Deng, Kang & 
Low 2013; Prior, Surroca & Tribó 2008; Salewski & Zülch 2014). For example, 
overconfident managers could make a decision to overinvest in socially responsible 
activities to build their reputations as good social citizens even though this may 
reduce firms’ profitability and shareholder wealth. As a result, other stakeholders 
may benefit from the socially responsible activities the expense of shareholders. 
Moser and Martin (2012) have defined “at the expense of shareholders” by the costs 
of the socially responsible activity of a firm being greater than the benefits gained 
from such activity.   
 
From a capital market perspective, voluntary GHG emission disclosure information 
is critical to the functioning of an efficient capital market. Prior research finds 
conflicting results regarding the announcement of climate change related information 
(Griffin & Sun 2013; Hsu & Wang 2013; Lee, Park & Klassen 2013). Hsu and Wang 
(2013) note that the socially responsibility initiatives such as GHG emission 
reduction initiatives to tackle climate change is costly to the investors.  Lee, Park and 
Klassen (2013) have shown that a negative association between the announcement of 
climate disclosure and stock return  suggesting that investors perceive climate change 
announcements as reducing shareholder value. From this point of view, voluntary 
GHG emission disclosure information destroys shareholder value.  
 
The shareholder expense view argues mangers may engage in voluntary GHG 
emission information disclosure for their opportunistic purpose. Effective internal 
and external monitoring through various corporate governance mechanisms may 
diminish managerial incentives and opportunistic use of GHG emission information 
disclosure. As a result, effective corporate governance mechanisms limit managerial 
opportunistic use of voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information. Salewski 
and Zülch (2014, p. 2) concluded that: “firms might engage in CSR reporting to 
cover up their de facto socially irresponsible behavior and that the decision to invest 
in and report about CSR may to some extent be driven by opportunism”. 
 
Barnea and Rubin (2010) have argued that a firm’s managers and blockholders have 
an interest to overinvest in CSR for their private interest of expanding their image as 
a good global citizen at the expense of shareholders. As a result, a firm’s policy with 
respect to socially responsible activity can create a conflict between different types 
of shareholders. Salewski and Zülch (2014) posit the view that investing and 
reporting about socially responsible activities provides the impression of a 
transparent firm, while the firm is masking behind the transparency and engaging in 
unethical activities at the expense of shareholders. Moser and Martin (2012) have 
argued that traditional stakeholder theory does not assume that mangers intentionally 
invest and report socially responsible activity at the expense of shareholders. If 
managers involve in socially responsible activity to satisfy the needs of a variety of 
stakeholders, then, some socially responsible activities are undertaken at the expense 
of shareholders.  
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Based on agency theory, GHG emission mitigation strategies, activities and reporting 
constitutes a principal-agent conflict between managers and shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). Overconfident managers sometimes make value destroying 
investments on GHG emission reduction initiatives to build their personal reputations 
as good global citizens (Jo & Harjoto 2012). Managers’ choice of overinvestments 
on GHG emission reduction initiatives is possibly a waste of resources that destroys 
firm value. A range of good corporate governance mechanisms of a firm may prevent 
managers’ opportunistic behaviour regarding GHG emission initiatives which may 
induce an inverse relationship between effective corporate governance mechanisms 
and voluntary GHG emission information.  
 
According to prior research, managers use sustainability disclosure as a tool to get 
immense supports from their stakeholders, when they are engaged in earnings 
management at the expense of shareholders (Prior, Surroca & Tribó 2008). Thus a 
positive association between sustainability disclosure and earnings management may 
be driven by managers’ decision to invest and report sustainability activities at the 
expense of shareholders often using their socially responsible decision to cover up 
value destroying earnings management (Salewski & Zülch 2014).  
3.5. Hypotheses development 
3.5.1. Corporate governance and GHG disclosures 
The instrumental aspect of stakeholder theory proposes that firms should focus on 
socially responsible activities to meet the interests of stakeholders while making 
conventional corporate objectives (Carroll 1999; Donaldson & Preston 1995). As a 
result, firms may build trust with stakeholders by providing socially responsible 
activities in order to achieve corporate success. In this view, firms with good 
corporate governance act on behalf of wider range of stakeholders and persuade 
management to provide information associated with GHG emission initiatives. The 
literature on corporate governance suggests that good corporate mechanisms are 
associated with improved transparency and disclosure (Mallin 2002), and doing so  
mitigates information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders.  Since the 
board and managers of socially responsible firms have a fiduciary duty to provide 
sustainable information to a broader group of stakeholders those firms are less likely 
to breach the implicit contract with the stakeholders. The extent and quality of 
voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information are seen as a firm’s corporate 
governance efforts to meet the needs of stakeholders. From the stakeholder value 
maximisation point of view, effective corporate governance pressurises the managers 
to engage in socially responsible disclosure to fulfil the demands of a broader group 
of stakeholders and this activity in turn creates shareholder value. If managers use 
effective corporate governance mechanisms and voluntary disclosure of GHG 
emission information to align with stakeholders’ interests, then voluntary disclosure 
of GHG emission information should be positively related to effective corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
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In addition to the instrumental aspect of stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory 
suggests that voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information can be disseminated 
by a firm to fill the legitimacy gap. Therefore, effective corporate governance 
mechanisms may be playing vital roles in mitigating the legitimacy gap by disclosing 
high quality GHG emission information to a broader group of stakeholders. 
Therefore, it is expected that effective corporate governance mechanisms pressure 
top management to disclose voluntary GHG emission information to reduce the 
legitimacy gap between organisation and society.  
 
Stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory support the stakeholder value maximisation 
view and suggest that a range of internal and external effective corporate governance 
mechanisms should play a vital role in focusing on the demands of stakeholders and 
ensuring organisational legitimacy through voluntarily disclosing GHG emission 
information. Therefore, firms may use effective corporate governance mechanisms 
and GHG emission disclosure to align with the interests of various stakeholders and 
legitimise their activities.  
Based on the stakeholder value maximisation view, the author posits the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1(a): There should be a positive association between effective corporate 
governance mechanisms and voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information. 
 
In contrast to the above view, the shareholder expense view claims, based on agency 
theory, that the choice of GHG emission disclosure is a principal-agent conflict 
between managers and shareholders (Harjoto & Jo 2011; Jo & Harjoto 2012). This 
viewpoint proposes that firms with overconfident CEOs are more likely to overinvest 
in GHG emission reduction initiatives and information disclosure takes place due to 
managers’ personal motives at the expense of shareholders.  If managers are not 
closely monitored by effective corporate governance mechanisms, they prefer to act 
more out of their personal interest rather than the interest of a broader group of 
stakeholders.  Effective corporate governance mechanisms should mitigate the 
managers’ opportunity to act for their personal interest. Therefore, it is expected that 
there will be a negative association between effective corporate governance and 
voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information because various effective 
corporate governance mechanisms should reduce the managers’ motivations and 
rent-seeking activities.  
 
In accordance with the shareholder expense view, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 1(b): Voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information is inversely 
associated with effective corporate governance mechanisms. 
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3.5.2. GHG disclosures and earnings management 
In supporting the stakeholder wealth maximisation point of view,  previous research 
has found a negative relationship between different types of voluntary disclosures 
and earnings management (Balakrishnan et al. 2013; Dye 1988; Jo & Kim 2007; 
Schipper 1989; Trueman & Titman 1988). The claim is that firms that provide more 
transparent and reliable disclosures are less likely to engage in earnings management. 
With regards to the broader perspective of CSR disclosure, previous studies support 
the stakeholder wealth maximisation view and find similar findings. Chih, Shen and 
Kang (2008) have found that a socially responsible firm will not hide unfavourable 
earnings realisations so that they will not engage in earnings management. Kim, Park 
and Wier (2012) found that CSR firms were less likely to engage in earnings 
management. Scholtens and Kang (2013) found that firms with good CSR were 
engaged significantly less in earnings management. Yip, van Staden and Cahan 
(2011) found that firms that operated in environmentally sensitive industries were 
less likely to engage in earnings management. Using a sample of Korean firms, Choi, 
Lee and Park (2013) found evidence that supports this view. 
 
From the stakeholder wealth maximisation point of view, if managers act in a 
socially responsible manner, a negative association between quality of GHG 
emission information and earnings management will be expected. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is suggested:  
 
Hypothesis 2(a): There will be a negative association between the extent and quality 
of GHG emission disclosure and earnings management. 
 
Earnings management results from agency conflicts arising from the misalignment of 
interests between managers and shareholders, which lead managers to take care of  
their own interests at the expense of the shareholders (Beaudoin, Cianci & Tsakumis 
2014; Jensen & Meckling 1976). One managerial incentive is to wear a coat as 
socially responsible managers in order to cloak their opportunistic behaviour, when 
they engage in earnings management. According to agency theory, managers might 
use firms’ resources for their self-interest rather than for the interests of stakeholders. 
Such managers might practice GHG emission reduction initiatives and reporting to 
disguise their managerial opportunistic behaviour. The shareholder expense view 
posits that managers are motivated to disclose relevant information to the 
stakeholders in order to get their support while they engage in earnings management. 
Earnings management benefits managers and some stakeholders at the expense of 
shareholders. If managers use sustainability disclosures opportunistically for their 
private interests rather than for the interests of their stakeholders, shareholder value 
creation would be damaged by such activity.  
 
Gargouri, Shabou and Francoeur (2010) have found a positive association between 
the level of corporate social performance and earnings management.  Particularly, 
their findings show that environmental aspects of corporate social performance are 
positively and significantly related with earnings management. They explained that 
such environmental activities contributed to significant costs that reduce financial 
performance, which appeared to prompt managers to engage in earnings 
Chapter 3:  Theoretical framework and hypotheses development 
 
63 
 
management. Patten and Trompeter (2003) have argued that managers could use 
environmental disclosure as an effective tool for reducing exposure to potential 
regulatory costs; and that decisions to manipulate earnings are tied to a larger 
corporate strategy for dealing with political pressures.  
 
Prior researchers have supported the shareholder expense view by analysing the 
relationship between social sustainability disclosures and earnings management. 
(Cespa & Cestone 2007; Choi, Lee & Park 2013; Pagano & Volpin 2005; Prior, 
Surroca & Tribó 2008; Rahmawati & Dianita 2011; Sun et al. 2010). Cespa and 
Cestone (2007) have argued that managers have incentives to disclose information 
related to sustainability when they engage in earnings management. Prior, Surroca 
and Tribó (2008) have argued that managers engaging in earnings management may 
use CSR as a powerful tool to get support from major stakeholders in order to protect 
their position against the disciplinary actions. Patten and Trompeter (2003) have 
argued that managers could use environmental information disclosures as well as 
earnings management practices to deal with the political pressure. Kim, Park and 
Wier (2012) have argued that managers may use CSR as a form of reputational 
insurance which can be used by the managers as a license to engage in earnings 
management. 
 
The above studies on the relationship between social responsibility disclosures and 
earnings management support the shareholder expense view.  Based on the 
shareholder expense view, we argue that manager’ decisions to disclose GHG 
emissions information through the CDP, annual reports, and sustainability reports 
and on their corporate website is intended to camouflage their opportunistic 
behaviour. In addition to this, managers of these firms may wear the CSR cloak to 
disguise their crooked activity such as earnings management. Based on the 
shareholder expense view, it is expected that there will be a positive relationship 
between voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information and earnings 
management. Therefore, the following hypothesis is presented: 
 
Hypothesis 2(b): There will be a positive association between the extent and quality 
of GHG emission disclosure and earnings management. 
3.5.3. GHG disclosures, corporate governance and  
  earnings management 
The stakeholder value maximisation view posits that effective corporate governance 
mechanisms can serve as instruments to resolve conflicts among a broader group of 
stakeholders.  In supporting the stakeholder wealth maximisation view,  Jo and 
Harjoto (2012) have argued that managers use effective corporate governance 
mechanisms together with engagement  in CSR activity to resolve conflict among 
stakeholders and this would be positively related with firm value.  Therefore, it is 
believed that firms with effective corporate governance mechanisms encourage 
disclosure of high quality of GHG information; and at the same time constrain 
managers’ engagement in earnings management. Consequently, this study expects 
that the negative association between GHG disclosure and earnings management will 
be further strengthened by effective corporate governance mechanisms.   
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Based on stakeholder value maximisation view, we hypothesis the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2(c): The negative association between voluntary disclosure of GHG 
emission information and earnings management will be strengthened by the presence 
of effective corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
In contrast to the stakeholder maximisation view, the shareholder expensive view 
states that managers have motivation to disclose more sustainability information to 
hide their opportunistic behaviour. Investing and reporting in social sustainability 
disclosure is affected by firms’ effective corporate governance mechanisms. If 
managers are not monitored properly by effective corporate governance mechanisms, 
they may have a preference to engage in socially responsible activity that might be 
destroying shareholder value.  Firms with effective corporate governance 
mechanisms are less likely invest in CSR activity in order to disguise their rent-
seeking activities namely earnings management. Therefore, firms with effective 
corporate governance mechanisms have less motivation to invest and report more on 
GHG emission reduction activity to divert stakeholders’ attention at the expense of 
shareholders (Choi, Lee & Park 2013). Managers who engage in both social 
responsible activities and earnings management at the expense of shareholders are 
engaging in unethical behaviour. Therefore, there will be a positive association 
between CSR and earnings management (Kim, Park & Wier 2012). Managers may 
decide to engage in CSR activities as a way to create a positive impression with 
stakeholders, and show that the firm is transparent; when in fact the firm hides 
behind the appearance of transparency while engaging in earnings management. 
 
Based on shareholder expense view, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
 
Hypothesis 2(d): The positive association between voluntary disclosure of GHG 
emission information and earnings management will be moderated by effective 
corporate governance mechanisms. 
3.5.4. Liquidity and GHG disclosure 
Voluntary disclosure influences stock market trading resulting in lower information 
asymmetry which in turn improves stock market liquidity. It is argued here that 
managers choose to disclose more information for various reasons that could affect 
stock liquidity directly. Firms seek to disclose GHG emission information to satisfy a 
wider range of stakeholders and such disclosures may impact on liquidity.  
Balakrishnan et al. (2013) find that increased voluntary disclosure has a beneficial 
effect on the liquidity of the firms’ shares.   
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Managers’ choice to disclose more information voluntarily has an effect on the 
liquidity. Most recently, researchers have analysed various aspects of disclosure 
quality in relation to stock market liquidity. They have found that the quality of 
information disclosure improves stock market liquidity (Balakrishnan et al. 2013; 
Bardos 2011; Lang & Maffett 2011; Ng 2011). Lang and Maffett (2011) found 
evidence that firms with greater transparency in earnings and accounting standards 
disclosure experienced greater market liquidity. Ng (2011) found that the quality of 
information disclosure was associated with lower liquidity risks that lead to lowering 
of the cost of capital. In line with these findings, Bardos (2011) found that the  
quality of financial information improves liquidity. 
 
We therefore posit the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information will improve 
the liquidity of a firm’s shares, ceteris paribus. 
3.6. Conclusion 
This Chapter provides the theoretical frameworks that lead to the hypotheses 
developed. Stakeholder theory, agency theory and legitimacy theory were reviewed 
to examine the relationship between corporate governance, voluntary disclosure of 
GHG emission disclosure, and earnings management. In addition to that, two 
competing views - stakeholder value maximisation and shareholder expense view - 
were introduced in order to guide the hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. DATA AND 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Introduction 
This Chapter presents the data and methodologies used in this research. Section 4.2 
explains the sample selection and exclusions. Section 4.3 explains the data collection 
processes. Section 4.4 measures the variables used in this study. Section 4.5 deals 
with endogeneity and selection bias. Section 4.6 outlines the data analysis techniques 
used in this study to test its hypotheses. Finally, section 4.7 concludes the Chapter. 
 
4.2. Sample selections and exclusions 
The data for this study are the largest firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) which are asked by the CDP to voluntarily respond to its annual questionnaire 
for the reporting years from 2006 to 2009.  
Table 4.1 Total sample firms before exclusions 
Detail CDP4 CDP5 CDP6 CDP7 Total 
The CDP Reporting Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Answered Questionnaire (AQ) 55 58 96 104 313 
Provided information (IN) 06 06 07 03 22 
Declined to participate (DP) 20 13 28 18 79 
Did not respond (NR) 19 23 70 75 187 
Total 100 100 201 200 601 
 
 
The CDP is an independent not-for-profit organisation that surveys the world’s latest 
companies’ information on the business risks and opportunities presented by climate 
change and GHG emissions  (Green & Zhou 2013). This study uses the CDP 
databases for Australian firms from 2006 to 2009, which includes information for the 
years 2005 to 2008.  This time periods cover voluntary disclosure made by large 
Australian firms before implementing of the mandatory GHG emission reporting 
Act.  The CDP sends its questionnaire to the Australian firms each year in February 
and it is firms’ choice to respond the CDP’s questionnaire on or before May each 
year. The CDP publishes the information in September/November in each year. This 
study also uses Australian firms’ Annual reports, sustainability reports, and corporate 
websites as other sources in addition to the CDP to measure quality of GHG 
emission information using the CDP 2010 scoring methodology.  
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The CDP sent its questionnaire only to the ASX100 firms in the reporting year 2006 
and 2007 and then expanded its survey to include ASX200 firms in reporting years 
2008 onwards. Table 4:1 provides details of the initial sample. Initially, this study 
identified a sample of 601 firm year observations from the CDP database for the 
reporting years 2006 to 2009. A total of 36 year firm observations were excluded 
from its initial sample for various reasons. Ten firm year observations were excluded 
due to lack of corporate governance data. Further, 8 more firm year observations 
were excluded due to non-availability of annual reports. Furthermore, 17 firm year 
observations were removed because of non-availability of financial and stock market 
data. One firm has been removed from sample due to delisting before the reporting 
date. The details of these exclusions are provided in Table 4.2. The final sample of 
this study is 565. 
 
Table 4.2 Summary of sample selection and exclusions 
Reason for sample exclusion Numbers Total 
Initial sample of  ASX CDP  firms from 2006 to 2009  601 
Less exclusions   
- Corporate governance data not available 10  
- Annual reports not available to score CDP 08  
- Financial data not available  17  
- Removed from sample due to delisting before reporting 
date  
01  
- Total exclusions  36 
- Final sample  565 
 
4.3. Data collection 
This study uses a sample frame of ASX largest listed firms that were selected by the 
CDP to respond to GHG emission questionnaire. This research uses two GHG 
emission disclosure variables such as managers’ choice to respond to the GHG 
emission questionnaire and the quality of GHG emission disclosure. Managers’ 
choice to respond to the CDP questionnaire is an indicator variable that can be 
obtained from the CDP database.  The quality of GHG emission disclosure index is 
calculated using firms’ annual reports, sustainability reports, and corporate websites. 
Annual financial reports are collected from the Morningstar DatAnalysis and Bureau 
van Dijk Electronic Publishing Osiris databases. The available sustainability reports 
are collected from Bureau van Electronic Publishing Osiris database, Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) website, and the particular company’s website.  
 
 
Chapter 4: Data and methodology 
 
69 
 
Data on corporate governance variables such as board independence, CEO duality, 
and board diversity for sampled ASX firms are hand-collected from annual reports 
obtained from the Morningstar DatAnalysis and Bureau van Electronic Publishing 
Osiris databases. Ownership variables such as directors’ share ownership and 
institutional shareholding are hand-collected for sample firms from annual reports 
obtained from the Morningstar DatAnalysis and Bureau van Electronic Publishing 
Osiris databases. Directors’ ownership is hand-collected from the directors’ details in 
the annual reports and Institutional share ownership is hand-collected from Top20 
shareholding list in the annual reports. The audit quality variables such as frequency 
of audit committee meetings and the size of the audit committee are hand-collected 
from the annual reports. 
 
Financial data for earnings management calculation is collected from the 
Morningstar DatAnalysis and FinAnalysis. Industrial classification is based on data 
from the Morningstar DatAnalysis and the Thomson Financial DataStream. Trading 
data regarding the firms’ shares viz., stock return, trading volume, and bid-ask prices 
are collected from the Thomson Financial DataStream. The data for the control 
variables are collected from the Morningstar DatAnalysis, Bureau van Electronic 
Publishing Osiris, and the Thomson Financial DataStream databases. 
4.4. Measurement of variables  
This section lists the different variables and describes how are they are measured 
below.  
 
4.4.1. Voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
This study uses two proxies for voluntary disclosure of GHG emissions information 
viz., managers’ choice to disclose GHG emission information and the quality or 
transparency of GHG emission disclosure. 
 
Managers’ choice of GHG emission disclosure (DISC) 
 
Firstly, based on the CDP questionnaire response, a dummy variable will be used for 
the CDP responding firms and non-disclosing firms. Recent studies by (Matsumura, 
Prakash & Vera-Muñoz 2014) have used dummy variables based on responding and 
non-responding status of companies to the CDP questionnaires.  The CDP is the 
largest repository of GHG emission disclosures in the world (Peters and Romi 
(2014).  
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Quality of GHG emission disclosure (QUAL) 
 
Secondly, this thesis adopts the CDP 2010 scoring methodology to measure the 
quality of GHG emission information. Recent studies have used Carbon Disclosure 
Leadership Index (CDLI) based on the CDP 2010 methodology as a proxy for quality 
of GHG emissions disclosure (Cotter & Najah 2012; Griffin & Sun 2013; Prado-
Lorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez 2010). The CDP uses the respondents’ answered 
questions on information request to create a disclosure index called the CDLI. GHG 
emission information disclosure is considered as a part of environmental disclosures.  
 
Australian firms’ GHG emission disclosures may be released as a part of the annual 
report or as a stand-alone sustainability report or on its corporate website. The CDP 
2010 scoring methodology to evaluate the quality of GHG emission disclosure score 
made by Australian firms.  This methodology has been developed jointly by CDP 
and their global advisor PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). This methodology provides 
a detail scoring approach that can be used by researchers. Peters and Romi (2014) 
suggest that the CDP 2010 is the benchmark for GHG disclosure methodology. It 
includes different types of questions such as lead question and conditional questions. 
Further, it provides scales for scoring the extent of disclosure (Please see Appendix 
1)  
 
There are three reasons why this research adopts the CDP 2010 methodology to score 
the quality of GHG emission information disclosure. Firstly, this methodology 
specifically focuses on the quality of GHG emission disclosure rather than quantity 
of GHG emission information. Secondly, this methodology has been developed by a 
group of experts and confirmed with external validity. Finally, since previous 
researchers (Griffin & Sun 2013; Rankin, Windsor & Wahyuni 2011) identify the  
CDP as one of leading sources of quality  GHG emission information disclosure, it is 
expected that  its methodology will be more comprehensive. The calculated CDLI is 
based on firms’ responses to its questionnaires, which are available for our sample 
companies.   
 
This research analyses the quality of voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information made via annual reports, standalone sustainability reports, and corporate 
websites using content analysis. Content analysis is a ‘systematic replicable 
technique for comprising many words of text into fewer content categories, based on 
explicit rules of coding’ (Stemler 2001). Krippendorff (2004, p. 18) defines content 
analysis as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from 
text to the contexts of their use”. This analysis involves constructing a qualitative 
data base by classifying or coding different aspects of a qualitative data  set 
(Schwartz-Ziv & Weisbach 2013). It is the  appropriate tool  for evaluating the public 
disclosure of information (Jose & Lee 2007).  Rather than using number of pages or 
words, this study selects the text and sentence in the sources to weight the score. The 
CDP 2010 methodology is integrated with content analysis and relevant each 
sentence is matched with quality of GHG emission disclosure indicators and scored 
as indicated in the methodology. If the same information is repeated in within or 
different sources this information is only considered once. Quality of GHG emission 
disclosure consists of variety of questions and weighted in different scales. 
 
Chapter 4: Data and methodology 
 
71 
 
For this purpose, information on GHG emissions made in annual financial and/or 
sustainability reports will be analysed. In addition to those, any GHG emissions 
information disclosed on each company’s website will be considered when scoring.    
A firm can communicate its climate-change related activities through various 
corporate channels. Emphasising the social impact of a firm’s climate-change 
motives is an effective way to communicate to its stakeholders with regards to GHG 
emission disclosure. Annual reports (Chu, Chatterjee & Brown 2013; Rupley, Brown 
& Marshall 2012),  stand-alone sustainability reports annual reports (Cotter & Najah 
2012; Rupley, Brown & Marshall 2012), corporate websites (Jose & Lee 2007; 
Prado-Lorenzo et al. 2009) are dominant corporate communication channels which 
are analysed by previous research to assess the extent and quality of disclosure.   
These sources are solely voluntary and have both quantitative and qualitative nature 
of information related to climate change.  
 
Sub-scores 
 
The CDP scoring methodology is measured as the benchmark for the GHG emission 
disclosure information (Peters & Romi 2014). This study incorporates the CDP 2010 
scoring methodology and measures the transparency or quality of GHG emission 
disclosure for the sample firms. The methodology for computing the overall score 
involves estimating scores based on five sub-categories of the quality of GHG 
emission disclosure scores.  These are (i) governance (GOVE), (ii) risks and 
opportunities (RISK), (iii) strategy (STRA), (iv) GHG accounting, energy and fuel 
use, and trading GHGE), and (v) communications (COMM). (Please find attached 
Appendix 1 for further details). 
 
4.4.2. Corporate governance variables 
Recently, Jo and Harjoto (2012) examined the causal effect of corporate governance 
on CSR. Interestingly, lagged corporate governance variables positively affect firms’ 
CSR after controlling for various firm characteristics. Consistent with prior research, 
this thesis uses lagged corporate governance variables as well as control variables as 
one of the techniques to correct for endogeneity bias.  The corporate governance 
variables consist of board independence, CEO duality, percentage of shareholding by 
directors, female directors on the board, percentage of shareholding by institutional 
investors, number of audit committee meetings, and the size of the audit committee.   
Board independence (IND) 
 
Board independence is measured as a proportion of independent directors on the 
board. A board consists of both executive and non-executive directors. Among non-
executive directors, those who have no material relationship with the firm and have 
less than five percent of shareholding are treated as independent directors. This data 
is hand-collected from the annual report. 
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CEO duality (DUA) 
 
Managing Directors or CEOs of a firm also acting as chairpersons of the board is 
considered as CEO duality. CEO duality is a binary variable taking a value one if a 
firm’s Managing Director or CEO holds the position of chairman of the board of 
directors. This data is hand-collected from the firm’s annual report. 
Board gender diversity (DIV) 
 
Board gender diversity is measured by the presence of a woman director on the 
board. This variable is also is a binary variable which takes one if a firm has a 
woman director on the board. This data is also hand-collected from the directors’ 
report section of the annual report.  
 
Frequency of audit committee meetings (LAT) 
 
Total number of audit committee meetings held during a financial year will be the 
proxy for frequency of audit committee meetings. This data is hand-collected from 
annual reports. 
 
The size of audit committee (MAC) 
 
The size of the audit committee is the number of members on the audit committee. 
This data is hand-collected from the directors’ report section of the annual report. 
 
Managerial share ownership (MSO) 
 
Managerial share ownership is measured as the proportion of shareholding by both 
executive and non-executive directors. This data is collected from the directors’ 
details section of the annual reports. 
Institutional shareholding (INS) 
 
Institutional shareholding is measured as a proportion of shares held by the 
institutional investors. This data is collected from the Top 20 shareholding section of 
the annual report. Institutions on the Top 20 shareholding list are selected and then 
added to get the total shareholding.  
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Effective corporate governance mechanisms 
 
Firms’ effective corporate governance mechanisms persuade managers to act in the 
best interest of stakeholders when there is a conflict between shareholders and non-
investing stakeholders. Under effective corporate governance mechanisms, managers 
may use socially responsible initiatives to resolve conflicts among stakeholders 
(Harjoto & Jo 2011). In this study, effective corporate governance mechanisms 
consists of  a greater board independence, the  absence of CEO duality,  the presence 
of board gender diversity, lower directors’ ownership, higher institutional ownership 
and smaller size of the audit committee. 
 
4.4.3. Earnings management calculations 
This study uses accrual earnings management rather than real earnings management 
or cash flows because accruals are relatively easier to manipulate and less visible to 
stakeholders than cash flows (Choi & Pae 2011). This research measures earnings 
management as the absolute value of abnormal accruals, using the modified Jones 
accrual model and the performance-augmented discretionary accrual model. In 
addition to those two models, this study also uses the performance-matched modified 
Jones discretionary accrual model. This study employs two accruals measures viz., 
total accruals and total current accruals. Total accruals for firm i in year t are 
calculated as TAi,t = NPATi,t – NOCFi,t, where where, TAi,t  = firm i’s  total accruals 
in year t,  NPATi,t = firm i’s net profit after tax in year t, and  NOCFi,t, =  firm’s i’s net 
operating cash flow in year t. Total current accrual for firm i in year t are measured as 
TCAi,t = (∆CAi,t - ∆CLi,t  - ∆Cashi,t + ∆STDi,t - DEPNi,t)/Ai,t-1 where, TCAi,t  = firm i’s  
total accruals in year t, ∆CAi,t  = the change in current assets from year t-1 to year t,  
∆CLi,t = the change in current liabilities from year t-1 to year t,  ∆Cashi,t = the change 
in cash and short-term investments from year t-1 to year t, ∆STDi,t =  firm i’s change 
in short-term debts  from year t-1 to year t,  DEPNi,t = firm i’s depreciation and 
amortization expense in year t, Ai,t-1 =  firm i’s  book value of assets in year t-1. 
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4.4.3.1 Modified Jones model 
 
In the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney 1996), total accruals are 
regressed on ΔREV minus the change in trade receivable (ΔTR), and gross property, 
plant, and equipment (PPE). The independent variables are deflated by lagged total 
assets in order to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
 
TAi,t
Ai,t−1
= 𝛼0 (
1
Ai,t−1
) + 𝛼1 (
ΔREVi,t − ∆TRi,t
Ai,t−1
) + 𝛼2 (
PPEi,t
Ai,t−1
) + ε𝑖,𝑡                             (1) 
 
 
Where, 
TCAi,t   = firm i’s total current accruals in year t 
∆REVi,t   = firm i’s change in revenues from year t-1 to year t   
∆TRi,t   = firm i’s change in trade receivables from year t-1 to year t 
PPEi,t   = firm i’s level of gross property, plant, and equipment in year t 
Ai,t-1   = firm i’s total assets in year t-1 
εi,t   = firm i’s residual  in year t 
 
This study estimates the first earnings management measure using equation (1). In 
estimating equation (1), this study uses the Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) industry groups that contain twenty-four industries.  While estimating 
equation (1), we exclude all firm-year observations that have fewer than ten 
observations in a GICS industry group for any specific year. Following Klein (2002), 
Hazarika, Karpoff and Nahata (2012), Kim, Park and Wier (2012), this thesis 
measures earnings management as the absolute value of residual  ε𝑖,𝑡 of firm i in year 
t. 
4.4.3.2 Performance-augmented model 
 
The second earnings management measure is performance-augmented discretionary 
accruals model (Kothari, Leone & Wasley 2005). In this model, return on assets is 
added as an explanatory variable to control firms’ performance. Sun and Rath (2011) 
evaluate various discretionary accruals using a sample of ASX listed firms and find 
that performance-augmented discretionary accruals model tends to report more 
reliable estimation of discretionary accruals. Prior, Surroca and Tribó (2008) 
examined the relationship between CSR and earnings management using 
performance-augmented discretionary accruals and found a positive association 
between CSR and earnings management. 
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TCAi,t
Ai,t−1
= 𝛼0 (
1
Ai,t−1
) + 𝛼1 (
ΔREVi,t − ∆TRi,t
Ai,t−1
) + 𝛼2 (
PPEi,t
Ai,t−1
) +  𝛼3(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡) +  ε𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
 
The independent variables are defined as in the previous subsection. In addition,  
ROAi,t = firm i’s return on assets. 
 
4.4.3.3 Performance-matched model 
This research adopts performance-matched discretionary accruals model for 
robustness check. Researchers choose from a wide range of firm characteristics to 
match a sample such as return on assets, size, income, cash flow, industry and year. 
This study matches firms from the same industry (and year) that has the closet return 
on assets (ROA).  Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) suggested that discretionary 
accruals estimated using the Jones (1991) modified model tended to be the best 
specified measures of discretionary accruals across a wide variety of simulated 
conditions.  The discretionary accruals for a matched firm were obtained by 
employing the following regression model of modified Johns model.  
 
TCAim,t
Aim,t−1
= 𝛼0 (
1
Aim,t−1
) + 𝛼1 (
ΔREVim,t − ∆TRim,t
Aim,t−1
) + 𝛼2 (
PPEmi,t
Ami,t−1
) + 𝑅𝑂𝐴+ ε𝑖𝑚,𝑡       (3)      
 
Where, 
TCAim,t = mathed firm im’s total current accruals from year t-1 to year t, ∆REVim,t  = 
matched firm im’s change in revenues from year t-1 to year t, ∆TRim,t = matched firm 
im’s change in trade receivables from year t-1 to year t, PPEim,t = matched firm im’s 
level of gross property, plant, and equipment in year t, Ait-1 =  matched firm im’s 
total assets in year t-1, ROAim,t = firm im’s return on assets and εim,t = matched firm 
im’s error term in year t.  
 
The discretionary accrual of the matched firm im is the absolute value of residual 
 ε𝑖𝑚,𝑡 of a matched firm im in year t and is obtained from equation (3). Performance-
matched discretionary accruals are computed as the absolute value of the residual 
 ε𝑖,𝑡  minus the matched firm’s absolute value of residual  ε𝑖𝑚,𝑡. 
4.4.4. Measures of stock liquidity  
Amihud’s illiquidity and bid-ask spreads are the two main measurements that proxy 
for stock liquidity. These two proxies are widely used in the literatures. This thesis 
collects announcements of voluntary information of GHG emission from the annual 
report release date. The quality of GHG emission information is measured based on 
the annual reports, sustainability reports and company websites. The annual reports 
and release dates of annual reports are available from the DatAnalysis database. The 
study uses annual report release date as an announcement date. 
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Amihud’s illiquidity (AMILOG) 
 
This study uses Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure which is calculated using 
following equation:  
 
AMILOG = √[1000,000 ∗ |ri,t| /(pi,t ∗  voli,t)]   …………………………… (4) 
This study takes the square root of the ratio of absolute stock return to dollar volume. 
Then, the average of these daily illiquidity measures over the periods (Quarter year, 
half a year, three quarter year, and one year) are computed and the natural log of the 
value is taken. A lower value of Amihud’s illiquidity measure indicates greater 
liquidity. Investors can trade stocks with lower AMILOG with a minimal effect on 
prices. 
 
Table 4.3  Definitions of variables 
Variables Predicted 
signs 
Description 
Managers’ choice of 
GHG emission 
Disclosure (DISC) 
 DISC is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the firm discloses its GHG emission 
information to the CDP and permits public 
accessible. 
Quality of GHG 
emission disclosure 
(QUAL) 
 Quality of GHG emission information 
disclosure measured based on the CDP 2010 
scoring methodology using firms’ annual 
reports, standalone sustainability reports and 
corporate websites.  
Amihud’s (2002) 
Illiquidity (AMILOG) 
 AMILOG is measured as the square root of 
the absolute value of the daily return divided 
by daily trading volume over the periods of 
one year and takes log of the value.  
Bid-ask spread 
(BIDLOG) 
 BIDLOG is calculated as the difference the 
closing ask and bid prices, divided by the 
midpoint of ask and bid prices and takes log 
of the value. 
Earnings management 
proxies 
(AUG/MJM/MAT/MTC) 
+/- The absolute value of discretionary accruals 
calculated using the modified Jones model 
with ROA (AUG), the modified Jones model 
(MJM), the performance-matched modified 
Jones model (MAT), and the performance-
matched modified Jones model adjusted with 
ROA (MTC). 
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Variables Predicted 
signs 
Description 
Board Independence 
(IND) 
+ Proportion of independent directors on the 
board.  
CEO Duality (DUA) - An indicator variable that equals to one if the 
CEO has a role as a chairman of the board, 
and zero otherwise.  
Board diversity 
(DIV) 
+ An indicator variable that equals to one if 
woman director/s on the board, and zero 
otherwise.  
Frequency of audit 
committee meetings 
(LAT) 
+ Number of audit committee meetings in a 
financial year 
The size of the audit 
committee (MAC) 
- Number of directors in an audit committee.  
Directors’ share 
ownership (MSO) 
- Proportion of shares held by all directors on 
the board.  
Institutional share 
ownership (INS) 
+ Proportion of shares held by institutional 
investors calculated from Top20 
shareholding list.  
Size (LMV/LTA) + The logarithm of market value of equity and 
total assets respectively. 
Tobin’s q (TOB) +/- Tobin’s q is measured as the market value of 
common equity plus book value of preferred 
stock plus book value of long-term debt and 
current liabilities, all scaled by book value of 
total assets. 
Return on asset (ROA) + The reported net profit after tax divided by 
total assets.  
Leverage (LEV) + LEV is the debt ratio calculated total debt 
divided by total assets.   
Listing age (AGE)  Number of years since a stock is listed on 
Australian stock exchange  
Stock return volatility 
(VOL) 
- VOL is the volatility calculated as standard 
deviation of daily stock returns over the 
annual report announcement period from day 
-260 to day -2. 
Cross-listing (CRL) + CRL is an indicator variable that equals to 1 
if a firm is listed other than ASX and 0 
otherwise. 
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Bid-ask spreads (BIDLOG) 
 
This study used the daily closing ask price and bid price to measure bid-ask spread. 
Bid-ask spreads are calculated as follow:  
 
BIDLOG = (Ask pricei,t – Bid pricei,t) / [(Ask pricei,t + Bid pricei,t)/2]            (5) 
 
The calculated value is multiplied by 100. Then, this study takes an average of daily 
bid-ask spreads over different periods (Quarter year, half a year, three quarter year, 
and one year). Negative bid-ask spreads are excluded from the calculations. A Lower 
bid-ask spread denotes greater liquidity. 
 
4.4.5. Control variables 
Control variables are included to ensure that associations between dependent variable 
and explanatory variables of interest remain robust to inclusion of other variables 
which are expected to have an impact. The control variables include in this study are 
firm size (LMV), Tobin’s q (TOB), profitability (ROA), financial leverage (LEV), 
listing age (AGE) and stock return volatility (VOL). 
 
Firm size (LMV) 
 
Larger firms have greater visibility and more stakeholders and more likely to be 
subject to stakeholders’ scrutiny, and therefore, will disclose more GHG emission 
information to get their support for their continuous operations (Lu & Abeysekera 
2014). Empirical studies provide evidence that the firm size has an impact on the 
likelihood and quality of GHG emission disclosure (Matsumura, Prakash & Vera-
Muñoz 2014; Peters & Romi 2014; Prado-Lorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez 2010; Rankin, 
Windsor & Wahyuni 2011).  Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the 
book value of total assets. It is expected that larger firms are more likely to disclose 
more voluntary information on GHG emissions because of relatively higher public 
attention to these companies. 
 
Tobin’s q (TOB) 
Researchers generally use Tobin’s q to control for growth opportunities of the firm. 
Peters and Romi (2014) argue that firms with fewer discretionary resources are less 
likely to disclose GHG emission information during high growth periods.On the 
other hand, there is a possibility that growth firms are more likely to disclose GHG 
emission information in order to mitigate information asymmetry between the firms 
and investors during this stage. Tobin’s q is measured as the market value of 
common equity plus book value of preferred stock plus book value of long-term debt 
and current liabilities, scaled by book value of total assets (Peters & Romi 2014). 
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Profitability (ROA) 
Firm economic performance may be related to its ability to meet costly programs 
related to social demands (Ullmann, 1985). Firms with more profitability are more 
likely to meet societal expectations of accountability. Profitability is measured as the 
reported net profit after tax divided by the book value of the total assets (ROA). 
Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) found that profitability had a negative relationship with 
disclosure of information on GHG emissions. Smith, Yahya and Amiruddin (2007) 
examined the relationship between environmental disclosures in annual reports for 
listed companies in Malaysia and ROA and found a negative association between 
these two variables. Another study by Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) 
found a positive relationship. Moreover, Gamerschlag, Moeller and Verbeeten 
(2011) found a positive relation between voluntary environmental disclosure and 
return on investment. This study expects to find a positive association between levels 
of voluntary disclosures of GHG emissions and profitability. 
Leverage (LEV) 
Leverage is measured by dividing total debt by total assets. Luo, Lan and Tang 
(2012) and Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) found a positive relationship 
between leverage of a firm and levels of voluntary disclosures of GHG emissions. In 
addition, Cotter and Najah (2012) found a positive association between leverage and 
levels of voluntary disclosures (only for non-responding CDP firms). Therefore, 
LEV is expected to have a positive association with levels of GHG emission 
disclosures. 
Listing age (AGE) 
Listing age is defined as the number of years a firm’s stock has been listed on a 
particular stock exchange (Chen et al. 2011). Haniffa and Cooke (2002) argue that 
newly listed firms need to disclose more information to the investors to reduce 
scepticism and boost confidence among them. However, they find no evidence in 
support of their proposition. Recently,  Li, Mangena and Pike (2012)  found evidence 
that younger listed firms are more likely to provide intellectual capital disclosure to 
mitigate information asymmetry and lower the cost of capital. On the other hand, 
since GHG emission disclosure have distinct economic consequences and 
determinants, mature firms need to disclose more GHG emission information than 
younger firms to the investors to maintain their reputation and visibility. Therefore, 
this thesis expects to find a positive association between listing age and GHG 
emission disclosure.  
Stock return volatility (VOL) 
 
Stock return volatility is measured as the standard deviation of adjusted daily stock 
returns prior to annual report announcement date. Firms with a tendency to disclose 
more information voluntarily have lower information asymmetry and therefore lower 
stock price volatility. We include stock return volatility to control for the firm-level 
tendency to voluntarily disclose more information. Therefore, the relationship 
between voluntary disclosure of GHG emission and stock return volatility is 
expected to be negative. 
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Cross-listing (CRL) 
When a firm is listed on two or more stock market exchanges, it is considered to be cross-
listed. Cross-listed firms face greater visibility and more scrutiny by a range of stakeholders 
(Peters & Romi 2014). Cross-listed Australian firms may face greater pressure to participate 
and provide GHG emission information to their investors and external monitoring regulators. 
Peters and Romi (2014) show that US firms disclosing GHG emission information are more 
likely to be cross listed. 
4.5. Endogeneity and selection bias 
Potential endogeneity problems may also mask the actual relationship between 
corporate governance, voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information and 
earnings management.  Endogeneity is defined as: “a correlation between the 
explanatory variables and the error term in a regression” (Roberts & Whited 2012, 
p. 6). Endogeneity could be due to omitted variables, simultaneity or measurement 
error. This study adopts four techniques to minimise the possibility of endogeneity 
problem and selection bias.  
4.5.1. Lag independent variables 
Prior researchers use lagged independent variables to minimise the endogeneity 
problem. For example, Jo and Harjoto (2012) use lagged corporate governance 
variables to see the effect of corporate governance on CSR and find that while the lag 
of CSR does not affect corporate governance variables, the lag of corporate 
governance variables positively affects firms’ CSR after controlling for various firm 
characteristics.  To address endogeneity problem, Peters and Romi (2014) 
incorporate lagged independent variables for their study on the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and voluntary GHG emission disclosure 
information for US firms.  Following prior work, we use lagged independent 
variables wherever possible.  
4.5.2. Year and industry dummy 
This study controls for year and industry fixed effects as a further control for the 
endogeneity problem. Industries are defined based on the GICS industry sectors. 
Prior researchers use year and industry dummy variables to control possible time and 
industry effects (Lee, Lee & Nagarajan 2014).  
4.5.3. Use of a variety of control variables 
Coles, Lemmon and Meschke (2012) suggest that one of the solutions to address the 
endogeneity is to use a variety of control variables to solve for the omitted variable 
problem. This study uses firm size, profitability, firm growth, firm age, leverage and 
volatility as control variables in addition to our main independent variables.  
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4.5.4. Two-stage least squares method 
The two-state least squares method is one of the most powerful and versatile tools, 
which allows for consistent estimation of simultaneous equations with endogenous 
predictors (Antonakis et al. 2012). In this method, firstly, the dependent 
(endogenous) variable is regressed on their independent and control variables, and 
predicted value is extracted. Secondly, the calculated predicted value is used as the 
dependent variable in the second stage regression.  
4.5.5.  Heckman two-stage estimation 
 Heckman sample selection technique is a two-step estimation procedure, which 
corrects non-randomly selected sample (Heckman 1979). Corporate decisions are not 
made at random but are intentionally made by their managers to self-select into their 
desired choices (Li & Prabhala 2007). When analysing firms choice to  disclose 
voluntary GHG emission information, there is a potential self-selection bias 
(Lourenço et al. 2014). Peters and Romi (2014) have suggested that Heckman  two-
stage model can be used to correct the potential selection bias. Therefore, we use 
Heckman two-stage regression model. In the first stage, disclosure choice will be 
analysed using a probit model. Then, the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR) will be 
calculated using the first stage regression.  The inverse Mill’s ratios will be added in 
the second stage as an explanatory variable (Lourenço et al. 2014; Matsumura, 
Prakash & Vera-Muñoz 2014; Peters & Romi 2014). Further,  Lennox, Francis and 
Wang (2012) suggest that the selection model will be improved if researchers 
exclude  some of the independent variables from first stage in the second stage. 
4.6. Data analysis techniques 
4.6.1. Cross-sectional multiple regression model 
The impact of corporate governance on voluntary GHG 
emission disclosure 
 
Firstly, this research seeks to identify the relationship between characteristics of 
corporate governance and voluntary GHG emission disclosure. This study uses two 
dependent variables, namely, DISC and QUAL. DISC is an indicator variable that 
equals one if a firm responds to CDP and that information is disclosed publicly. 
QUAL is voluntary GHG emission disclosure index calculated based on annual 
reports, sustainability reports, and corporate website using the CDP 2010 scoring 
methodology. Firstly, this study uses probit regression model using DISC as a 
dependent variable. Secondly, this research runs least square regression using QUAL 
as a dependent variable. Dhaliwal et al. (2012) have argued that since non-financial 
disclosure has distinct economic and consequences, control variables are not 
adequate. Therefore, the Heckman two-stage estimation provides additional check of 
the robustness. Following the above argument, this research adopts the Heckman 
two-step estimation to control potential selection bias due to omitted correlated 
variables.   
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DISCi,t/QUALi,t = β0 + β1INDi,t-1 + β2DUAi,t-1 + β3DIVi,t-1 + β4LATi,t-1 + β5MACi,t-1 + 
β6MSOi,t-1 + β7INSi,t-1 + β8LMVi,t-1 + β9TOBi,t-1 + β10ROAi,t-1 + β11LEVi,t-1 + β12AGEi,t-1  + 
β13VOLi,t-1 + β14CRLi,t-1 + β15Σyear + β16Σindustry + εi,t                                                                               (6)    
 
Robustness check model 
 
Heckman Sample Selection Model 
 
Disclosure choice model: 
 
DISCi,t = β0 + β1INDi,t-1 + β2DUAi,t-1 + β3DIVi,t-1 + β4LATi,t-1 + β5MACi,t-1 + β6MSOi,t-1 + 
β7INSi,t-1 + β8LMVi,t-1 + β9TOBi,t-1 + β10ROAi,t-1 + β11LEVi,t-1 + β12AGEi,t-1  + β13VOLi,t-1  + 
β14CRLi,t-1 + β15CDPi,t-1 + β16Σyear + β17Σindustry + εi,t                                                                                  (7) 
 
 Second stage model: 
 
QUALi,t = β0 + β1INDi,t-1 + β2DUAi,t-1 + β3DIVi,t-1 + β4LATi,t-1 + β5MACi,t-1 + 
β6MSOi,t-1 + β7INSi,t-1 + β8LMVi,t-1 + β9TOBi,t-1 + β10ROAi,t-1 + β11LEVi,t-1 + 
β12AGEi,t-1  + β13VOLi,t-1 + β14CRLi,t-1 + β14Σyear + β15Σindustry + εi,t                        (8) 
The relationship between corporate governance, voluntary 
GHG emission disclosure and earnings management 
 
DISCi,t/QUALi,t = β0 + β1AUGi,t/MJMi,t/MATi,t/MTCi,t + β2INDi,t-1 + β3DUAi,t-1 + β4DIVi,t-1 + 
β5LATi,t-1 + β6MACi,t-1 + β7MSOi,t-1 + β8INSi,t-1 + β9LMVi,t-1 + β10TOBi,t-1 + β11ROAi,t-1 + 
β12LEVi,t-1 + β13AGEi,t-1  + β14VOLi,t-1 + β15CRLi,t-1 + β16Σyear + β17Σindustry + εi,t              (9)                                                                                                                                        
 
Robustness check model 
 
Heckman Sample Selection Model 
 
Disclosure choice model: 
 
DISCi,t = β0 + β1AUGi,t + β2INDi,t-1 + β3DUAi,t-1 + β4DIVi,t-1 + β5LATi,t-1 + β6MACi,t-1 + 
β7MSOi,t-1 + β8INSi,t-1 + β9LMVi,t-1 + β10TOBi,t-1 + β11ROAi,t-1 + β12LEVi,t-1 + β13AGEi,t-1  + 
β14VOLi,t-1  + β15CRLi,t-1 + β16CDPi,t-1 + β17Σyear + β18Σindustry + εi,t                         (10) 
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Second stage model: 
 
QUALi,t = β0 + β1AUGi.t + β2INDi,t-1 + β3DUAi,t-1 + β4DIVi,t-1 + β5LATi,t-1 + β6MACi,t-1 + 
β7MSOi,t-1 + β8INSi,t-1 + β9LMVi,t-1 + β10TOBi,t-1 + β11ROAi,t-1 + β12LEVi,t-1 + β13AGEi,t-1  + 
β14VOLi,t-1 + β15CRLi,t-1 + β16Σyear + β17Σindustry + εi,t                                     (11) 
 
Two-stage least squares regression  
 
The equation for the first stage model is:  
 
AUGi,t = β0 + β1INDi,t-1 + β2DUAi,t-1 + β3DIVi,t-1 + β4LATi,t-1 + β5MACi,t-1 + β6MSOi,t-1 + 
β7INSi,t-1 + β8LMVi,t-1 + β9TOBi,t-1 + β10ROAi,t-1 + β11LEVi,t-1 + β12AGEi,t-1  + β13VOLi,t-1 + 
β14CRLi,t-1 + β15Σyear + β16Σindustry + εi,t                                                                          (12) 
 
The equation for the second stage model is:  
 
QUALi,t = β0 + β1AFitted_AUGi,t + β2INDi,t-1 + β3DUAi,t-1 + β4DIVi,t-1 + β5LATi,t-1 + 
β6MACi,t-1 + β7MSOi,t-1 + β8INSi,t-1 + β9LMVi,t-1 + β10TOBi,t-1 + β11ROAi,t-1 + β12LEVi,t-1 + 
β13AGEi,t-1  + β14VOLi,t-1 + β15CRLi,t-1 + β16Σyear + β17Σindustry + εi,t                                            (13) 
The benefits of disclosing GHG emission information 
 
The relationship between voluntary GHG emission disclosure and stock price 
liquidity 
 
AMILOGi,t = β0 + β1DISCi,t-1/QUALi,t-1 + β2INSi,t-1 + β3LTAi,t-1 + β4VOLi,t-1 + β5Σyear + 
β6Σindustry + εi,t                                                                (14) 
 
Robustness check model 
BIDLOGi,t  = β0 + β1DISCi,t-1/QUALi,t-1 + β2INSi,t-1 + β3LTAi,t-1 + β4VOLi,t-1 + β5Σyear + 
β6Σindustry + εi,t                                                                     (15) 
4.7. Conclusion 
This Chapter has dealt with the methodologies used in this research.  Firstly, this 
Chapter began with the sample selection and data collection processes used in this 
study. Secondly, this Chapter described the dependent, independent, and control 
variables and their measurements. Thirdly, the Chapter dealt with controls for the 
potential endogeneity and sample selection bias problems. Finally, this Chapter 
concluded with an explanation of the data analysis techniques used in this research. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
5.1. Introduction 
This Chapter provides details of descriptive statistics of variables used in this study. 
Section 5.2 reports final sample distribution across the CDP reporting years 2006 to 
2009. Section 5.3 provides descriptive statistics of the quality of GHG emission 
information disclosure and its sub-categories, corporate governance and firm 
characteristics for the full sample of firms as well as the sub-samples of publicly 
disclosing and non-disclosing firms. Additionally, the full sample is further split into 
high and low quality of GHG emission disclosure firms based on the sample median 
of GHG emission disclosure scores. Section 5.4 reports the descriptive statistics of 
five sub-categories quality of GHG emission information across the CDP reporting 
years. Section 5.5 shows the descriptive statistics of four different measures of 
earnings management across GHG emission disclosures. Section 5.6 reports the 
descriptive statistics of stock liquidity across the CDP responses and quality firms. 
Finally, the chapter ends with our conclusions. 
5.2. Sample disdribution by responses 
Table 5.1 shows the breakup of the final sample by the CDP reporting year and 
response categories. The CDP sent its questionnaire regarding GHG emission 
information to Australian firms belonging to ASX100 in 2006. The survey was 
expanded from ASX100 to ASX200 from reporting year 2008 onwards.  A firm can 
respond to the CDP questionnaire in one of four different ways. The firm may choose 
to answer the CDP questionnaire (AQ), provide partial information (IN), decline to 
participate (DP) and not to respond (NR). When a firm chooses to answer the CDP 
questionnaire or provides information partially, it has two more additional options. It 
could either permit CDP to make the answers publicly available or restrict public 
access. Out of a sample of 565 firm year observations, 227 firm year observations 
(40%) responded to the CDP questionnaire fully or partially and granted permission 
to disclose their GHG emission information publicly. An additional 93 firm year 
observations (17%) responded the CDP questionnaire fully or partially but did not 
give permission to make it publicly. Eighty firm year observations (14%) declined to 
respond the CDP questionnaire and one hundred and sixty-five firm year 
observations (29%) did not respond to the CDP questionnaire.  
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Table 5.1Sample distribution by responses and CDP reporting years  
CDP Reporting Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Answered Questionnaire (AQ) 52 57 92 100 301 
Provided information (IN) 6 6 5 2 19 
Permission to disclosing publicly 32 44 71 80 227 
% Permission to disclosing publicly 35% 47% 38% 42% 40% 
Declined to participate (DP) 23 13 26 18 80 
Did not respond (NR) 11 18 66 70 165 
Total 92 94 189 190 565 
This table reports the entire sample as well as the breakdown by the CDP reporting years and the 
associated publicly disclosure rate. 
 
5.3. Descriptive statistics for corporate  
 governance and GHG disclosure 
Table 5.2 provides descriptive statistics of voluntary disclosure quality of GHG 
emission information, corporate governance characteristics and control variables. 
This table reports mean and median value of the dependent, independent and control 
variables for the entire sample as well as two sub-samples categorised on the basis of 
whether the firm is discloses information to the CDP publicly or not. This table also 
presents the non-parametric test of Mann Whitney (MW) for the two sub-groups.  
 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of emission disclosure quality for the entire 
sample. The average quality of GHG emission information for the entire sample is 
37.28%. The disclosing and non-disclosing firms have averages of 48.96% and 
29.43% respectively and are significantly different at the 1% level. The sub-
categories of quality of GHG emission disclosure namely governance (GOVE), risk 
and opportunities (RISK), strategy (STRA), GHG accounting, energy and fuel use, 
and trading (GHGE), and communication (COMM) show highly substantial 
differences between the disclosing and non-disclosing firms. The Mann Whitney 
non-parametric test statistics indicates that the differences are statistically significant 
at the 1% level. 
 
Panel B contains the descriptive statistics regarding corporate governance 
characteristics for the entire sample. The first corporate governance variable of this 
study is board independence (IND) measured as the proportion of independent 
directors on the board. The mean value of the proportion of independent directors for 
the entire sample is 65.92%. This result is comparable to that in Monem (2013) 
(64.00%) and Kang, Cheng and Gray (2007) (64.09%) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008) 
(63.69%). The subsample of disclosing firms have higher proportion of independent 
directors as compared to the non-disclosing sample firms. The Mann Whitney non-
parametric test statistics indicates that the difference is statistically significant at the 
1% level. CEO duality (DUA) is higher for non-disclosing firms than disclosing 
firms. The board gender diversity (DIV) is significantly higher for the disclosing 
firms than non-disclosing firms.  
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The frequency of audit committee meetings (LAT) of the full sample firms is 4.69. 
The disclosing firms have higher number of audit committee meetings as compared 
to non-disclosing firms and the difference is broadly significant at the 1% level. The 
average (median) size of the audit committee (MAC) for the entire sample firms are 
3.90 (4.00). The disclosing and non-disclosing sample of firms has average of 4.00 
and 3.83 which are significantly different at the 1% level. The average proportion of 
shares held by directors (MSO) on the board for the entire sample is 5.48%. This is 
consistent with previous research of (Henry 2011) (6.36%) and (Monem 2013) 
(7.09%). The disclosing and non-disclosing firms have average shareholding by 
directors of 1.86% and 7.90% respectively, which are significantly different at the 
1% level. This indicates that the directors with more shareholding are less likely to 
disclose GHG emission information. The mean percentage of institutional investors’ 
shareholding (INS) for the full sample is 64.53%. This is similar to statistics reported 
in other research studies, for example, (Monem 2013) (63.68%). The average 
percentage of institutional shareholding is 65.77% and 63.70% for disclosing sample 
firms and non-disclosing sample firms respectively. Overall, univariate results 
indicate that GHG emission disclosing firms have stronger corporate governance 
mechanisms than non-disclosing firms. The disclosing firms have boards that are 
more independent, more gender diverse, hold more board meetings and their 
directors’ have lower shareholdings. 
 
Table 5.2 Corporate governance and GHG emission disclosure decisions 
Variables Mean  and 
Median ALL 
Disclosing firms 
(i) 
Not disclosing 
firms (ii) 
MW Test 
(i) vs. (ii) 
Panel A: Quality of GHG emission disclosure measures 
QUAL 
Mean% 
Median% 
37.28 
31.91 
48.96 
47.14 
29.43 
26.09 
11.07*** 
GOVE 
Mean% 
Median% 
1.46 
0.00 
2.12 
2.17 
1.01 
0.00 
7.73*** 
RISK 
Mean% 
Median% 
23.96 
23.57 
28.88 
31.43 
20.65 
20.29 
10.54*** 
STRA 
Mean% 
Median% 
5.74 
5.67 
6.85 
7.09 
5.00 
5.04 
9.58*** 
GHGE 
Mean% 
Median% 
5.30 
0.00 
10.05 
7.09 
2.10 
0.00 
10.22*** 
COMM 
Mean% 
Median% 
0.81 
1.33 
1.04 
1.40 
0.65 
0.70 
4.80*** 
Panel B: Corporate governance measures 
IND 
Mean% 
Median% 
65.92 
66.67 
70.92 
75.00 
62.56 
62.50 
5.28*** 
DUA 
Mean 
Median 
0.14 
0.00 
0.11 
0.00 
0.16 
0.00 
1.82* 
DIV 
Mean 
Median 
0.53 
1.00 
0.67 
1.00 
0.43 
0.00 
5.61*** 
LAT 
Mean 
Median 
4.69 
4.00 
5.12 
5.00 
4.40 
4.00 
4.49*** 
MAC 
Mean 
Median 
3.90 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
3.83 
4.00 
1.74* 
MSO 
Mean% 
Median% 
5.48 
0.37 
1.86 
0.15 
7.90 
0.86 
7.42*** 
INS 
Mean% 
Median% 
64.53 
66.83 
65.77 
69.16 
63.70 
66.56 
1.26 
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variables Mean  and 
Median ALL 
Disclosing firms 
(i) 
Not disclosing 
firms (ii) 
MW Test 
(i) vs. (ii) 
Panel C: Control variables 
LMV 
Mean 
Median 
8.07 
7.97 
8.62 
8.62 
7.71 
7.55 
8.80*** 
TOB 
Mean 
Median 
2.15 
1.51 
1.64 
1.31 
2.49 
1.63 
3.74*** 
ROA 
Mean% 
Median% 
6.91 
5.38 
6.39 
4.95 
7.26 
5.80 
0.76 
LEV 
Mean% 
Median% 
25.65 
25.52 
25.48 
26.10 
25.76 
24.73 
0.73 
AGE 
Mean% 
Median% 
17.82 
12.30 
22.86 
13.64 
14.44 
11.58 
3.67*** 
VOL 
Mean% 
Median% 
3.17 
2.70 
2.89 
2.60 
3.36 
2.84 
2.08** 
CRL 
Mean 
Median 
0.24 
0.00 
0.31 
0.00 
0.19 
0.00 
3.17*** 
N 
 
565 227 338 
 
This table provides firms characteristics of the entire sample as well as for the two groups: disclosing 
and non-disclosing firms. The table also provides non-parametric test statistics of Mann Whitney (MW 
test) differences in median value between two groups. All corporate governance and control variables 
are collected at the balance sheet date prior to the year of disclosure. QUAL: quality of GHG emission 
disclosure measured based on the CDP 2010 scoring methodology using firms’ annual reports, 
standalone sustainability reports and corporate websites. GOVE: governance; RISK: risks and 
opportunities; STRA: strategy;  GHGE: GHG accounting, energy and fuel use, and trading; COMM: 
communications; IND: Board independence measured as proportion of independent directors on the 
board; DUA: a dummy variable that takes one if the CEO has a role as a chairman of the board; DIV: a 
dummy variable equal to one if the board has female director(s); LAT: number of audit committee 
meetings; MAC; the size of audit committee measured as number of members of an audit committee in 
a financial year; MSO: the proportion of ordinary shares held by  directors; INS: the proportion of 
shareholding by the institutional investors  measured from Top20 shareholding list of a firm excluding 
individual shareholding; LMV: the size of a firm measured as natural logarithm of market value in 
millions one month before disclosure annual report announcement date; TOB: Tobin’s  q measured as 
the market value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock plus book value of long-term 
debt and current liabilities, all scaled by book value of total assets;  ROA: firm profitability measured 
as net profit after tax  before abnormal items divided by total assets; LEV: leverage measured as total 
debt divided by total assets; AGE: firm age calculate from its listing date (years); VOL: share return 
volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of adjusted share price return one year before from its 
annual report announcement date; CRL is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is listed in another 
exchange besides ASX and 0 otherwise. 
* 
Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, 
** 
significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level, and 
***
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
 
 
Panel C reports the descriptive statistics our control variables for the entire sample. 
The average logarithm of market value (LMV) for the entire sample of firms is 8.07 
and for the disclosing and non-disclosing sample of firms they are 8.62 and 7.71 
respectively. It is significantly different between these groups suggesting that larger 
firms are more likely to disclose GHG emission information than smaller firms due 
to their visibility. The mean (median) value of the Tobin’s q (TOB) for the entire 
sample is 2.15 (1.51). The disclosing and non- disclosing sample of firms have mean 
(median) of 1.64 (1.31) and 2.49 (1.63) respectively and the difference is significant 
at the 1% level. This result indicates that firms with higher growth prospects are less 
likely to disclose GHG emission related information. The average return on assets 
(ROA) is 6.91% and it is not materially different between the two groups. Leverage 
(LEV) has an average 25.65% for the full sample.  The disclosing and non-disclosing 
firms have averages of 25.48% and 25.76% and the non-parametric test statistics 
indicate that the difference is insignificant.   
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On average, the listing age of the sample firms (AGE) is 17.82 years. The disclosing 
and non-disclosing firms have average listing age of 22.86 and 14.44 years 
respectively, and the difference is significant at the 1% level. It is evident that the 
firms that are listed on the ASX longer tend to make more GHG emission 
information public due to social pressure. The mean stock return volatility (VOL) for 
the entire sample is 2.33% and for the disclosing and non-disclosing firms are 2.16% 
and 2.44% respectively, significantly different at the 5% level . This indicates that 
the non-disclosing firms have more volatile stock returns than disclosing firms. The 
proportion of cross-listing (CRL) is significantly higher for the disclosing firms 
compared to non-disclosing firms. 
 
Table 5.3 Quality of GHG information scores attained across years 
Variables Mean  and Median 2006 2007 2008 2009 
QUAL 
Mean% 
Median% 
33.75 
28.37 
39.72 
33.33 
34.52 
28.78 
40.53 
35.84 
GOVE 
Mean% 
Median% 
1.47 
0.00 
1.63 
2.10 
1.24 
0.00 
1.58 
1.41 
RISK 
Mean% 
Median% 
22.20 
21.58 
24.79 
24.11 
22.86 
21.58 
25.48 
25.71 
STRA 
Mean% 
Median% 
5.25 
5.04 
5.84 
5.69 
5.49 
5.07 
6.19 
6.38 
GHGE 
Mean% 
Median% 
4.17 
0.00 
6.47 
0.00 
4.15 
0.00 
6.40 
0.00 
COMM 
Mean% 
Median% 
0.66 
0.71 
0.87 
1.39 
0.78 
1.27 
0.87 
1.37 
N  92 94 189 190 
This table reports quality of GHG emission information measured based on the CDP 2010 scoring 
methodology using annual reports, sustainability reports and company website for five sub categories 
such as governance, risk and opportunities, strategy, greenhouse gas, and communication and  across 
the CDP reporting years. QUAL: overall quality of GHG emission disclosure GOVE: governance 
component of the disclosure index; RISK: risks and opportunities component of the disclosure index; 
STRA: strategy component of the disclosure index; GHGE: GHG accounting, energy and fuel use, and 
trading component of the disclosure index; COMM: communications component of the disclosure 
index. 
 
Table 5.3 shows the quality of voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information for 
the five sub-categories as well as across the four CDP reporting years. The average 
total scores of voluntary disclosure of GHG emissions are 33.75 per cent in 2006 and 
40.53 per cent in 2009.  In general, there has been an increase in scores over time 
except 2008 ostensibly due to the Global Financial Crisis.  
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Table 5.4: Quality of GHG emission disclosure by industries 
Industrial sector 
Mean  and Median 
Disclosure 
quality N 
High 
quality N 
Low 
quality N 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Mean% 
Median% 
24.21 
23.74 65 
40.01 
36.69 13 
20.26 
22.28 52 
Consumer Staple Mean% 
Median% 
42.26 
34.03 38 
51.45 
46.76 25 
24.57 
25.90 13 
Energy Mean% 
Median% 
37.68 
33.22 48 
50.75 
45.26 24 
24.60 
25.18 24 
Financial Mean% 
Median% 
35.32 
27.54 155 
54.60 
53.52 70 
19.44 
18.84 80 
Health Care Mean% 
Median% 
21.84 
20.57 27 
46.44 
46.44 02 
19.87 
18.84 25 
Industrial Mean% 
Median% 
39.75 
35.97 82 
52.28 
47.72 46 
23.73 
24.65 36 
Information 
Technology 
Mean% 
Median% 
24.17 
30.22 05 - - 
24.17 
30.22 05 
Material Mean% 
Median% 
47.17 
45.39 111 
55.79 
57.39 80 
24.95 
24.64 31 
Tele communication Mean% 
Median% 
46.02 
35.71 10 
53.89 
60.96 07 
27.64 
28.06 03 
Utilities Mean% 
Median% 
38.84 
34.77 24 
49.16 
38.13 15 
21.64 
21.58 09 
This table provides overall quality scores of GHG emission information disclosed in annual reports, 
sustainability reports and company’s websites. Mean and median score in percentages are reported in 
the third column. The sample is divided into two groups based on median GHG disclosure scores. 
 
 
Table 5.4 presents the quality of voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information 
across ten industries. The above industry classifications are defined by the GICS 
downloaded from DatAnalysis database.  The greenhouse gas intensive sectors such 
as energy, material, industrial and utilities disclose higher quality GHG information 
in their corporate reporting channels voluntarily. The highest mean score of those 
greenhouse intensive sectors is 47.17% reported in material industry sector. On the 
other hand, the firms belonging to less GHG intensive sectors such as health care, 
information technology, and consumer discretionary have lower level of quality 
GHG information. The lowest average score is 21.84%, which is reported in the 
health care industry sector. It is clear that firms in greenhouse intensive sectors report 
higher quality information regarding GHG emissions. 
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Table 5.5 Corporate governance and quality GHG emission information 
Variables Mean and 
Median High quality (i) Low quality (ii) MW test (i) vs. (ii) 
Panel A: Quality of GHG emission disclosure measures 
QUAL 
Mean% 
Median% 
52.92 
50.00 
21.69 
22.46 20.51
*** 
GOVE 
Mean% 
Median% 
2.47 
3.38 
0.45 
0.00 14.67
*** 
RISK 
Mean% 
Median% 
31.38 
32.17 
16.56 
16.78 19.86
*** 
STRA 
Mean% 
Median% 
7.37 
7.69 
4.12 
4.32 17.25
*** 
GHGE 
Mean% 
Median% 
10.47 
8.45 
0.14 
0.00 16.11
*** 
COMM 
Mean% 
Median% 
1.22 
1.40 
0.39 
0.00 11.36
*** 
Panel B: Corporate governance characteristics 
IND 
Mean% 
Median% 
70.14 
71.43 
61.71 
60.00 5.38
*** 
DUA 
Mean 
Median 
0.07 
0.00 
0.21 
0.00 4.68
*** 
DIV 
Mean 
Median 
0.58 
1.00 
0.47 
0.00 2.70
*** 
LAT 
Mean 
Median 
5.06 
5.00 
4.33 
4.00 4.15
*** 
MAC 
Mean 
Median 
3.96 
4.00 
3.83 
3.00 1.78
* 
MSO 
Mean% 
Median% 
2.84 
0.17 
8.10 
0.75 5.93
*** 
INS 
Mean% 
Median% 
65.84 
69.04 
63.23 
65.45 1.97
** 
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Variables Mean and 
Median High quality (i) Low quality (ii) MW test (i) vs. (ii) 
Panel C: Control variables 
LMV 
Mean 
Median 
8.34 
8.32 
7.80 
7.65 4.94
*** 
TOB 
Mean 
Median 
1.74 
1.43 
2.56 
1.58 2.33
** 
ROA 
Mean% 
Median% 
6.28 
5.11 
7.54 
5.88 0.57 
LEV 
Mean% 
Median% 
26.61 
27.00 
24.69 
23.30 1.76
* 
AGE 
Mean 
Median 
23.31 
14.68 
12.35 
10.24 6.88
*** 
VOL 
Mean% 
Median% 
3.12 
2.70 
3.22 
2.73 0.40 
CRL 
Mean 
Median 
0.26 
0.00 
0.26 
0.00 1.06 
N  282 283  
This table provides firms characteristics of the entire sample as well as for the two groups: disclosing 
and non-disclosing firms. The table also provides non-parametric test statistics of Mann Whitney (MW 
test) differences in median value between two groups. All corporate governance and control variables 
are collected at the balance sheet date prior to the year of disclosure. QUAL: quality of GHG emission 
disclosure measured based on the CDP 2010 scoring methodology using firms’ annual reports, 
standalone sustainability reports and corporate websites. GOVE: governance; RISK: risks and 
opportunities; STRA: strategy;  GHGE: GHG accounting, energy and fuel use, and trading; COMM: 
communications; IND: Board independence measured as proportion of independent directors on the 
board; DUA: a dummy variable that takes one if the CEO has a role as a chairman of the board; DIV: a 
dummy variable equal to one if the board has female director(s); LAT: number of audit committee 
meetings; MAC; the size of audit committee measured as number of members of an audit committee in 
a financial year; MSO: the proportion of ordinary shares held by  directors; INS: the proportion of 
shareholding by the institutional investors  measured from Top20 shareholding list of a firm excluding 
individual shareholding; LMV: the size of a firm measured as natural logarithm of market value in 
millions one month before disclosure annual report announcement date;  TOB: Tobin’s  q measured as 
the market value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock plus book value of long-term 
debt and current liabilities, all scaled by book value of total assets;  ROA: firm profitability measured 
as net profit after tax  before abnormal items divided by total assets; LEV: leverage measured as total 
debt divided by total assets; AGE: firm age calculate from its listing date (years); VOL: share return 
volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of adjusted share price return one year before from its 
annual report announcement date; CRL is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is listed in another 
exchange besides ASX and 0 otherwise. 
* 
Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, 
** 
significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level, and 
***
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 5.5 reports univariate comparisons for all variables across samples of high 
quality and low quality disclosure firms.  Firms that disclose more than median index 
scores of GHG emission information are categorised as  high quality GHG emission 
information firms, whereas firms that disclose less than or equal to median index 
scores of GHG emission information are categorised as low quality GHG emission 
information firms. Panel A shows that the individual component scores are also 
significantly different across the two groups.  
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Panel B of Table 5.5 indicates that there is a significant difference between firms that 
have high quality GHG emission information released through their corporate 
reporting channels as compared to their low quality counterparts. High quality firms 
have more independent directors (IND) on the board than low quality firms. This 
indicates that firms that have higher proportion of independent directors on the board 
are more likely disclose better GHG emission information. The mean independent 
directors on the board is 70.14% for firms with high quality GHG information, which 
is significantly higher than the 61.71% for firms with low quality GHG information.  
CEO duality (DUA) is significantly lower for firms that disclose high quality GHG 
information than firms that disclose low quality GHG information. Board diversity 
(DIV) is not much different between high quality and low quality firms. High quality 
firms have more number of audit committee meetings than low quality firms. The 
mean frequency of audit committee meetings (LAT) for high quality firms and low 
quality sample firm are 5.06 and 4.33 respectively. The Mann Whitney non-
parametric test statistics shows that the difference is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. 
 
 It is confirmed that firms that have higher audit committee meetings at the board 
level are more likely to disclose GHG emission information. Firms that disclose 
lower quality GHG emission information are more likely to have more directors’ 
shareholding (MSO). Directors of the low quality sample firms have higher 
percentage of share ownership (8.10%) as compared to the high quality sample firms 
(2.84%) and the difference is significant at the 1% level. Average institutional 
shareholdings (INS) for high quality and low quality sample firms are 65.84% and 
63.23% respectively and the difference is significant at the 5% level. This evidence 
supports the view that institutional investors exert pressure to influence firms to 
disclose more credible GHG information to the public through their corporate 
channels voluntarily. These descriptive analyses indicate that firms with high quality 
GHG emission disclosure are more independent, more gender diverse, having more 
board meetings and more shares are owned by institutional investors, less likely to 
have the CEO serving as board chairman and have lower directors’ shareholdings 
than firms with low quality GHG emission disclosure. 
 
In considering control variables, firm size measured as the logarithm of market value 
is significantly different between high quality and low quality firms. The average 
Tobin’s q for firms with high quality GHG emission information (1.74) is 
significantly lower than the average for firms with low quality GHG information 
(2.56). This finding implies that firms with lower growth opportunities disclose 
better quality GHG emission information. Firm listing age (AGE) is significantly 
different between high quality and low quality firms. There is no material difference 
in return on assets (ROA), share volatility (VOL) and cross-listing (CRL) between 
the two groups.  
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5.4. Earnings management and GHG emission  
 disclosure 
Table 5.6 provides basic descriptive statistics of earnings management and voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emission information. This study measures earnings management 
as the absolute value of discretionary accrual using four different earnings 
management proxies. The average absolute current discretionary accrual estimated 
using the modified Jones model with ROA (AUG) is 6.97% for the entire sample. 
However, the disclosing and non-disclosing firms have averages of AUG 5.75% and 
7.71% respectively and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Mean value of the absolute value of total accruals calculated using performance 
matched modified Jones Model (MAT) is 13.20% for the entire sample. The 
disclosing and non-disclosing firms have a mean value of MAT 11.11% and 14.47% 
respectively and significant at the 10% level. There are no significant differences 
across the two groups when we use the MJM and MTC proxies for earnings 
management.   
 
Table 5.6 Absolute value of discretionary accruals 
Panel A: Absolute value of abnormal accruals across disclosures groups 
  ALL Disclosure Non-Disclosure MW test 
AUG 
Mean% 
Median% 
6.97 
4.46 
5.75 
3.76 
7.71 
4.71 
2.25
** 
MJM 
Mean% 
Median% 
7.99 
4.94 
6.22 
4.91 
9.05 
5.05 
1.31 
MAT 
Mean% 
Median% 
13.20 
8.58 
11.11 
7.18 
14.47 
8.76 
1.78
* 
MTC 
Mean% 
Median% 
10.86 
7.72 
9.85 
7.04 
11.47 
7.99 
1.03 
N  420 158 262  
Panel B: Absolute value of abnormal accruals across GHG quality  
  High Quality Low Quality MW test 
AUG 
Mean% 
Median% 
5.75 
3.64 
8.20 
4.86 2.59
*** 
MJM 
Mean% 
Median% 
7.53 
4.90 
8.44 
5.05 0.35 
MAT 
Mean% 
Median% 
12.76 
8.73 
13.65 
7.94 0.07 
MTC 
Mean% 
Median% 
9.59 
6.81 
12.14 
8.31 2.13** 
N  210 210  
This table provides descriptive statistics of the absolute value of abnormal accruals. AUG is the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones model with ROA. MJM is 
the absolute value of total accruals calculated using the modified Jones model. MAT is the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals calculated using performance matched modified Jones model. MTC is 
the absolute value of current accruals calculated using performance matched modified Jones model 
adjusted with ROA.  Panel A provides the absolute value of discretionary accruals for the entire sample 
as well as the two groups of disclosing and non-disclosing firms. The table also provides the non-
parametric Mann Whitney test statistics of differences in median value between disclosing and non-
disclosing firms. Panel B of Table 8 provides the absolute value of four different measures of earnings 
management across two groups classified on the basis of high and low quality GHG emission 
disclosure. 
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The mean absolute value of discretionary accruals in this study is comparable to 
previous research findings. For example, Choi, Lee and Park (2013) in their Korean 
study, report that the average absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated 
using the modified Jones model is equal to 6.06%. Hazarika, Karpoff and Nahata 
(2012) in their US study, find that the average absolute value of discretionary 
accruals calculated using the modified Jones model is 7.93%. High quality and low 
quality GHG emission disclosing firms have average absolute value of discretionary 
accruals calculated using the modified Jones model with ROA (AUG) of 5.75% and 
8.20% respectively and are significant at the 1% level. Another earnings 
management measure, the absolute value of current discretionary accruals calculated 
using performance matched modified Jones Model with ROA (MTC), have mean 
values of 9.59% and 12.14% respectively and are significant at the 5% level.  
Collectively, these primary results indicate that high quality GHG emission 
disclosure firms are less likely to engage in earnings management and suggest firms 
that disclose high quality GHG emission information provide high quality financial 
reporting quality to the stakeholders supporting the stakeholder value maximisation 
view. 
5.5. Voluntary disclosure of GHG emission and  
 liquidity 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure and bid-ask spreads are the two main proxies 
for stock liquidity. These two proxies are widely used in the literature (Balakrishnan 
et al. 2013; Bardos 2011). The quality of GHG emission information is measured 
based on the annual reports and their announcement dates are available in the 
DatAnalysis database. This study uses firm’s annual report release date as the 
announcement date. 
 
Table 5.7 Amihud’s illiquidity for disclosing and non-disclosing samples 
Post-announcement 
period  
Full sample 
N = 562 
Disclosing 
N = 226 
Non-disclosing 
N = 336 
MW test 
Quarter  year 
Mean 
Median 
0.067 
0.041 
0.048 
0.030 
0.081 
0.052 
7.67
*** 
Half  year 
Mean 
Median 
0.073 
0.043 
0.051 
0.031 
0.087 
0.057 
7.73
*** 
Three quarters of a year 
Mean 
Median 
0.073 
0.044 
0.052 
0.031 
0.087 
0.057 
7.72
*** 
One year 
Mean 
Median 
0.073 
0.044 
0.052 
0.030 
0.087 
0.059 
7.88
*** 
This table presents mean and median of Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure for different periods 
(quarter year, half a year, three quarters of a year, and one year) after announcement date. This table 
reports illiquidity results for the entire sample, and for disclosing and non-disclosing groups. This table 
also reports nonparametric Mann-Whitney (MW) test statistics for the difference in median Amihud’s 
(2002) illiquidity across disclosure and not disclosure sub groups. 
*
Significantly different from zero at 
the 10% level, 
**
significantly different from zero at the 5% level, and
 ***
significantly different from zero 
at the 1% level. 
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The results from Table 5.7 show that Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure has a 
mean (median) of 0.067 (0.047) and 0.073 (0.044) for the post announcement periods 
of a quarter year and one year respectively. With regards to the above findings, the 
mean Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure of this study is comparable to that of prior 
studies in stock price liquidity. For example, Balakrishnan et al. (2013), in their 
study, report that the mean Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure is equal to 0.073. 
The disclosing firms have lower Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure as compared to 
the non-disclosing sample firms for various post announcement periods suggesting 
that the disclosing firms may have higher stock price liquidity than the non-
disclosing firms. The Mann-Whitney non-parametric test statistics point out that the 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level for all time horizons.  
 
Table 5.8 Amihud’s illiquidity measure and disclosure quality 
post-announcement 
period  
High quality 
N = 281 
Low quality 
N = 281 
MW test 
Quarter  year 
Mean 
Median 
0.059 
0.034 
0.076 
0.046 
3.96
*** 
Half a year 
Mean 
Median 
0.062 
0.036 
0.083 
0.050 
4.24
*** 
Three quarters of a 
year 
Mean 
Median 
0.062 
0.036 
0.085 
0.052 
4.33
*** 
One year 
Mean 
Median 
0.061 
0.035 
0.085 
0.055 
4.65
*** 
This table presents mean and median of Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure for different periods 
(quarter year, half a year, three quarters of a year, and one year) after announcement date. This table 
reports illiquidity results for the entire sample, and for firms with high quality and low quality GHG 
emission disclosures. This table also reports nonparametric Mann-Whitney (MW) test statistics for the 
difference in median Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity across high quality and low quality sub groups. 
*
Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, 
**
significantly different from zero at the 5% level, 
and
 ***
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
The results from table 5.8 show that for all time horizons, firms that have greater 
GHG emission disclosure quality have lower mean and median value of Amihud’s 
(2002) illiquidity measure as compared to low quality disclosure firms. The mean 
values of Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure for the high and low quality firms are 
0.061 and 0.085 one year after the annual report announcement date. As suggested 
earlier, firms with higher quality GHG emission disclosure have more stock price 
liquidity than firms with lower quality of GHG emission information after post 
announcement date. The Mann-Whitney non-parametric test statistics point out that 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level for all time horizons.  
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The bid-ask spread is an additional liquidity measure to the Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity measure. The bid-ask spreads for the entire, disclosing and non-disclosing 
sample firms for the four different time horizons namely, quarter  year, half-a year, 
three quarters of a  year, and one year are presented in Table 5.9. The average bid-
ask spread for the entire sample is 1.43 and 1.42 for the periods of quarter year and 
one year respectively. The disclosing and non-disclosing firms have average bid-ask 
spreads of 1.22 and 1.56 for the period of one year respectively and the difference is 
significant at the 1% level. It is evident that the firms’ decision to disclose is more 
likely to positively impact share price liquidity even one year after the release date.   
 
Table 5.9 Bid-ask spreads and disclosing and non-disclosing sample 
Post-announcement 
period 
 Full sample 
N = 562 
Disclosing 
N = 226 
Non-disclosing 
N = 336 
MW 
test 
Quarter  year 
Mean 
Median 
1.43 
0.97 
1.23 
0.75 
1.56 
1.12 
4.10
*** 
Half  year 
Mean 
Median 
1.46 
1.06 
1.23 
0.86 
1.61 
1.28 
4.52
*** 
Three quarters of a 
year 
Mean 
Median 
1.44 
1.12 
1.24 
0.87 
1.58 
1.32 
4.58
*** 
One year 
Mean 
Median 
1.42 
1.16 
1.22 
0.86 
1.56 
1.38 
4.91
*** 
This table presents mean and median bid-ask spread for different periods (quarter year, half a year, three 
quarters of a year, and one year) after announcement date. This table reports the results on bid-ask 
spread for the entire sample, and for disclosing and non-disclosing groups. This table also reports 
nonparametric Mann-Whitney (MW) test statistics for the difference in median bid-ask spread across 
disclosure and non-disclosure sub groups. 
*
Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, 
**
significantly different from zero at the 5% level, and
 ***
significantly different from zero at the 1% 
level. 
 
 
Our findings are robust to the use of alternate time horizons. The disclosing and non-
disclosing sample of firms have median bid-ask spreads that are significantly different 
for the post announcement periods. The Mann-Whitney non-parametric test statistics 
confirm that the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level for all time 
horizons.  
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Table 5.10 Bid-ask spreads and disclosure quality 
Post-announcement 
period 
 High quality 
N = 281 
Low quality 
N = 281  
Quarter year 
Mean 
Median 
1.39 
0.94 
1.48 
0.99 
1.12 
Half a year 
Mean 
Median 
1.37 
0.96 
1.54 
1.18 
1.66
* 
Three quarters 
Mean 
Median 
1.35 
1.00 
1.53 
1.25 
2.02
** 
One year 
Mean 
Median 
1.33 
1.02 
1.52 
1.26 
2.54
** 
This table presents mean and median of bid-ask spread for different periods (quarter year, half a year, 
three quarters of a year, and one year) after announcement date. This table reports bid-ask spread results 
for the entire sample, and for firms with high quality and low quality GHG emission disclosures. This 
table also reports nonparametric Mann-Whitney (MW) test statistics for the difference in median bid-
ask spread across high quality and low quality sub groups. 
*
Significantly different from zero at the 10% 
level, 
**
significantly different from zero at the 5% level, and
 ***
significantly different from zero at the 
1% level. 
 
 
High quality and low quality sample firms show significant differences in the bid-ask 
spreads for the time horizons of half-a year, three quarter of a year, and one year. 
High quality disclosure firms have smaller bid-ask spreads than low quality 
disclosure firms. This result validates our proposition that that high quality firms 
have more liquid shares and try to further improve their liquidity by disseminating 
high quality GHG emission information.  This may lead to a decrease in the 
information asymmetry among a broader group of stakeholders. 
5.6. Conclusion 
This Chapter discussed in detail the descriptive statistics of variables used in this 
research. There are two different disclosures used in this study.  Based on the two 
disclosure variables, all independent variables and control variables are divided into 
two major categories. Statistical significances are identified using the Mann-Whitney 
(MW) non-parametric test statistics. The next Chapter presents the main results of 
testing the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6. DATA ANALYSIS AND 
RESULTS 
6.1. Introduction 
The objective of this Chapter is to present correlations and regression analysis to test 
the stated hypotheses in Chapter 3. This Chapter on data analysis and results consists 
of three key sections. The first part of this Chapter discusses the empirical results 
regarding the impact of corporate governance attributes on voluntary disclosure of 
GHG emission information. The second section provides the empirical results for the 
relationship between voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information and 
earnings management. The third section of this Chapter reports empirical results on 
the link between stock market liquidity and voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information.  
6.2. The impact of corporate governance on    
  voluntary GHG emission disclosure 
This section analyses the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emission information using correlations and regressions. There 
are two competing views suggested in Chapter 3 with regards to the relationship 
between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information. Based on stakeholder value maximisation view, it is posited that : 
 
Hypothesis 1(a): There is a positive association between effective corporate 
governance mechanisms and voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information. 
 
Based on shareholder expense view, the following hypothesis is posited:  
 
Hypothesis 1(b): Voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information is inversely 
associated with effective corporate governance mechanisms. 
6.2.1. Correlation results for H1 (a) and (b) 
Table 6.1 presents Pearson and Spearman correlations between voluntary disclosure 
of GHG emission information, corporate governance variables, and control variables. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, there are two proxies that are used to capture voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emission information. DISC is the first dependent variable which 
is an indicator variable and takes the value one if a firm responds to the CDP and that 
information is publicly disclosed. QUAL is the second dependent variable and is 
calculated using information based on annual reports, sustainability reports, and 
corporate website using the CDP 2010 scoring methodology.  
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Pearson correlation coefficients between the choice of GHG emission disclosure 
(DISC) and quality of GHG emission disclosure (QUAL) is positive, with a 
coefficient of 0.489 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Spearman 
correlation coefficient also provides similar results between these two variables, with 
a coefficient of 0.466 and is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. These 
results suggest that there is an association between managers’ decision to disclose 
GHG emission information publicly via the CDP and the quality of GHG emission 
disclosure. A positive association is found between the proportion of independent 
directors (IND) and the two proxies for GHG emission disclosure DISC and QUAL 
and both are statistically significant at the 1% level. These results indicate 
preliminary support for the stakeholder value maximisation hypothesis, as stated in 
Hypothesis (1a) suggesting that effective corporate governance mechanisms, such as 
greater independence of directors on the board, are positively associated with the 
probability and the quality of GHG emission disclosure. 
 
CEO duality (DUA) has a negative correlation with the quality of GHG emission 
disclosure and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The correlation between 
DISC and CEO duality is also negative but only significant at the 10% level. These 
results also show preliminary support for the stakeholder value maximisation 
hypothesis, as stated in Hypothesis (1a).  A positive correlation is found between 
board gender diversity (DIV) and the two proxies of voluntary GHG emission 
disclosure (DISC and QUAL). These results also indicate initial support for the 
stakeholder value maximisation hypothesis (H1a), which suggests that gender 
diversity on the board of directors is positively associated with the probability and 
the quality of GHG emission disclosures. The frequency of audit committee meetings 
(LAT) has a positive and statistically significant correlation with DISC and QUAL.  
 
Spearman correlation coefficients between the size of audit committee and the two 
proxies (DISC and QUAL) of voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information are 
positive, and are statistically significant at the 5% and 10% confidence levels 
respectively. The Pearson and Spearman coefficients between shareholding by all 
directors on the board (MSO) and the two proxies of voluntary GHG emission 
disclosure (DISC and QUAL) are negative. These results suggest that firms with 
higher shareholding by all directors on the board tend to disclose less GHG emission 
information voluntarily. Institutional shareholders (INS) have no significant 
correlations with DISC and QUAL. Blockholder ownership (BHD) has positive 
association between two proxies of DISC and QUAL. The highest correlation 
coefficient result reported in Table 6.1 is 0.92 between INS and BHD. This study 
uses one of these variables at a time due to the multicollinearity problem. 
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Table 6.1 Correlation matrix (Pearson above diagonal and Spearman below diagonal) 
 
DISC QUAL IND DUA DIV LAT MAC MSO INS BHD LMV TOB ROA LEV AGE VOL CRL 
DISC 1 0.489*** 0.230*** -0.077* 0.236*** 0.204*** 0.067 -0.261*** 0.064 0.116*** 0.365*** -0.164*** 0.230*** -0.008 0.178*** -0.118*** 0.133*** 
QUAL 0.466*** 1 0.308*** -0.211*** 0.196*** 0.242*** 0.088** -0.239*** 0.032 0.106** 0.378*** -0.172*** 0.226*** -0.008 0.401*** -0.055 0.330*** 
IND 0.222*** 0.300*** 1 -0.299*** 0.259*** 0.220*** 0.287*** -0.402*** -0.219*** -0.175*** 0.329*** -0.097** 0.204*** -0.142*** 0.260*** -0.193*** 0.175*** 
DUA -0.077* -0.212*** -0.285*** 1 -0.113*** -0.160*** -0.241*** 0.258*** 0.050 -0.004 -0.064 -0.012 -0.035 0.052 -0.180*** 0.137*** -0.140*** 
DIV 0.236*** 0.156*** 0.271*** -0.113*** 1 0.284*** 0.295*** -0.138*** -0.058 0.009 0.421*** -0.105** 0.291*** -0.080* 0.143*** -0.275*** 0.167*** 
LAT 0.189*** 0.216*** 0.198*** -0.160*** 0.268*** 1 0.267*** -0.123*** -0.105** -0.052 0.361*** -0.237*** 0.300*** -0.029 0.220*** -0.220*** 0.145*** 
MAC 0.073* 0.087** 0.321*** -0.243*** 0.315*** 0.261*** 1 -0.184*** -0.092* -0.042 0.287*** -0.164*** 0.262*** 0.054 0.193*** -0.204*** 0.107** 
MSO -0.312*** -0.301*** -0.328*** 0.223*** -0.168*** -0.171*** -0.219*** 1 0.142*** 0.138*** -0.161*** 0.347*** -0.111*** -0.055 -0.185*** 0.196*** -0.047 
INS 0.053 0.044 -0.241*** 0.036 -0.042 -0.113*** -0.086* -0.057 1 0.919*** 0.024 0.083* -0.116*** 0.054 -0.030 0.091** 0.114*** 
BHD 0.100** 0.113*** -0.196*** -0.010 0.001 -0.059 -0.061 -0.096** 0.923*** 1 0.101** 0.091** -0.066 0.007 0.036 0.068 0.174*** 
LMV 0.371*** 0.318*** 0.328*** -0.064 0.427*** 0.333*** 0.279*** -0.367*** 0.058 0.115*** 1 -0.162*** 0.507*** -0.127*** 0.340*** -0.439*** 0.355*** 
TOB -0.157*** -0.089** -0.114*** -0.059 -0.132*** -0.119*** -0.126*** 0.313*** 0.106** 0.126*** -0.127*** 1 -0.076 -0.166*** -0.146*** 0.151*** -0.056 
ROA 0.243*** 0.169*** 0.273*** -0.117*** 0.354*** 0.303*** 0.294*** -0.125*** -0.068 -0.023 0.522*** 0.004 1 -0.240*** 0.294*** -0.120*** 0.176*** 
LEV 0.031 0.048 -0.139*** 0.040 -0.063 -0.037 0.030 -0.027 0.078* 0.038 -0.089** -0.079 -0.218*** 1 -0.157*** 0.046 -0.104* 
AGE 0.155*** 0.369*** 0.245*** -0.176*** 0.141*** 0.175*** 0.210*** -0.198*** -0.008 0.053 0.319*** 0.089** 0.346*** -0.138*** 1 -0.179*** 0.242*** 
VOL -0.087* 0.021 -0.202*** 0.096** -0.281*** -0.183*** -0.249*** 0.323*** 0.097** 0.104* -0.489*** 0.199*** -0.254*** -0.014 -0.148*** 1 -0.134*** 
CRL 0.133*** 0.335*** 0.207*** -0.140*** 0.167*** 0.159*** 0.132*** -0.196*** 0.101** 0.158*** 0.309*** 0.004 0.128*** -0.103* 0.255*** -0.102** 1 
Table 6.1 reports the Pearson correlations between variables related to voluntary disclosures, corporate governance and control variables. DISC is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
firm discloses GHG emission information to the CDP, and 0 otherwise. QUAL is quality of GHG emission disclosure index calculated based on annual reports, sustainability reports, and 
corporate website using the CDP 2010 scoring methodology. IND is board independence measured as proportion of independent directors on the board; DUA is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the CEO has a role as a chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. DIV is board diversity measured as an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the board has female director and 0 
otherwise. LAT is natural logarithm of number of audit committee meetings. MAC is the size of the audit committee measured as number of members of an audit committee. MSO is 
proportion of ordinary shares held by all directors. INS is   proportion of shareholding held by the institutional investors measured from Top20 shareholding list of a firm excluding 
individual shareholdings. BHD is the proportion of shareholding held by blockholders, who hold 5% or more shares. LMV is the size of a firm measured as natural logarithm of market 
value in millions one month before the annual report release date.  TOB is Tobin’s q measured as the market value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock and book value of 
long-term debt and current liabilities, all scaled by book value of total assets. ROA is firm profitability measured as net profit after tax before abnormal items divided by total assets. LEV 
is leverage measured as total debt divided by total assets. AGE is natural logarithm of firm age calculated from its listing date (years). VOL is the volatility calculated as the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns over the annual report announcement period from day -260 to day -2.  CRL is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm is listed other than ASX and 0 
otherwise.  ***, **, * indicate that correlation is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% (2-tailed) levels respectively.  
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With regards to control variables, firm size (LMV) and listing age of the firm (AGE) 
reveal high positive association with  both  GHG emission disclosure measures 
(DISC and QUAL). These results suggest that larger and older firms are more likely 
to disclose more GHG emission information via the CDP and their corporate 
reporting channels to meet the demand of a broader group of stakeholders. Tobin’s q 
(TOB) shows negative association with both measures of GHG emission disclosures 
suggesting that firms with higher growth prospects are less likely to provide 
voluntary GHG emission information because at the high growth stage, managers of 
the firms are not motivated to measure and report GHG emission information. In 
addition, Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients show positive association 
between profitability (ROA) and the proxies of DISC and QUAL.  Leverage (LEV) 
indicates no association with both GHG emission disclosures. Share price volatility 
(VOL) has negative association with only DISC. This result suggests that firms that 
decide to disclose more GHG emission are more likely to have lower information 
asymmetry between insiders and outside investors. The cross-listed firms reveal high 
positive correlation with both GHG emission disclosure measures suggesting that 
Australian firms that are cross-listed in a foreign stock exchange need to respect their 
regulations therefore need to provide more information with regards to GHG 
emissions. 
6.2.2. Voluntary GHG emission disclosure and  
  corporate governance variables 
This section relates corporate governance variables to the firm’s decision to 
voluntarily respond to the CDP as well as the quality of GHG emission disclosure 
calculated based on firms’ annual reports, standalone sustainability reports, and 
corporate websites using sing the CDP 2010 scoring methodology. Corporate 
governance variables and control variables used in this research are lagged variables.  
Table 6.2 reports the results of cross sectional logistic regression analysis with the 
firms’ decision to disclose their GHG emission information (DISC) as the dependent 
variable. The list of effective corporate governance variables are greater board 
independence (IND), absence of CEO duality (DUA), presence of board gender 
diversity (DIV), more audit committee meetings (LAT),  smaller size of the audit 
committee (MAC), lower directors’ ownership (MSO), higher institutional 
ownership (INS), and greater level of blockholders ownership (BHD).  
 
Table 6.2 presents two different models of logistic regression. Models 1 and 2 show 
the results including year and industry fixed effects, which control for potential time 
and industry effects. The board independence (IND) is slightly associated with 
managers’ choice of GHG emission disclosure. CEO duality is insignificant in model 
1 and 2. The board gender diversity (DIV) is positively related to managers’ decision 
to disclose GHG emission information via the CDP. Firms with more audit 
committee members are less likely to disclose GHG emission disclosure to public. 
These findings are not consistent with previous research findings of a positive 
association between the size of the audit committee and quality of financial 
disclosure (Felo, Krishnamurthy & Solieri 2003; Pucheta-Martínez & De Fuentes 
2007). On the other hand, others (Lin, Xiao & Tang 2008; Scarbrough, Rama & 
Raghunandan 1998; Yermack 1996) argue that the more members in an audit 
committee may lead to unnecessary debates and delay in decision making process, 
this in turn, it is not necessarily considered as an effective functioning mechanisms.    
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Table 6.2 Decision to disclose GHG emission information and corporate governance 
Model 1 2 
Intercept 
-5.9030 
(-4.71)
*** 
-5.3203 
(-4.49)
*** 
IND 
1.2302 
(1.62) 
1.2861 
(1.68)
* 
DUA 
0.1772 
(0.50) 
0.2225 
(0.62) 
DIV 
0.5538 
(2.35)
** 
0.5291 
(2.25)
** 
LAT 
0.2344 
(0.90) 
0.2276 
(0.88) 
MAC 
-0.2608 
(-2.63)
*** 
-0.2694 
(-2.70)
*** 
MSO 
-6.1918 
(-3.55)
*** 
-6.1061 
(-3.57)
*** 
INS 
1.8628 
(2.65)
***  
BHD  
1.8314 
(2.83)
*** 
LMV 
0.5704 
(4.33)
*** 
0.5467 
(4.13)
*** 
TOB 
-0.1647 
(-2.11)
** 
-0.1620 
(-2.07)
** 
ROA 
0.1506 
(0.78) 
0.1645 
(0.84) 
LEV 
0.5929 
(0.93) 
0.6345 
(0.99) 
AGE 
0.0786 
(0.62) 
0.0716 
(0.57) 
VOL 
-3.5636 
(-0.55) 
-3.8687 
(-0.59) 
CRL 
0.0442 
(0.15) 
0.0315 
(0.11) 
Year Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2 
(%) 22.50 22.72 
Wald chi
2
 102.44 104.27 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 
N 565 565 
This table provides the results of multivariate logistic regression analysis. The dependent variable is DISC which is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm discloses GHG emission information to the CDP and 0 otherwise. IND 
is board independence measured as proportion of independent directors on the board.  DUA is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if the CEO has a role as a chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. DIV is board diversity measured as 
an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the board has female director and 0 otherwise. LAT is natural logarithm of 
number of audit committee meetings. MAC is the size of the audit committee measured as number of members of 
an audit committee. MSO is the proportion of ordinary shares held by all directors. INS is the proportion of 
shareholding by the institutional investors measured from the Top20 shareholding list of a firm excluding 
individual shareholdings. BHD is the proportion of shareholding held by blockholders, who hold 5% or more 
shares. LMV is the size of a firm measured as natural logarithm of market value in millions one month before the 
annual report release date.  TOB is Tobin’s q measured as the market value of common equity plus book value of 
preferred stock and book value of long-term debt and current liabilities, all scaled by book value of total assets. 
ROA is firm profitability measured as net profit after tax before abnormal items divided by total assets. LEV is 
leverage measured as total debt divided by total assets. AGE is the natural logarithm of firm age calculated from its 
listing date (years). VOL is the volatility calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the annual 
report announcement period from day -260 to day -2. CRL is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm is listed 
other than ASX and 0 otherwise. .z-statistics are reported in parenthesis.   ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Particularly, Kent and Stewart (2008) find a negative relationship between the size of 
the audit committee and financial disclosure for Australian firms.   Consistent with 
this study and the above argument, Australian firms with more members in the audit 
committee are less likely to provide greater GHG emission disclosure to 
stakeholders.  
 
Directors’ shareholding (MSO) is negatively associated with managers’ decision to 
disclose GHG emission information via the CDP. The negative associations between 
managerial share ownership and voluntary GHG emission disclosure support the 
stakeholder value maximisation hypothesis, as stated in Hypothesis (1a) and indicate 
that firms in which directors hold greater proportion of ordinary shares are less likely 
to disclose GHG emission information to the public. The coefficient on institutional 
shareholding and blockholder ownership are positive and significant suggesting 
firms with more institutional and blockholder ownership are more likely to disclose 
voluntary GHG emission information publicly. These results also support our 
prediction and supports for the stakeholder value maximisation view hypotheses 
(H1a). The frequency of audit committee meetings is not significant in all models.   
 
A number of control variables are associated with the decision to disclose GHG 
emission information. The size of firm is significantly positively associated with the 
firms’ decision to disclose their GHG emissions information in all models. This 
result is consistent with previous research (Ben-Amar & McIlkenny 2014; 
Matsumura, Prakash & Vera-Muñoz 2014; Peters & Romi 2014; Prado-Lorenzo & 
Garcia-Sanchez 2010; Rankin, Windsor & Wahyuni 2011). Tobin’s q is negatively 
and significantly associated with managers’ choice of GHG emission disclosure, 
indicating that managers’ decision with regards to disclosure is negatively associated 
with firms’ growth opportunities. Profitability, leverage, firm age, stock return 
volatility, and cross-listing are not significant in all models.  
 
In Table 6.3, the dependent variable is quality of GHG emission disclosure (QUAL).  
This table presents two different models of multiple regression results.  Models 1 and 
2 of Table 6.3 show the results including year and industry fixed effects. This study 
corrected heteroskedasticity using robust standard errors in all of our models. Model 
1 of Table 6.3 is highly significant with an adjusted R square of 44.62%, F-statistics 
of 25.79, p-value of 0.0000, and maximum variance inflation factor of 2.50 (Please 
see the appendix 2 for further details). 
 
There is a statistically significant positive association between the proportion of 
independent directors on the board (IND) and quality of GHG emission disclosure, 
which supports the stakeholder value maximisation view hypothesis (H1a). This 
suggests that firms provide greater amount of quality of voluntary GHG emission 
information in their annual, sustainability reports, and corporate websites when they 
have higher proportion of independent directors on the board.  These results are 
consistent with prior research.  Rupley, Brown and Marshall (2012) and Iatridis 
(2013) found a similar result for environmental disclosure quality. With regards to 
GHG emission disclosure quality, Liao, Luo and Tang (2014) found a similar result 
for the UK firms. This result supports the findings of  Irani and Oesch (2013) who 
report that better corporate governance mechanisms that act to mitigate agency costs 
often require management to disclose more information.  
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There is a significant negative association between CEO duality (DUA) quality of 
GHG emission information (QUAL) which supports the stakeholder value 
maximisation view hypothesis (H1a). This result shows that firms with CEO duality 
are associated with lower quality of GHG emission information.  There is association 
between board gender diversity (DIV) and the quality of GHG emission information. 
The number of audit committee members has a negative association with the quality 
of GHG emission information. It is concluded here that firms make better quality 
voluntary GHG emission information disclosure when they have a smaller sized 
audit committee. The results regarding board gender diversity and the size of the 
audit committee are consistent with the stakeholder value maximisation view 
hypothesis (H1a). MSO is not associated with the quality of GHG information 
disclosure.  
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Table 6.3 Quality of GHG emission information and corporate governance 
Model 1 2 
Intercept 
-0.1555 
(-1.96)** 
-0.1509 
(-2.00)** 
IND 
0.1254 
(3.15)*** 
0.1286 
(3.21)*** 
DUA 
-0.0539 
(-2.91)*** 
-0.0531 
(-2.85)*** 
DIV 
0.0314 
(2.29)** 
0.0310 
(2.27)** 
LAT 
0.0239 
(1.44) 
0.0240 
(1.45) 
MAC 
-0.0185 
(-2.96)*** 
-0.0186 
(-2.99)*** 
MSO 
-0.0955 
(-1.45) 
-0.0970 
(-1.48) 
INS 
0.0227 
(0.52)  
BHD  
0.0328 
(0.89) 
LMV 
0.0471 
(6.00)*** 
0.0463 
(5.86)*** 
TOB 
-0.0056 
(-1.63) 
-0.0057 
(-1.66)* 
ROA 
-0.0071 
(-0.74) 
-0.0065 
(-0.68) 
LEV 
0.1222 
(3.07)*** 
0.1225 
(3.09)*** 
AGE 
0.0401 
(5.23)*** 
0.0400 
(5.22)*** 
VOL 
-0.1364 
(-0.30) 
-0.1432 
(-0.31) 
CRL 
0.0623 
(3.65)*** 
0.0614 
(3.57)*** 
Year Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 (%) 44.62 44.67 
F-statistic 25.79 25.86 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 
N 565 565 
Max VIF 2.50 2.54 
This table provides the results of multivariate regression analysis. The dependent variable (QUAL) is the quality of 
GHG emission disclosure index calculated based on annual reports, sustainability reports, and corporate website 
using the CDP 2010 scoring methodology. IND is board independence measured as proportion of independent 
directors on the board.  DUA is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO has a role as a chairman of the board, 
and 0 otherwise. DIV is board diversity measured as an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the board has female 
director and 0 otherwise. LAT is natural logarithm of number of audit committee meetings. MAC is the size of the 
audit committee measured as number of members of an audit committee. MSO is the proportion of ordinary shares 
held by all directors. INS is the proportion of shareholding by the institutional investors measured from the Top20 
shareholding list of a firm excluding individual shareholdings. BHD is the proportion of shareholding held by 
blockholders, who hold 5% or more shares.  LMV is the size of a firm measured as natural logarithm of market 
value in millions one month before the annual report release date.  TOB is Tobin’s q measured as the market value 
of common equity plus book value of preferred stock and book value of long-term debt and current liabilities, all 
scaled by book value of total assets. ROA is firm profitability measured as net profit after tax before abnormal 
items divided by total assets. LEV is leverage measured as total debt divided by total assets. AGE is the natural 
logarithm of firm age calculated from its listing date (years). VOL is the volatility calculated as the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns over the annual report announcement period from day -260 to day -2. CRL is an 
indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm is listed other than ASX and 0 otherwise. t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis.   ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Max VIF is the maximum 
variance inflation factor. 
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With regards to control variables, firm size, leverage, listing age and cross-listing 
have significant results. Firm size is positively associated with quality of GHG 
emission disclosure, which supports our earlier results. The positive relationship 
between firm size and quality of GHG emission disclosure can be explained by the 
fact that larger firms have additional resources to disclose the quality GHG emission 
information. This result is consistent with previous studies (Ben-Amar & McIlkenny 
2014; Choi, Lee & Psaros 2013; Freedman & Jaggi 2011; Prado-Lorenzo et al. 
2009). Tobin’s q is slightly negatively related to the quality of GHG emission 
information suggesting that firms with higher growth opportunities are less likely to 
disclose high quality GHG emission information. 
 
Listing age appears to be positive and significant in all of the models. Leverage is 
significantly positively associated with the quality of voluntary GHG emission 
disclosures in all models. This result indicates that debt holders exert pressure on 
firms to disclose more GHG emission information. Profitability (ROA) does not 
have any significant association with the quality of voluntary GHG emission 
disclosure. Choi, Lee and Psaros (2013) find a similar result between ROA and 
carbon emission disclosure in Australian firms but they use a different methodology 
to measure carbon emission disclosure. Stock return volatility (VOL) is not 
associated with the quality of voluntary GHG emission disclosure. Cross-listing 
appears to be positive and significant suggesting that cross-listed firms are more 
likely to provide GHG emission information to fulfill the needs of regulators and 
investors from other countries.  
 
Overall, effective corporate governance mechanisms such as greater board 
independence, absence of CEO duality, presence of board gender diversity, lower 
directors’ ownership, higher institutional ownership, greater blockholders ownership 
and smaller size of the audit committee impact on voluntary GHG emission 
disclosure information. These results suggest that firms with better corporate 
governance mechanisms are more likely to pursue climate change agenda and direct 
the management to provide better quality GHG emission information to a broader 
group of stakeholders to legitimise their activities. These results fail to reject the 
stakeholder value maximisation hypothesis and supports Hypothesis (1a). The author 
was unable to find support for the shareholder expense view posited in Hypothesis 
(1b).  
 
The findings of this research are comparable to previous research. Ntim and 
Soobaroyen (2013) find that better-governed firms are more likely to pursue more 
active CSR initiatives in South Africa. Specifically, they find that board size, board 
diversity, government ownership, and a greater percentage of independent directors 
on board have positive impact on disclosure about CSR initiatives. On the other 
hand, blockholder ownership and institutional shareholding have negative effect on 
CSR. Rupley, Brown and Marshall (2012) show that board independence, board 
diversity, and multiple directorships are positively associated with voluntary 
environmental disclosure suggesting that good corporate governance features based 
on a broad range of monitoring mechanisms pressure management to act in the best 
interests of stakeholders, thereby increasing the quality of voluntary environmental 
disclosure. 
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Liao, Luo and Tang (2014) have shown that firms with better corporate governance 
are more likely to disclose more voluntary GHG emission information in the UK. 
Particularly, they found evidence that board diversity, board independence, and the 
presence of board level environmental committee have positive effects on voluntary 
GHG emission disclosure. Their findings indicated that an independent and 
diversified board and the existence of an environmental committee at board level 
may balance a firm’s financial and non-financial goals with limited resources and 
moderating the possible conflicting expectations of stakeholders’ demands.  
 
6.2.3. Long-term performance  
 
This study investigates the long-term stock performance with regards to the CDP 
reporting announcement based on whether firms disclose GHG emission  
information, focusing on portfolio returns using calendar-time methodology. The 
model given below is used in our empirical estimations: 
 
ptttftmtftPt HMLSMBRRRR   321 )(                                  (16) 
 
The proxy for the risk-free rate (Rft)   is the 90-day Australian bank accepted bill 
rate;  Rmt is the return on ASX all ordinaries share price index; SMBt is the difference 
in the returns of  portfolios of small and  large capitalisation stocks; HMLt is the is 
the difference in returns of  portfolios of high and low book-to-market ratio. This 
study uses Morgan and Stanley Capital International (MSCI) indices from 
DataStream for large, small, value, and growth stocks in the Australian market to 
calculate returns on the SMB and HML portfolio. The expected value of the intercept  
(α), which measures the monthly abnormal return,  is zero under null hypothesis of 
no abnormal performance (Chan, Kot & Tang 2013).  
 
Table 6.4 Long-term performance 
Panel A: The long-term performance for disclosing versus not disclosing firms for a 
THREE-year period 
  1 2 3 Adj. R
2
 
Disclosing firms 
0.0040 
(2.85)
*** 
0.8983 
(28.9)
*** 
0.2717 
(5.49)
*** 
0.2197 
(5.88)
*** 
95.11 
Not disclosing firms 
0.0048 
(2.44)
** 
0.9997 
(23.02)
*** 
0.5268 
(7.62)
*** 
0.2865 
(5.49)
*** 
93.53 
Panel B: The long-term performance for disclosing versus not disclosing firms for a 
FIVE-year period 
 
 1 2 3 Adj. R2 
Disclosing firms 
0.0044 
(3.56)
*** 
0.8903 
(30.92)
*** 
0.3012 
(6.63)
*** 
0.1769 
(4.93)
*** 
94.11 
Not disclosing firms 
0.0042 
(2.23)
** 
0.9197 
(20.91)
*** 
0.5330 
(7.68)
*** 
0.2648 
(4.83)
*** 
89.65 
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The candar time regression results are reported in Table 6.4. This provides average 
abnormal monthly return (α) for the rolling portfolios employing equally weighted 
monthly returns for three- and  five-year periods from the month after announcing 
the CDP report. Panel A of Table 6.4 reports the long-term abnormal returns for 
GHG emission disclosing firms versus not disclosing firms for a three-year period. 
The long-term intercepts (α) are 0.40%  (with a t-value of 2.85) and 0.48% (with a t-
value of 2.44) for disclosing and not disclosing firms respectively. When comparing 
long-term abnormal returns for the three- and five year periods, the long term return 
for disclosing firms are higher whereas the long term returns for non disclosing firms 
are reduced. These results provide very strong support for the stakeholder value 
maximazation view.    
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6.2.4. Year-by-year regression results 
Table 6.5 Decision to Disclose GHG emission information and corporate governance by years 
Reporting year 2006 2007. 2008 2009 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Intercept 
-5.9316 
(-1.30) 
-4.4936 
(-0.77) 
-7.6196 
(-3.27)
*** 
-6.9258 
(-2.48)
** 
IND 
-1.3682 
(-0.62) 
-3.5017 
(-1.04) 
3.4006 
(2.30)
** 
-0.3479 
(-0.24) 
DUA 
-2.9763 
(-1.55) 
-1.2140 
(-1.13) 
1.0277 
(1.65)
* 
0.5526 
(0.71) 
DIV 
0.3638 
(0.51) 
3.3721 
(1.96)
* 
0.3122 
(0.71) 
0.6886 
(1.49) 
LAT 
0.2592 
(0.37) 
-0.0882 
(-0.09) 
-0.0252 
(-0.05) 
0.9280 
(1.55) 
MAC 
-0.1721 
(-0.73) 
-1.0365 
(-2.54)
** 
-0.2888 
(-1.42) 
-0.4821 
(-2.22)
** 
MSO 
1.6300 
(0.31) 
-21.1738 
(-1.84)
* 
-3.5175 
(-1.20) 
-14.5896 
(-4.19)
*** 
INS 
-1.8006 
(-0.98) 
-4.6846 
(-1.72)
* 
2.6218 
(1.96)
* 
4.1360 
(2.45)
** 
LMV 
1.0024 
(1.78)
* 
1.1054 
(2.20)
** 
0.5247 
(2.15)
** 
0.8815 
(3.09)
*** 
TOB 
-0.9296 
(-2.49)
** 
0.5449 
(0.74) 
-0.2155 
(-1.73)
* 
-0.3115 
(-2.43)
** 
ROA 
-0.9636 
(-1.06) 
-0.9885 
(-1.83)
* 
0.4247 
(1.15) 
1.0380 
(2.71)
*** 
LEV 
-0.5462 
(-0.23) 
3.0861 
(1.07) 
2.2292 
(1.70)
* 
-2.6317 
(-1.90) 
AGE 
0.1704 
(0.54) 
0.8797 
(1.80)
* 
0.1662 
(0.73)
* 
-0.4018 
(-1.24) 
VOL 
6.0263 
(0.10) 
33.8784 
(0.28) 
-23.7670 
(-1.95)
* 
3.5334 
(0.30) 
CRL 
-1.5413 
(-1.89)
* 
-0.3227 
(-0.30) 
0.6152 
(1.15) 
0.3967 
(0.67) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 (%) 21.39 37.61 29.23 42.60 
Wald chi2 17.46 18.56 53.74 59.75 
Probability 0.6828 0.6135 0.0003 0.0000 
N 90 83 189 186 
This table provides the results of multivariate logistic regression analysis. The dependent variable is DISC 
which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm discloses GHG emission information to the CDP 
and 0 otherwise. IND is board independence measured as proportion of independent directors on the board.  DUA is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO has a role as a chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. DIV is board 
diversity measured as an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the board has female director and 0 otherwise. LAT is 
natural logarithm of number of audit committee meetings. MAC is the size of the audit committee measured as 
number of members of an audit committee. MSO is the proportion of ordinary shares held by all directors. INS is the 
proportion of shareholding by the institutional investors measured from the Top20 shareholding list of a firm 
excluding individual shareholdings. LMV is the size of a firm measured as natural logarithm of market value in 
millions one month before the annual report release date.  TOB is Tobin’s q measured as the market value of common 
equity plus book value of preferred stock and book value of long-term debt and current liabilities, all scaled by book 
value of total assets. ROA is firm profitability measured as net profit after tax before abnormal items divided by total 
assets. LEV is leverage measured as total debt divided by total assets. AGE is the natural logarithm of firm age 
calculated from its listing date (years). VOL is the volatility calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns 
over the annual report announcement period from day -260 to day -2. CRL is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if a 
firm is listed other than ASX and 0 otherwise. z-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
***
, 
**
, 
* 
indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 6.5 reports the multivariate logistic regression results of managers’ decision to 
report voluntary GHG emission disclosure publicly by year. Four CDP reporting 
years are considered in this study.  These results include industry fixed effects. With 
regards to corporate governance variables, the proportion of independent directors on 
the board is significant only for 2008. Board gender diversity appears to be positive 
and significant only for the year 2007. The size of the audit committee has a 
significantly negative coefficient for the years 2007 and 2009. Managerial share 
ownership’s coefficient is statistically significant (p > 0.01) in 2009. The coefficient 
on institutional investors is positive and significant in CDP reporting years 2007, 
2008 and 2009. With regards to control variables, larger firms are more likely to 
disclose their GHG emission information for all years. TOB is negative and 
significant in all models except in 2007. ROA shows a conflicting result in 2007 and 
2008. Stock return volatility is insignificant in all the models except in 2008. Cross-
listing appears to be insignificant in all models except in 2006. 
 
Table 6.6 reports the regression results by year using disclosure quality as the 
dependent variable. All models include industry fixed effects.  The proportion of 
independent directors on the board is significantly positively associated with the 
quality of GHG emission information in 2008 and 2009. CEO duality is significantly 
negatively associated with GHG emission information in   2006 and 2007. Board 
gender diversity is not significant in all models except in 2009. Frequency of audit 
committee meetings is insignificant in all models. The size of the audit committee 
has significant negative coefficients in 2007 and 2009. Managerial share ownership 
is significantly negatively related to quality of GHG emission information only for 
year 2009. INS provides a conflicting result in year 2006 and 2009. 
 
With regards to the control variables, firm size exhibits positive relation with quality 
of GHG emission disclosure in all the CDP reporting years except 2006 and 2007. 
TOB appears to be negative and significant only for year 2008. ROA shows an 
insignificant relation with quality of GHG emission disclosure. Leverage is positive 
in 2007 and 2008. There is a positive association between listing age and voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emissions in all reporting years. Stock return volatility tends to be 
insignificant in all models. Cross-listing shows a positive relation with quality of 
GHG emission disclosure in 2006 and 2008. 
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Table 6.6 Quality of GHG disclosure and corporate governance by years 
Reporting year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Intercept 
0.2930 
(1.22) 
0.3064 
(1.03) 
-0.2636 
(-2.30)
** 
-0.4708 
(-3.44)
*** 
IND 
-0.1024 
(-0.92) 
-0.0959 
(-0.83) 
0.1328 
(1.94)
* 
0.2552 
(3.44)
*** 
DUA 
-0.0997 
(-1.92)
* 
-0.1956 
(-3.90)
*** 
-0.0439 
(-1.42) 
-0.0393 
(-1.18) 
DIV 
0.0299 
(0.86) 
0.0488 
(1.38) 
0.0151 
(0.62) 
0.0425 
(1.70)
* 
LAT 
0.0139 
(0.32) 
0.0524 
(1.16) 
0.0299 
(1.05) 
0.0152 
(0.49) 
MAC 
-0.0171 
(-1.21) 
-0.0504 
(-2.59)
** 
-0.0109 
(-0.84) 
-0.0213 
(-2.06)
** 
MSO 
0.0347 
(0.13) 
-0.1898 
(-0.89) 
-0.0465 
(-0.45) 
-0.2113 
(-2.05)
** 
INS 
-0.2519 
(-2.08)
** 
-0.1696 
(-1.21) 
0.0565 
(0.85) 
0.1590 
(2.04)
** 
LMV 
0.0272 
(1.32) 
0.0296 
(1.36) 
0.0487 
(3.91)
*** 
0.0639 
(4.44)
*** 
TOB 
-0.0124 
(-1.24) 
-0.0154 
(-1.39) 
-0.0130 
(-2.60)
*** 
-0.0012 
(-0.35) 
ROA 
-0.0282 
(-0.78) 
-0.0180 
(-0.58) 
-0.0122 
(-0.65) 
0.0007 
(0.04) 
LEV 
0.1268 
(0.80) 
0.2738 
(2.18)
** 
0.1056 
(1.78)
* 
0.0121 
(0.19) 
AGE 
0.0359 
(2.21)
** 
0.0782 
(3.73)
*** 
0.0330 
(2.51)
** 
0.0404 
(2.70)
*** 
VOL 
-4.4284 
(-1.41) 
-7.4566 
(-1.63) 
-0.5845 
(-1.04) 
1.0310 
(1.40) 
CRL 
0.0783 
(1.95)
* 
0.0462 
(1.09) 
0.0670 
(2.17)
** 
0.0361 
(1.21) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 (%) 42.45 47.30 40.96 44.09 
F-statistic 3.92 4.63 6.67 7.48 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 92 94 189 190 
Max VIF 2.72 2.57 2.45 2.46 
This table provides the results of multivariate regression analysis. The dependent variable (QUAL) is 
the quality of GHG emission disclosure index calculated based on annual reports, sustainability reports, 
and corporate website using the CDP 2010 scoring methodology. IND is board independence measured as 
proportion of independent directors on the board.  DUA is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO has a role 
as a chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. DIV is board diversity measured as an indicator variable that equals to 
1 if the board has female director and 0 otherwise. LAT is natural logarithm of number of audit committee 
meetings. MAC is the size of the audit committee measured as number of members of an audit committee. MSO is 
the proportion of ordinary shares held by all directors. INS is the proportion of shareholding by the institutional 
investors measured from the Top20 shareholding list of a firm excluding individual shareholdings. LMV is the size 
of a firm measured as natural logarithm of market value in millions one month before the annual report release date.  
TOB is Tobin’s q measured as the market value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock and book 
value of long-term debt and current liabilities, all scaled by book value of total assets. ROA is firm profitability 
measured as net profit after tax before abnormal items divided by total assets. LEV is leverage measured as total 
debt divided by total assets. AGE is the natural logarithm of firm age calculated from its listing date (years). VOL 
is the volatility calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the annual report announcement 
period from day -260 to day -2. CRL is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm is listed other than ASX and 0 
otherwise. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.   
***
, 
**
, 
* 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. Max VIF is the maximum variance inflation factor. 
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Overall, the link between corporate governance mechanisms and voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emission information is supported albeit the results are weaker 
when we conduct a year by year analysis. A possible explanation is that the power of 
statistical tests is weaker when we use fewer observations.  
6.2.5. Disclosure sub-scores and corporate  
  governance 
Table 6.7 reports the regression results of five sub-scores of GHG emission 
disclosures. The CDP 2010 rating methodology uses five sub-scores. These are (i) 
governance, (ii) risks and opportunities, (iii) strategy, (iv) GHG accounting, energy 
and fuel use, and trading, and (v) communications. Table 6.6 presents the results 
with year and industry fixed effects for all models. Considering corporate 
governance variables among sub-disclosure categories, the proportion of 
independent directors on the board and CEO duality appears to be significant in all 
categories of GHG emission disclosures in the predicted directions. Board gender 
diversity exhibits a positive and significant relation with quality of GHG emission 
disclosure for all categories except strategy and GHG.  
 
The size of the audit committee has significant impact on all sub-categories of 
quality of GHG emission disclosure except strategy. Managerial share ownership 
and frequency of audit committee meetings do not seem to be associated with any 
sub-categories of GHG emission disclosures except strategy and risk and 
opportunities respectively. Institutional shareholding is insignificant in all sub-
categories. Turning to the control variables, firm size is positively significantly 
associated with all sub-categories of GHG emissions.  Tobin’s q shows a negative 
and significant coefficient in governance and communication sub-categories of 
quality of GHG emission disclosure suggesting that growth firms tend to disclose 
less GHG emission information. Profitability is insignificant at all sub-categories 
except risk sub-category. Leverage is positive and significant in all models except 
governance and communication sub-categories. Listing age seems to be positively 
associated with all sub-categories of GHG emission disclosures except 
communications.  
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Table 6.7 Sub-scores of disclosures and corporate governance  
Sub-scores GOVE RISK STRA GHGE COMM 
Intercept 
-1.2745 
(-1.83)
* 
0.9381 
(0.24) 
1.3016 
(1.27) 
-15.8835 
(-4.64)
*** 
-0.3602 
(-1.18) 
IND 
1.8114 
(4.73)
*** 
4.1330 
(2.26)
** 
1.0976 
(2.03)
** 
4.7433 
(2.48)
** 
0.6870 
(4.12)
*** 
DUA 
-0.6475 
(-3.83)
*** 
-1.9151 
(-2.02)
** 
-0.4052 
(-1.56) 
-2.2679 
(-2.85)
*** 
-0.1229 
(-1.41) 
DIV 
0.3487 
(2.86)
*** 
1.8885 
(2.79)
*** 
0.1256 
(0.70) 
0.8927 
(1.39) 
-0.1315 
(-2.36)
** 
LAT 
-0.1974 
(-1.45) 
1.3403 
(1.73)
* 
0.2543 
(1.26) 
0.9442 
(1.27) 
0.0834 
(1.31) 
MAC 
-0.1322 
(-2.37)
** 
-0.7758 
(-2.72)
*** 
-0.0768 
(-0.99) 
-0.8090 
(-2.82)
*** 
-0.0547 
(-2.20)
** 
MSO 
-0.6629 
(-1.14) 
-4.3420 
(-1.25) 
-1.6853 
(-2.01)
** 
-2.7553 
(-1.03) 
0.1172 
(0.40) 
INS 
-0.0178 
(-0.05) 
2.9434 
(1.37) 
-0.7192 
(-1.20) 
-0.0033 
(0.01) 
0.0142 
(0.08) 
LMV 
0.1756 
(2.52)
** 
1.7961 
(4.99)
*** 
0.4652 
(4.60)
*** 
2.1018 
(5.52)
*** 
0.1448 
(4.73)
*** 
TOB 
-0.0609 
(-2.27)
** 
-0.3193 
(-1.54) 
-0.0582 
(-1.26) 
-0.0979 
(-1.04) 
-0.0404 
(-3.03)
*** 
ROA 
-0.0582 
(-0.82) 
-0.9586 
(-2.52)
** 
-0.1753 
(-1.33) 
0.5437 
(1.05) 
-0.0546 
(-1.58) 
LEV 
0.4218 
(0.99) 
5.9627 
(3.08)
*** 
1.9915 
(3.78)
*** 
3.7990 
(2.14)
** 
0.1502 
(0.93) 
AGE 
0.2017 
(3.08)
*** 
1.9512 
(5.22)
*** 
0.2958 
(3.22)
*** 
1.5259 
(4.17)
*** 
0.0311 
(1.08) 
VOL 
4.7808 
(1.10) 
-1.1248 
(-0.05) 
-6.8334 
(-0.99) 
-7.2694 
(-0.37) 
-4.3772 
(-2.26)
** 
CRL 
0.6235 
(4.14)
*** 
2.8916 
(3.66)
*** 
0.5677 
(2.77)
*** 
2.1540 
(2.49)
** 
0.0475 
(0.77) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 (%) 33.63 41.73 31.33 34.26 26.72 
F-statistic 24.01 27.56 13.66 13.05 13.77 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 565 565 565 565 565 
Max VIF 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 
This table provides the results of multivariate regression analysis. The dependent variables are GOVE: governance; 
RISK: risks and opportunities; STRA: strategy; GHGE: GHG accounting, energy and fuel use, and trading; 
COMM: communications. IND is board independence measured as proportion of independent directors on the 
board.  DUA is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO has a role as a chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. 
DIV is board diversity measured as an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the board has female director and 0 
otherwise. LAT is natural logarithm of number of audit committee meetings. MAC is the size of the audit 
committee measured as number of members of an audit committee. MSO is the proportion of ordinary shares held 
by all directors. INS is the proportion of shareholding by the institutional investors measured from the Top20 
shareholding list of a firm excluding individual shareholdings. LMV is the size of a firm measured as natural 
logarithm of market value in millions one month before the annual report release date.  TOB is Tobin’s q measured 
as the market value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock and book value of long-term debt and 
current liabilities, all scaled by book value of total assets. ROA is firm profitability measured as net profit after tax 
before abnormal items divided by total assets. LEV is leverage measured as total debt divided by total assets. AGE 
is the natural logarithm of firm age calculated from its listing date (years). VOL is the volatility calculated as the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns over the annual report announcement period from day -260 to day -2. CRL 
is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm is listed other than ASX and 0 otherwise. t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis.   
***
, 
**
, 
* 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Max VIF is the 
maximum variance inflation factor. 
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The coefficient on stock return volatility is highly negatively significant only for the 
communication sub-category. Cross-listing is positive and significant in all sub-
categories except communication. Overall, our findings support the stakeholder 
value maximisation view hypothesis and suggest that firms with effective corporate 
governance mechanisms are more likely to disclose higher quality GHG emission 
information to satisfy a variety of stakeholders’ interests and reduce the legitimacy 
gap between the firm and the society in which it operates.  
6.2.6. Robustness analysis 
Three additional tests are conducted to check the robustness of reported results. 
Firstly, this study performs the Heckman two-stage sample selection regression to 
account for the self-selection problem. Secondly, this study uses the Horwath 
Corporate Governance ranking (HCG) as an alternative measure of corporate 
governance quality. Finally, regressions were run excluding financial sector firms. 
The purpose of this exercise is to check for the robustness of results after controlling 
for self-selection, alternative measure of corporate governance quality and to control 
for industry effects. 
6.2.5.1 Self-selection and two-stage regression 
The decision to disclose GHG emission information to the CDP could also have a 
bearing on the quality of GHG emission disclosure. Thus, we need to control for this 
self-selection bias. Prior studies on voluntary GHG emission disclosure use the 
Heckman two-stage sample selection regression to control the potential selection 
bias. For example, Peters and Romi (2014) and Matsumura, Prakash and Vera-
Muñoz (2014) incorporated the  Heckman two-stage sample selection regression  to 
control the possibility of selection bias. This study also performs the Heckman two-
stage sample selection regression to control for self-selection. The inverse Mills ratio 
(LAMBDA) was included in the second stage of regression to control for potential 
selection bias due to omitted variables (Dhaliwal et al. 2012).  
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Table 6.8 Heckman two-stage sample selection model 
 Full sample Excluding Financial sector 
Intercept 
-0.0828 
(-0.55) 
-0.2634 
(-1.63) 
IND 
0.1508 
(1.87)
* 
0.2843 
(3.58)
*** 
DUA 
-0.1865 
(-4.82)
*** 
-0.1170 
(-2.75)
*** 
DIV 
0.0347 
(1.32) 
0.0583 
(2.18)
** 
LAT 
0.0380 
(1.24) 
0.0656 
(1.96)
* 
MAC 
-0.0045 
(-0.45) 
-0.0012 
(-0.12) 
MSO 
0.2125 
(1.00) 
0.3428 
(1.74)
* 
INS 
0.0248 
(0.29) 
0.0053 
(0.06) 
LMV 
0.0264 
(2.05)
** 
0.0296 
(2.10)
** 
TOB 
-0.0211 
(-2.14)
** 
-0.0342 
(-3.09)
*** 
ROA 
-0.0048 
(-0.37) 
0.0098 
(0.72) 
LEV 
0.1851 
(2.49)
** 
0.0225 
(0.26) 
AGE 
0.0398 
(3.11)
*** 
0.0447 
(3.34)
*** 
VOL 
2.5219 
(3.16)
*** 
4.4252 
(4.02)
*** 
CRL 
0.0708 
(2.80)
*** 
0.0796 
(3.00)
*** 
LAMBDA 
-0.0690 
(-3.65)
*** 
-0.0693 
(-3.54)
*** 
Year Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes 
Wald chi2 103.21 195.25 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 
N 565 410 
This table provides the results of the second stage of the Heckman two-stage sample selection model. The dependent 
variable (QUAL) is quality of GHG emission disclosure index calculated based on annual reports, sustainability 
reports, and corporate website using the CDP 2010 scoring methodology. IND is board independence measured as 
proportion of independent directors on the board.  DUA is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO has a role as 
a chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. DIV is board diversity measured as an indicator variable that equals to 1 if 
the board has female director and 0 otherwise. LAT is natural logarithm of number of audit committee meetings. 
MAC is the size of the audit committee measured as number of members of an audit committee. MSO is the 
proportion of ordinary shares held by all directors. INS is the proportion of shareholding by the institutional investors 
measured from the Top20 shareholding list of a firm excluding individual shareholdings. LMV is the size of a firm 
measured as natural logarithm of market value in millions one month before the annual report release date.  TOB is 
Tobin’s q measured as the market value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock and book value of long-
term debt and current liabilities, all scaled by book value of total assets. ROA is firm profitability measured as net 
profit after tax before abnormal items divided by total assets. LEV is leverage measured as total debt divided by total 
assets. AGE is the natural logarithm of firm age calculated from its listing date (years). VOL is the volatility 
calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the annual report announcement period from day -260 
to day -2. CRL is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm is listed other than ASX and 0 otherwise. LAMBDA 
is the invere Mills ratio obtained from the first stage probit model. z-statistics are reported in parenthesis.   ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
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This study examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emission information using the Heckman two-stage sample 
selection estimates. Managers choose to disclose their GHG emission information to 
the CDP and their reporting channels, which may be affected by  a self-selection 
problem (Matsumura, Prakash & Vera-Muñoz 2014). This study corrects for this 
problem by jointly estimating the decision to disclose GHG emission information 
and the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the quality of GHG emission 
information.  
 
In the first stage of the Heckman model, we use managers’ decision to disclose 
voluntary GHG emission information as the dependent variable (DISC) and employ 
a set of independent and control variables. The probit model is used in the 
estimations. The procedure also generates the inverse Mills ratio (LAMBDA) which 
is used in the second stage regression. The inverse Mill’s ratio is added in the second 
stage as an explanatory variable. In this choice equation, we add prior CDP 
disclosure responses as an additional variable for specification purposes and do not 
include this in the second stage of the Heckman model (Peters & Romi 2014). One 
or more variables from the choice model can be excluded from the second stage 
outcome model of Heckman two stage estimates (Lennox, Francis & Wang 2012). In 
the second stage model, the dependent variable is the quality of GHG emission 
information.  
 
This study uses the following disclosure choice model (first stage) to endogenise the 
decision to disclose GHG emission using the following equation.  
 
DISCi,t = β0 + β1INDi,t-1 + β2DUAi,t-1 + β3DIVi,t-1 + β4LATi,t-1 + β5MACi,t-1 + β6MSOi,t-1 + 
β7INSi,t-1 + β8LMVi,t-1 + β9TOBi,t-1 + β10ROAi,t-1 + β11LEVi,t-1 + β12AGEi,t-1  + β13VOLi,t-1  + 
β14CDPi,t-1 + β15Σyear + β16Σindustry + εi,t                                                                                                                (16) 
 
The following equation is used to estimate the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the quality of GHG emission information disclosure (second stage 
model). 
 
QUALi,t = β0 + β1INDi,t-1 + β2DUAi,t-1 + β3DIVi,t-1 + β4LATi,t-1 + β5MACi,t-1 + β6MSOi,t-1 + 
β7INSi,t-1 + β8LMVi,t-1 + β9TOBi,t-1 + β10ROAi,t-1 + β11LEVi,t-1 + β12AGEi,t-1  + β13VOLi,t-1 + 
β14Σyear + β15Σindustry + εi,t                                                                                                                 (17) 
 
The results reported in table 6.7 show that board independence and CEO duality 
impact disclosure quality in the predicted direction consistent with earlier results.  
Overall, our results are robust to controls for self-selection bias.  
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6.2.5.2 Alternative corporate governance and GHG emission  
           disclosure 
 
This study uses the Horwath Corporate Governance ranking (HCG) as an alternative 
measure of corporate governance quality to check for the robustness of our results. 
The HCG ranks the largest 250 Australian firms on their corporate governance 
structures and policies based on national and international best practice in corporate 
governance. Since this measure uses ranks, lower numbers indicate higher corporate 
governance quality. The coefficient on the HCG is negative and significant at the 1% 
level indicating that firms with high quality corporate governance are more likely to 
disclose better quality GHG emission information. This result suggests that 
Australian firms with good corporate governance practices monitor and guide the top 
management to focus on stakeholders’ demand and reduce legitimacy gap through 
disclosing climate change related information, particularly GHG emission reduction 
policy and strategies. Our results support stakeholder value maximisation hypothesis 
(1a). 
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Table 6.9 GHG emission disclosure and alternative corporate governance  
Logistic Regression OLS Regression 
Dependent variable DISC Dependent variable QUAL 
Intercept 
-4.5074 
(-3.47)
*** 
Intercept 
-0.0639 
(-0.81) 
HCG 
-0.0080 
(-3.87)
*** 
HCG 
-0.0005 
(-4.66)
*** 
LMV 
0.6119 
(4.25)
*** 
LMV 
0.0460 
(5.44)
*** 
TOB 
-0.2084 
(-2.66)
*** 
TOB 
-0.0062 
(-1.75) 
ROA 
0.1580 
(0.80) ROA 
-0.0027 
(-0.28) 
LEV 
0.0841 
(0.11) LEV 
0.0777 
(1.85)
* 
AGE 
-0.0574 
(-0.42) AGE 
0.0395 
(5.03)
*** 
VOL 
2.2315 
(0.24) VOL 
-0.5251 
(-1.05) 
CRL 
0.2151 
(0.75) CRL 
0.0844 
(4.55)
*** 
Year Yes Year Yes 
Industry Yes Industry Yes 
Pseudo R2 (%) 20.08 Adjusted R2 (%) 51.75 
Wald chi2 85.95 F-statistic 48.35 
Probability 0.0000 P value 0.0000 
N 450 N 454 
  Max VIF 2.43 
This table provides the results of multivariate logistic and OLS regression analysis. The dependent 
variables for the logistic and OLS regressions are DISC and QUAL. DISC is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the firm discloses GHG emission information to the CDP and 0 otherwise. QUAL is the 
quality of GHG emission disclosure index calculated based on annual reports, sustainability reports, and 
corporate website using the CDP 2010 scoring methodology. HCG is the ranking of corporate 
governance of the top 250 Australian firms collected from the Horwath Corporate Governance reports. 
LMV is the size of a firm measured as natural logarithm of market value in millions one month before 
the annual report release date.  TOB is Tobin’s q measured as the market value of common equity plus 
book value of preferred stock and book value of long-term debt and current liabilities, all scaled by 
book value of total assets. ROA is firm profitability measured as net profit after tax before abnormal 
items divided by total assets. LEV is leverage measured as total debt divided by total assets. AGE is the 
natural logarithm of firm age calculated from its listing date (years). VOL is the volatility calculated as 
the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the annual report announcement period from day -260 
to day -2. CRL is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm is listed other than ASX and 0 otherwise. t-
statistics are reported in parenthesis.   
***
, 
**
, 
* 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. Max VIF is the maximum variance inflation factor. 
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6.2.5.3 Excluding financial sector 
Table 6.10 Regression results excluding financial sector 
Logistic regression Ordinary least square regression 
Intercept 
-4.8266 
(-2.98)*** Intercept 
-0.0607 
(-0.65) 
IND 
1.4040 
(1.68)* IND 
0.1883 
(4.45)*** 
DUA 
0.2366 
(0.52) DUA 
-0.0407 
(-1.95) 
DIV 
0.6132 
(2.22)** DIV 
0.0451 
(3.09)*** 
LAT 
-0.3688 
(-1.21) LAT 
0.0165 
(0.93) 
MAC 
-0.2317 
(-2.06)** MAC 
-0.0173 
(-2.56)** 
MSO 
-4.6007 
(-2.57)*** MSO 
-0.0416 
(-0.61) 
INS 
1.0707 
(1.28) INS 
-0.0099 
(-0.22) 
LMV 
0.6102 
(3.84)*** LMV 
0.0419 
(4.65)*** 
TOB 
-0.2253 
(-2.10)** TOB 
-0.0100 
(-3.72)*** 
ROA 
0.4273 
(1.37) ROA 
0.0263 
(3.13)*** 
LEV 
1.2332 
(1.58) LEV 
0.0978 
(2.00)** 
AGE 
-0.0352 
(-0.24) AGE 
0.0363 
(4.32)*** 
VOL 
-6.8204 
(-0.66) VOL 
0.4671 
(0.75) 
CRL 
-0.4688 
(-1.40) CRL 
0.0501 
(2.88)*** 
Year Yes Year Yes 
Industry Yes Industry Yes 
Pseudo R2 22.00 Adj R2 (%) 53.39 
Wald chi2 68.28 F-statistic 32.40 
Probability 0.0000 P value 0.0000 
N 410 N 410 
  Max VIF 2.64 
This table provides the results of multivariate logistic and OLS regression analysis. The dependent variables for the 
logistic and OLS regressions are DISC and QUAL. DISC is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm discloses GHG 
emission information to the CDP and 0 otherwise. QUAL is the quality of GHG emission disclosure index calculated 
based on annual reports, sustainability reports, and corporate website using the CDP 2010 scoring methodology. IND is 
board independence measured as proportion of independent directors on the board.  DUA is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the CEO has a role as a chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. DIV is board diversity measured as an 
indicator variable that equals to 1 if the board has female director and 0 otherwise. LAT is natural logarithm of number of 
audit committee meetings. MAC is the size of the audit committee measured as number of members of an audit 
committee. MSO is the proportion of ordinary shares held by all directors. INS is the proportion of shareholding by the 
institutional investors measured from the Top20 shareholding list of a firm excluding individual shareholdings. LMV is 
the size of a firm measured as natural logarithm of market value in millions one month before the annual report release 
date.  TOB is Tobin’s q measured as the market value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock and book 
value of long-term debt and current liabilities, all scaled by book value of total assets. ROA is firm profitability measured 
as net profit after tax before abnormal items divided by total assets. LEV is leverage measured as total debt divided by 
total assets. AGE is the natural logarithm of firm age calculated from its listing date (years). VOL is the volatility 
calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the annual report announcement period from day -260 to 
day -2. CRL is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm is listed other than ASX and 0 otherwise. Z and t -statistics 
are reported in parenthesis.   
***
, 
**
, 
* 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Max VIF is the 
maximum variance inflation factor. 
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The author conducted another sensitivity analysis by excluding financial firms from 
the sample. The reason for conducting this additional analysis is that our sample 
period includes the Global Financial Crisis. Both regressions (logistic and OLS) 
were run with the reduced sample.  The results reported in Table 6.10 are consistent 
with previously reported ones. We find that board independence, board diversity,  
the size of the audit committee, and managerial share ownership significantly 
influence disclosure quality. This sensitive test also supports the stakeholder value 
maximisation view stated in hypothesis (1a).  
 
6.3. Voluntary GHG emission disclosure and  
earnings management 
 
This section analyses the relationship between voluntary disclosure of GHG 
emission information and earnings management using correlations and regressions. 
There are two competing hypotheses suggested in Chapter 3 with regards to the 
relationship between voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information and 
earnings management.  
 
Based on the stakeholder value maximisation view, we posit the following 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2(a): There is a negative association between the extent and quality of 
GHG emission disclosure and earnings management. 
 
Based on the shareholder expense view, we posit the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2(b): There will be a positive association between the extent and quality 
of GHG emission disclosure and earnings management. 
 
Based on the stakeholder value maximisation view, we posit the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2(c): The negative association between voluntary disclosure of GHG 
emission information and earnings management will be strengthened by effective 
corporate governance mechanisms. 
Based on the shareholder expense view, we posit the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2(d): The positive association between voluntary disclosure of GHG 
emission information and earnings management will be moderated by effective 
corporate governance mechanisms. 
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6.3.1. Correlation matrix 
Table 6.11 presents the Pearson and Spearman correlations of voluntary GHG 
emissions disclosure, earnings management, and other control variables. The author 
used four different proxies for earnings management, namely, the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones model with ROA (AUG), 
the absolute value of total accruals calculated using the modified Jones model 
(MJM), the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated using performance 
matched modified Jones model (MAT), and the absolute value of current accruals 
calculated using performance matched modified Jones model adjusted with ROA 
(MTC).  These measures have a high positive association between themselves and 
are statistically significant.  
 
The Pearson and Spearman correlation between DISC and the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones model with ROA (AUG) 
is significantly negative. The quality of GHG emission disclosure is negatively 
correlated with AUG and statistically significant at the 1% level. This evidence 
suggests that higher quality disclosure firms are less likely to engage in earnings 
management as compared to lower quality of GHG emission disclosure firms as 
reported in the literature and provides initial support for the stakeholder value 
maximisation view.  
 
Furthermore, earnings management proxies are significantly and negatively 
correlated with the size of firms indicating that larger firms are more likely to 
provide transparent financial reports.  Tobin’s q reveals high positive association 
with the four earnings management proxies. The correlation between leverage and 
earnings management proxies is statistically significant and negative. Finally, stock 
return volatility has high positive correlation with all earnings management proxies. 
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Table 6.11 Correlation between GHG disclosure and earnings management (Pearson above diagonal and Spearman below diagonal) 
 DISC QUAL AUG MJM MAT MTC LMV TOB ROA LEV AGE VOL CRL 
DISC 1 0.467*** -0.120** -0.143*** -0.118** -0.076 0.353*** -0.154*** -0.008 0.068 0.142*** -0.172*** 0.056 
QUAL 0.430*** 1 -0.163*** -0.084* -0.058 -0.109** 0.406*** -0.209*** -0.042 0.073 0.389*** -0.030 0.315*** 
AUG -0.110** -0.165*** 1 0.429*** 0.308*** 0.564*** -0.114** 0.272*** -0.058 -0.231*** -0.134*** 0.211*** -0.092* 
MJM -0.064 -0.043 0.282*** 1 0.584*** 0.254*** -0.162*** 0.191*** -0.072 -0.195*** -0.060 0.214*** -0.079 
MAT -0.087* -0.025 0.197*** 0.303*** 1 0.340*** -0.139*** 0.161*** 0.051 -0.162*** -0.040 0.188*** 0.025 
MTC -0.050 -0.111** 0.381*** 0.211*** 0.296*** 1 -0.083* 0.163*** -0.008 -0.208*** -0.067 0.163*** -0.080 
LMV 0.363*** 0.343*** -0.112* -0.101** -0.138*** -0.062 1 -0.088* 0.085 0.004 0.338*** -0.447*** 0.333*** 
TOB -0.128*** -0.162*** 0.245*** 0.231*** 0.215*** 0.204*** 0.030 1 0.482*** -0.259*** -0.191*** 0.177*** -0.064 
ROA 0.029 -0.024 0.064 0.036 0.085* 0.006 0.199*** 0.467*** 1 -0.198*** -0.031 -0.094* -0.004 
LEV 0.117** 0.119** -0.240*** -0.254*** -0.185*** -0.198*** 0.044 -0.312*** -0.292*** 1 -0.081* -0.055 -0.011 
AGE 0.118** 0.346*** -0.169*** 0.031 -0.033 -0.102** 0.307*** 0.049 0.099** -0.047 1 -0.179*** 0.154*** 
VOL -0.137*** 0.040 0.191*** 0.176*** 0.209*** 0.165*** -0.502*** 0.196*** -0.157*** -0.127*** -0.154*** 1 -0.110** 
CRL 0.056 0.323*** -0.108** -0.062 0.021 -0.105* 0.297*** -0.005 0.056 0.005 0.172*** -0.082* 1 
This table reports the Pearson correlations between variables related to voluntary disclosures, earnings management, and control variables. DISC is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the firm discloses GHG emission information to CDP and 0 otherwise. QUAL is quality of GHG emission disclosure index calculated based 
on annual reports, sustainability reports, and corporate website using the CDP 2010 scoring methodology. AUG is the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
calculated using the modified Jones model with ROA. MJM is the absolute value of total accruals calculated using the modified Jones model. MAT is the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals calculated using performance matched modified Jones model. MTC is the absolute value of current accruals calculated using 
performance matched modified Jones model adjusted with ROA. LMV is the size of a firm measured as natural logarithm of market value in millions one month 
before the annual report release date.  TOB is Tobin’s q measured as the market value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock and book value of long-
term debt and current liabilities, all scaled by book value of total assets. ROA is firm profitability measured as net profit after tax before abnormal items divided by 
total assets. LEV is leverage measured as total debt divided by total assets. AGE is natural logarithm of firm age calculate from its listing date (years). VOL is the 
volatility calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the annual report announcement period from day -260 to day -2. CRL is an indicator variable 
that equals to 1 if a firm is listed other than ASX and 0 otherwise.  
*** 
Correlation is significant at 1% level, 
** 
correlation is significant at 5% level, and 
*
 correlation is 
significant at 10% level. 
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6.3.2. Voluntary GHG emission disclosure and  
  earnings management 
Table 6.12 reports the results of cross-sectional logistic regression analysis of the 
managers’ decision to disclose GHG emission information. Model 1 shows the 
results without including control variables, year and industry fixed effects. Models 2 
to 5 report the results including year and industry dummies. In supporting 
stakeholder value maximisation point of view, Model 1 shows a significant negative 
association between the managers’ decision to disclose GHG emission information 
and earnings management. This result is no longer significant when the regression 
run with control variables and year and industry effects. Interestingly, the 
coefficients of earnings management variables are still negative. Similar results are 
found when the regressions are run with different earnings management proxies. 
Turing to the control variables, larger and visible firms (as proxied by size) disclose 
more GHG emission information as reported earlier. In addition, firms with higher 
growth opportunities are less likely to disclose GHG emission information to 
stakeholders. The author found no significant association with other control 
variables. 
 
The regression results for the relationship between quality of GHG emission 
disclosure and earnings management proxies are presented in Model 1 of Table 6.13 
shows that there is a significant negative association between the quality of GHG 
emission disclosure and the absolute value of discretionary accruals without 
including control variables, year and industry fixed effects. Models 2 to 5 present the 
regression results for the relationship between quality of GHG emission disclosure 
and the four proxies of earnings management. The author found negative 
associations between the modified Jones model with ROA (AUG) and the quality of 
GHG emission disclosure in model 2. These findings indicate that firms with higher 
quality of GHG emission information disclosure are less likely to engage in earnings 
management through discretionary accruals. These results are consistent with the 
stakeholder value maximisation hypothesis.  This is consistent with previous CSR 
studies (Choi, Lee & Park 2013; Kim, Park & Wier 2012). 
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Table 6.12 Choice of GHG disclosure and earnings management 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 
-0.2738 
(-2.02)** 
-4.1549 
(-3.21)*** 
-4.0690 
(-3.15)*** 
-4.1057 
(-3.13)*** 
-4.1486 
(-3.18)*** 
AUG 
-3.4944 
(-2.43)** 
-1.8753 
(-1.00)    
MJM   
-2.0885 
(-1.47)   
MAT    
-0.8308 
(-1.01)  
MTC     
-0.9754 
(-0.82) 
LMV  
0.6837 
(4.55)*** 
0.6650 
(4.40)*** 
0.6701 
(4.41)*** 
0.6809 
(4.54)*** 
TOB  
-0.2354 
(-2.21)** 
-0.2308 
(-2.21)** 
-0.2405 
(-2.36)** 
-0.2454 
(-2.35)** 
ROA  
0.3683 
(1.43) 
0.3498 
(1.34) 
0.3608 
(1.38) 
0.3706 
(1.42) 
LEV  
0.6633 
(0.85) 
0.6374 
(0.79) 
0.7317 
(0.93) 
0.7142 
(0.91) 
AGE  
-0.0352 
(-0.25) 
-0.0283 
(-0.20) 
-0.0291 
(-0.20) 
-0.0304 
(-0.21) 
VOL  
-12.3268 
(-1.48) 
-13.3697 
(-1.62) 
-13.1701 
(-1.59) 
-13.2468 
(-1.60) 
CRL  
-0.3524 
(-1.17) 
-0.3736 
(-1.23) 
-0.3137 
(-1.04) 
-0.3482 
(-1.16) 
Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 (%) 1.16 17.58 17.73 17.53 17.50 
Wald chi2 5.93 56.73 60.26 59.61 57.41 
Probability 0.0149 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 420 420 420 420 420 
This table provides the results of multivariate logistic regression analysis. The dependent variable is 
DISC which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm discloses GHG emission information to the 
CDP and 0 otherwise. AUG is the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated using the modified 
Jones model with ROA. MJM is the absolute value of total accruals calculated using the modified Jones 
model. MAT is the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated using performance matched 
modified Jones model. MTC is the absolute value of current accruals calculated using performance 
matched modified Jones model adjusted with ROA. LMV is the size of a firm measured as natural 
logarithm of market value in millions one month before the annual report release date.  TOB is Tobin’s 
q measured as the market value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock and book value of 
long-term debt and current liabilities, all scaled by book value of total assets. ROA is firm profitability 
measured as net profit after tax before abnormal items divided by total assets. LEV is leverage measured 
as total debt divided by total assets. AGE is the natural logarithm of firm age calculated from its listing 
date (years). VOL is the volatility calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 
annual report announcement period from day -260 to day -2. CRL is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if a 
firm is listed other than ASX and 0 otherwise. z-statistics are reported in parenthesis.   
***
, 
**
, 
* 
indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 6.13 Quality of GHG information disclosure and earnings management 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 
0.4014 
(33.52)*** 
-0.2465 
(-2.79)*** 
-0.2594 
(-2.96)*** 
-0.2562 
(-2.88)*** 
-0.2481 
(-2.79)*** 
AUG 
-0.3875 
(-3.84)*** 
-0.1826 
(-1.83)*    
MJM   
-0.0011 
(-0.01)   
MAT    
-0.0165 
(-0.30)  
MTC     
-0.0981 
(-1.38) 
LMV  
0.0507 
(5.21)*** 
0.0506 
(5.17)*** 
0.0504 
(5.11)*** 
0.0506 
(5.17)*** 
TOB  
-0.0082 
(-1.74)* 
-0.0091 
(-1.78)* 
-0.0091 
(-1.79)* 
-0.0088 
(-1.82)* 
ROA  
0.0223 
(2.44)** 
0.0218 
(2.33)** 
0.0218 
(2.35)** 
0.0222 
(2.44)** 
LEV  
0.0753 
(1.84)* 
0.0902 
(2.22)** 
0.0886 
(2.19)** 
0.0798 
(1.95)* 
AGE  
0.0496 
(5.11)*** 
0.0510 
(5.35)*** 
0.0510 
(5.35)*** 
0.0505 
(5.28)*** 
VOL  
2.3863 
(3.94)*** 
2.2603 
(3.54)*** 
2.2758 
(3.58)*** 
2.3340 
(3.75)*** 
CRL  
0.0761 
(3.90)*** 
0.0781 
(3.97)*** 
0.0785 
(3.96)*** 
0.0767 
(3.90)*** 
Year No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 (%) 2.41 32.33 31.81 31.82 32.08 
F-statistic 14.77 35.02 31.59 31.34 33.54 
P value 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 420 420 420 420 420 
Max VIF - 1.74 1.75 1.75 1.74 
This table provides the results of multivariate regression analysis. The dependent variable is QUAL, the 
quality of GHG emission disclosure index calculated based on annual reports, sustainability reports, and 
corporate website using the CDP 2010 scoring methodology. AUG is the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals calculated using the modified Jones model with ROA. MJM is the absolute value of total 
accruals calculated using the modified Jones model. MAT is the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
calculated using performance matched modified Jones model. MTC is the absolute value of current 
accruals calculated using performance matched modified Jones model adjusted with ROA. LMV is the 
size of a firm measured as natural logarithm of market value in millions one month before the annual 
report release date.  TOB is Tobin’s q measured as the market value of common equity plus book value 
of preferred stock and book value of long-term debt and current liabilities, all scaled by book value of 
total assets. ROA is firm profitability measured as net profit after tax before abnormal items divided by 
total assets. LEV is leverage measured as total debt divided by total assets. AGE is the natural logarithm 
of firm age calculated from its listing date (years). VOL is the volatility calculated as the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns over the annual report announcement period from day -260 to day -2. 
CRL is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm is listed other than ASX and 0 otherwise. t-statistics are reported 
in parenthesis.   
***
, 
**
, 
* 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Max VIF is the 
maximum variance inflation factor. 
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Models 3 to 5 report insignificant relationship between earnings management and the 
quality of GHG emission disclosure. Overall, the results suggest that Australian 
corporate managers do not use the quality of GHG emission disclosure information 
as a tool to mask their opportunistic behaviour. This finding is consistent with the 
results of Sun et al. (2010). Control variables such as firm size, Tobin’s q, 
profitability, leverage, firm age and cross-listing have an impact on quality of GHG 
emission disclosure.  This is consistent with previous results, which indicate that 
larger, visible, older and cross-listed firms with higher leverage disseminate more 
GHG emission information whereas firms with higher growth opportunities do the 
opposite. 
 
Overall, the author found weak support for the stakeholder value maximisation 
hypothesis (2a). This finding shows some evidence indicating that firms’ disclosing 
higher quality GHG emission information are less likely to engage in earnings 
management through discretionary accruals. 
 
Table 6.14 reports the logistic regression results of managers’ decision to disclose 
voluntary GHG emission information publicly and earnings management proxies on 
a yearly basis. This table shows the results including industry dummies. There is a 
positive association between managers’ decision to disclose GHG emission 
information and the absolute value of discretionary accruals (AUG) in the reporting 
year 2006 indicating that managers are playing an opportunistic role. The managers 
of these firms are using voluntary GHG emission disclosure for their rent-seeking 
activities. The author found insignificant negative association in the CDP reporting 
years 2007, 2008 and 2009. The size of the firm is positively associated with 
managers’ disclosure decision in 2008 and 2009. TOB, ROA and CRL show 
significant results in some years.  Further, the author found mostly insignificant 
negative association between earnings management and the disclosure decision. 
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6.3.3. Year-by-year regression results 
Table 6.14 Choice of GHG disclosure and earnings management by years 
Reporting Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Intercept 
-3.4472 
(-0.53) 
-3.9912 
(-0.84) 
-5.7469 
(-2.57)
*** 
-4.3499 
(-1.78)
* 
AUG 
17.7333 
(2.37)
** 
-6.5782 
(-0.72) 
-4.5743 
(-1.35) 
-2.8571 
(-0.57) 
LMV 
0.7714 
(1.07) 
0.2444 
(0.49) 
0.7000 
(2.75)
*** 
0.8420 
(2.81)
*** 
TOB 
-0.6236 
(-2.33)
** 
0.4087 
(1.23) 
-0.2970 
(-1.46) 
-0.2800 
(-2.22)
** 
ROA 
-0.5449 
(-0.42) 
-0.1041 
(-0.18) 
0.3412 
(0.98) 
1.0022 
(2.30)
** 
LEV 
1.0578 
(0.40) 
6.3451 
(2.02)
** 
1.9621 
(1.37) 
-1.3805 
(-1.03) 
AGE 
0.1489 
(0.33) 
0.6920 
(1.43) 
0.1383 
(0.58) 
-0.5439 
(-1.61) 
VOL 
-26.4692 
(-0.33) 
5.1321 
(0.04) 
-20.9041 
(-1.46) 
-6.8595 
(-0.53) 
CRL 
-3.4423 
(-1.99)
** 
-1.8081 
(-1.57) 
-0.0723 
(-0.14) 
0.2562 
(0.48) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2
 (%) 31.21 20.02 22.26 29.33 
Wald chi
2
 16.65 12.05 29.26 36.27 
Probability 0.2754 0.6755 0.0322 0.0016 
N 59 53 143 146 
This table provides the results of multivariate logistic regression analysis. The dependent variable is 
DISC which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm discloses GHG emission information to the 
CDP and 0 otherwise. AUG is the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated using the modified 
Jones model with ROA. LMV is the size of a firm measured as natural logarithm of market value in 
millions one month before the annual report release date.  TOB is Tobin’s q measured as the market 
value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock and book value of long-term debt and 
current liabilities, all scaled by book value of total assets. ROA is firm profitability measured as net 
profit after tax before abnormal items divided by total assets. LEV is leverage measured as total debt 
divided by total assets. AGE is the natural logarithm of firm age calculated from its listing date (years). 
VOL is the volatility calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the annual report 
announcement period from day -260 to day -2. CRL is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm is listed other 
than ASX and 0 otherwise. z-statistics are reported in parenthesis.   
***
, 
**
, 
* 
indicate significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 6.15 presents the regression results between the quality of GHG emission 
disclosure and the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated using the 
modified Jones model with ROA (AUG) for each of  CDP reporting years. All models 
show the results including industry fixed effects. A significantly negative association 
exists between the quality of GHG emission disclosure and the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals only for 2008. This result supports stakeholder value 
maximisation view suggesting that socially responsible firms accede to stakeholders’ 
demands and provide higher quality GHG emission information. 
 
Table 6.15 Quality of GHG emissions disclosure and earnings management by years 
CDP Reporting Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Intercept 
0.0971 
(0.37) 
-0.0060 
(-0.03) 
-0.0453 
(-0.38) 
-0.1002 
(-0.62) 
AUG 
-0.0022 
(0.01) 
-0.5128 
(-1.76)
* 
-0.2633 
(-2.05)
** 
0.0131 
(0.08) 
LMV 
0.0299 
(1.13) 
0.0424 
(1.66) 
0.0500 
(3.62)
*** 
0.0563 
(3.13)
*** 
TOB 
-0.0072 
(-0.56) 
-0.0173 
(-1.54) 
-0.0119 
(-2.65)
*** 
-0.0046 
(-1.15) 
ROA 
0.0303 
(0.58) 
0.0126 
(0.60) 
0.0116 
(0.78) 
0.0272 
(1.83)
* 
LEV 
0.1944 
(1.47) 
0.2489 
(1.88)
* 
0.0781 
(1.13) 
0.0424 
(0.52) 
AGE 
0.0402 
(1.65) 
0.0739 
(3.27)
*** 
0.0364 
(2.49)
** 
0.0302 
(1.70)
* 
VOL 
-1.5827 
(-0.52) 
-0.7928 
(-0.18) 
-0.3689 
(-0.50) 
0.5252 
(0.67) 
CRL 
0.0665 
(1.57) 
0.0080 
(0.21) 
0.0767 
(2.51)
** 
0.0569 
(1.69)
* 
Industry yes yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 (%) 51.92 55.72 46.45 36.62 
F-statistic 4.94 5.66 8.25 6.06 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 63 64 143 150 
Max VIF 2.64 2.34 1.87 2.12 
This table provides the results of multivariate regression analysis. The dependent variable is QUAL, the 
quality of GHG emission disclosure index calculated based on annual reports, sustainability reports, and 
corporate website using the CDP 2010 scoring methodology. AUG is the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals calculated using the modified Jones model with ROA. LMV is the size of a firm measured as 
natural logarithm of market value in millions one month before the annual report release date.  TOB is 
Tobin’s q measured as the market value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock and book 
value of long-term debt and current liabilities, all scaled by book value of total assets. ROA is firm 
profitability measured as net profit after tax before abnormal items divided by total assets. LEV is 
leverage measured as total debt divided by total assets. AGE is the natural logarithm of firm age 
calculated from its listing date (years). VOL is the volatility calculated as the standard deviation of daily 
stock returns over the annual report announcement period from day -260 to day -2.  CRL is an indicator 
variable that equals to 1 if a firm is listed other than ASX and 0 otherwise.  z-statistics are reported in parenthesis.   
***
, 
**
, 
* 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Max VIF is the maximum 
variance inflation factor. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Data analysis and results 
 
130 
 
There is insignificant negative association between quality of GHG emission 
disclosure and the absolute value of discretionary accruals in the CDP reporting 
years 2006, 2007 and 2009. Overall, these findings show weak support for the 
stakeholder value maximisation view.  
6.3.4. Disclosure sub-scores and corporate   
  governance 
Table 6.16 Sub-scores of quality of GHG emissions information and earnings management 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Sub-scores GOVE RISK STRA GHGE COMM 
Intercept 
-0.2436 
(-0.32) 
8.9893 
(2.30)
** 
2.8377 
(2.57)
*** 
-12.8256 
(-3.41)
*** 
0.2801 
(0.96) 
AUG 
-0.8556 
(-0.94) 
-6.5637 
(-1.49) 
-2.8980 
(-2.51)
** 
-4.3054 
(-1.13) 
-1.1500 
(-3.17)
*** 
LMV 
0.2301 
(2.74)
*** 
1.9866 
(4.75)
*** 
0.3935 
(3.51)
*** 
2.2707 
(5.34)
*** 
0.1365 
(4.26)
*** 
TOB 
-0.0524 
(-1.66)
* 
-0.3464 
(-1.55) 
-0.0647 
(-1.46) 
-0.1002 
(-1.05) 
-0.0343 
(-2.95)
*** 
ROA 
0.1144 
(1.39) 
-0.1217 
(-0.30) 
0.3112 
(2.78)
*** 
1.5029 
(3.39)
*** 
0.0311 
(0.95) 
LEV 
0.3277 
(0.55) 
5.4195 
(2.27)
** 
2.3722 
(3.87)
*** 
2.9787 
(1.45) 
-0.0706 
(-0.36) 
AGE 
0.1928 
(2.30)
** 
1.8123 
(4.22)
*** 
0.2939 
(2.89)
*** 
1.4265 
(3.41)
*** 
0.0155 
(0.52) 
VOL 
2.8895 
(0.52) 
6.0235 
(0.22) 
-5.4034 
(-0.61) 
-11.3822 
(-0.48) 
-3.1453 
(-1.64) 
CRL 
0.4736 
(2.83)
*** 
3.1513 
(3.49)
*** 
0.4900 
(2.23)
** 
2.1414 
(2.44)
** 
0.0244 
(0.35) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes yes 
Industry yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R
2
 
(%) 27.53 44.89 35.99 36.43 28.78 
F-statistic 15.60 28.73 16.72 20.37 17.79 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 420 420 420 420 420 
Max VIF 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.16 
 This table provides the results of multivariate regression analysis. The dependent variables are GOVE: 
governance; RISK: risks and opportunities; STRA: strategy; GHGE: GHG accounting, energy and fuel 
use, and trading; COMM: communications. AUG is the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
calculated using the modified Jones model with ROA. LMV is the size of a firm measured as natural 
logarithm of market value in millions one month before the annual report release date.  TOB is Tobin’s 
q measured as the market value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock and book value of 
long-term debt and current liabilities, all scaled by book value of total assets. ROA is firm profitability 
measured as net profit after tax before abnormal items divided by total assets. LEV is leverage measured 
as total debt divided by total assets. AGE is the natural logarithm of firm age calculated from its listing 
date (years). VOL is the volatility calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 
annual report announcement period from day -260 to day -2. CRL is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if a 
firm is listed other than ASX and 0 otherwise.  t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.   
***
, 
**
, 
* 
indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  Max VIF is the maximum variance inflation 
factor. 
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Table 6.16 reports the regression results using five sub-scores of GHG emission 
disclosures as dependent variables and absolute value of discretionary accruals 
(AUG) as an independent variable. This table reports the results with year and 
industry fixed effects for all models. Models 3 and 5 indicate a negative and 
significant association between the absolute value of discretionary accruals and two 
sub-categories of strategy and communication components of GHG emission 
disclosure at the 5% and 1% level respectively. The other sub-categories of GHG 
emission disclosures such as governance, risks and opportunities and GHG show 
insignificant negative associations with the absolute value of discretionary accruals.   
 
In summary, the findings here give limited support for the stakeholder value 
maximisation view hypothesis 2(a). The author found no support for the alternate 
view labelled as shareholder expense hypothesis 2(b).  
6.3.5. GHG emission disclosure, corporate  
  governance, and earnings management 
Table 6.17 reports the logistic regression results between the managers’ decision to 
report GHG emission disclosure, characteristics of corporate governance and 
earnings management measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals. All 
models present the results including year and industry dummies. Board 
independence, board gender diversity, the size of audit committee, and directors’ 
ownership are corporate governance characteristics which are associated with 
disclosure as reported earlier. When the author attempted to test each of the corporate 
governance variables of this study along with earnings management proxies, there 
was no significant association identified between the managers’ decision to disclose 
GHG emission disclosure and different measures of earnings management. For 
example, we use CEO duality (DUA), directors’ ownership (MSO), and institutional 
ownership (INS) with earning management measure. With regards to control 
variables, the size of the firm is positively associated and Tobin’s q is negatively 
associated with managers’ decision to disclose GHG emission information 
respectively. These results are consistent with previous finding suggesting. Overall, 
the author found support for neither the stakeholder value maximisation view nor the 
shareholder expense view.  
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Table 6.17 GHG disclosure, corporate governance and earnings management 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 
-4.8311 
(-3.19)*** 
-4.9619 
(-3.25)*** 
-4.8447 
(-3.19)*** 
-4.9058 
(-3.22)*** 
-5.1975 
(-3.40)*** 
AUG 
-0.9884 
(-0.47) 
-0.5268 
(-0.24) 
-0.6931 
(-0.29)  
-1.0040 
(-0.43) 
AUG*DUA  
-5.4667 
(-0.95)   
-4.1255 
(-0.66) 
AUG*MSO   
-5.4810 
(-0.27)  
-1.0857 
(-0.05) 
AUG*INS    
-1.6724 
(-0.50)  
IND 
1.3988 
(1.69)* 
1.3687 
(1.63) 
1.4062 
(1.70)* 
1.4132 
(1.70)* 
1.5170 
(1.82)* 
DUA 
0.1919 
(0.42) 
0.5436 
(1.00) 
0.1975 
(0.43) 
0.1889 
(0.41) 
0.3673 
(0.64) 
DIV 
0.5060 
(1.78)* 
0.5314 
(1.84)* 
0.5082 
(1.78)* 
0.5032 
(1.77)*  
LAT 
-0.2257 
(-0.73) 
-0.2368 
(-0.77) 
-0.2278 
(-0.74) 
-0.2251 
(-0.73) 
-0.2375 
(-0.77) 
MAC 
-0.2327 
(-2.07)** 
-0.2401 
(-2.10)** 
-0.2329 
(-2.07)** 
-0.2349 
(-2.09)** 
-0.2095 
(-1.83)* 
MSO 
-4.7302 
(-2.66)*** 
-4.7723 
(-2.63)*** 
-4.3642 
(-2.16)** 
-4.7211 
(-2.65)*** 
-4.7162 
(-2.23)** 
INS 
1.1438 
(1.37) 
1.1178 
(1.33) 
1.1435 
(1.37) 
1.2469 
(1.46) 
1.0827 
(1.29) 
LMV 
0.6266 
(4.05)*** 
0.6351 
(4.09)*** 
0.6251 
(4.06)*** 
0.6274 
(4.06)*** 
0.6847 
(4.42)*** 
TOB 
-0.2231 
(-2.17)** 
-0.2196 
(-2.08)** 
-0.2223 
(-2.15)** 
-0.2216 
(-2.14)** 
-0.2421 
(-2.21)** 
ROA 
0.4602 
(1.56) 
0.4550 
(1.54) 
0.4569 
(1.55) 
0.4617 
(1.57) 
0.4782 
(1.61) 
LEV 
0.7161 
(0.92) 
0.7383 
(0.94) 
0.7241 
(0.93) 
0.7200 
(0.93) 
0.6455 
(0.82) 
AGE 
-0.0800 
(-0.53) 
-0.0821 
(-0.54) 
-0.0795 
(-0.53) 
-0.0800 
(-0.53) 
-0.0709 
(-0.46) 
VOL 
-8.1994 
(-0.95) 
-6.1703 
(-0.70) 
-8.2344 
(-0.95) 
-8.1871 
(-0.95) 
-7.3078 
(-0.82) 
CRL 
-0.3804 
(-1.14) 
-0.3611 
(-1.07) 
-0.3756 
(-1.12) 
-0.3833 
(-1.14) 
-0.3601 
(-1.07) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 (%) 22.04 22.16 22.06 22.05 21.51 
Wald chi2 67.84 68.05 67.37 67.67 63.17 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
N 420 420 420 420 420 
This table provides the results of multivariate logistic regression analysis. The dependent variable is DISC which is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if the firm discloses GHG emission information to the CDP and 0 otherwise.  AUG is the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
calculated using the modified Jones model with ROA. AUG*DUA is an interaction variable between CEO duality and the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones model with ROA. AUG*MSO is an interaction variable between the proportion of 
shareholding by all directors and the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones model with ROA. 
AUG*INS is an interaction variable between the proportion of institutional shareholding and the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
calculated using the modified Jones model with ROA.  IND is board independence measured as proportion of independent directors on the 
board.  DUA is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO has a role as a chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. DIV is board diversity 
measured as an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the board has female director and 0 otherwise. LAT is natural logarithm of number of 
audit committee meetings. MAC is the size of the audit committee measured as number of members of an audit committee. MSO is the 
proportion of ordinary shares held by all directors. INS is the proportion of shareholding by the institutional investors measured from the 
Top20 shareholding list of a firm excluding individual shareholdings. LMV is the size of a firm measured as natural logarithm of market 
value in millions one month before disclosure annual report announcement date.  TOB is Tobin’s q measured as the market value of common 
equity plus book value of preferred stock and book value of long-term debt and current liabilities, all scaled by book value of total assets. 
ROA is firm profitability measured as net profit after tax before abnormal items divided by total assets. LEV is leverage measured as total 
debt divided by total assets. AGE is natural logarithm of firm age calculate from its listing date (years). VOL is the volatility calculated as the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns over the annual report announcement period from day -260 to day -2. CRL is an indicator variable 
that equals to 1 if a firm is listed other than ASX and 0 otherwise.  z-statistics are reported in parenthesis.   
***
, 
**
, 
* 
indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.   
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Table 6.18 Quality of GHG, corporate governance and earnings management 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 
-0.0729 
(-0.86) 
-0.0681 
(-0.80) 
-0.0612 
(-0.70) 
-0.0822 
-0.97 
-0.0816 
(-0.92) 
AUG 
-0.1039 
(-1.22) 
-0.1450 
(-1.63) 
-0.1634 
(-1.61)  
-0.2160 
(-2.07)** 
AUG*DUA  
0.3007 
(1.48)   
0.3578 
(1.89)* 
AUG*MSO   
0.4207 
(0.98)  
0.2359 
(0.55) 
AUG*INS    
-0.1121 
(-0.84)  
IND 
0.1701 
(4.09)*** 
0.1713 
(4.15)*** 
0.1638 
(3.87)*** 
0.1707 
(4.10)*** 
0.1758 
(4.08)*** 
DUA 
-0.0551 
(-2.86)*** 
-0.0798 
(-3.17)*** 
-0.0537 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.0554 
(-2.87)*** 
-0.0854 
(-3.29)*** 
DIV 
0.0474 
(3.16)*** 
0.0452 
(2.98)*** 
0.0480 
(3.21)*** 
0.0477 
(3.18)***  
LAT 
0.0221 
(1.22) 
0.0237 
(1.32) 
0.0224 
(1.24) 
0.0225 
(1.25) 
0.0234 
(1.30) 
MAC 
-0.0191 
(-2.87)*** 
-0.0185 
(-2.77)*** 
-0.0192 
(-2.87)*** 
-0.0192 
(-2.89)*** 
-0.0157 
(-2.30)** 
MSO 
-0.0435 
(-0.61) 
-0.0408 
(-0.57) 
-0.0940 
(-0.95) 
-0.0457 
(-0.64) 
-0.0731 
(-0.72) 
INS 
0.0052 
(0.11) 
0.0078 
(0.17) 
0.0048 
(0.11) 
0.0149 
(0.32) 
0.0040 
(0.09) 
LMV 
0.0444 
(5.00)*** 
0.0441 
(4.95)*** 
0.0443 
(5.02)*** 
0.0443 
(4.99)*** 
0.0485 
(5.48)*** 
TOB 
-0.0049 
(-1.29) 
-0.0052 
(-1.31) 
-0.0050 
(-1.26) 
-0.0050 
(-1.27) 
-0.0054 
(-1.27) 
ROA 
0.0167 
(2.07)** 
0.0168 
(2.10)** 
0.0170 
(2.11)** 
0.0168 
(2.07)** 
0.0182 
(2.25)** 
LEV 
0.1151 
(2.48)** 
0.1128 
(2.43)** 
0.1111 
(2.35)** 
0.1179 
(2.55)** 
0.1014 
(2.16)** 
AGE 
0.0320 
(3.73)*** 
0.0320 
(3.73)*** 
0.0319 
(3.71)*** 
0.0322 
(3.78)*** 
0.0329 
(3.78)*** 
VOL 
0.4270 
(0.89) 
0.3425 
(0.69) 
0.4141 
(0.86) 
0.4147 
(0.86) 
0.1982 
(0.40) 
CRL 
0.0590 
(3.36)*** 
0.0584 
(3.36)*** 
0.0584 
(3.33)*** 
0.0594 
(3.37)*** 
0.0598 
(3.39)*** 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 (%) 53.55 53.62 53.53 53.47 52.56 
F-statistic 30.24 28.90 29.05 30.30 28.85 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 420 420 420 420 420 
Max VIF 2.27 2.32 2.90 2.27 2.99 
This table provides the results of multivariate regression analysis. The dependent variable is the quality of GHG emission disclosure index 
calculated based on annual reports, sustainability reports, and corporate website using the CDP 2010 scoring methodology. AUG is the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones model with ROA. AUG*DUA is an interaction variable between 
the CEO duality and the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones model with ROA. AUG*MSO is an 
interaction variable between the proportion of shareholding by all directors and the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated using 
the modified Jones model with ROA. AUG*INS is an interaction variable between the proportion of institutional shareholding and the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones model with ROA.  IND is board independence measured as 
proportion of independent directors on the board; DUA is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the CEO has a role as a chairman of the 
board, and 0 otherwise. DIV is a board diversity measured as an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the board has female director and 0 
otherwise. LAT is natural logarithm of number of audit committee meetings. MAC is the size of the audit committee measured as number of 
members of an audit committee. MSO is proportion of ordinary shares held by all directors. INS is   proportion of shareholding by the 
institutional investors measured from Top20 shareholding list of a firm excluding individual shareholding. LMV is the size of a firm 
measured as natural logarithm of market value in millions one month before disclosure annual report announcement date.  TOB is Tobin’s q 
measured as the market value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock and book value of long-term debt and current liabilities, 
all scaled by book value of total assets. ROA is firm profitability measured as net profit after tax before abnormal items all divided by total 
assets. LEV is leverage measured as total debt divided by total assets. AGE is natural logarithm of firm age calculate from its listing date 
(years). VOL is the volatility calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the annual report announcement period from day 
-260 to day -2. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  . CRL is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm is listed other than ASX and 0 
otherwise. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Max VIF is the maximum variance inflation factor. 
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Table 6.18 presents the regression results between the quality of GHG emission 
disclosure, corporate governance attributes and the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals. All models show the results including year and industry fixed effects.  Most 
interestingly, the author found a positive association between the interaction variable 
AUG*DUA and the quality of GHG emission disclosure. This finding indicates that 
firms with CEO duality disclose reduced levels GHG emission information while 
practicing earnings management supporting the stakeholder value maximisation 
view. An insignificant negative association exists between the interaction variable 
AUG*INS and quality of GHG emission disclosure suggesting that institutional 
investors do not play a monitoring role to curb the unethical behavior of earnings 
management.  This study tried other corporate governance variables with earnings 
management proxy but failed to find any significant association. Overall, there is 
weak support for the stakeholder value maximisation view hypothesis. 
6.3.6. Robustness tests 
 This study adopts three different tests to check the robustness of previous results. 
First, the author used the Heckman two-stage sample selection regression.  Second, 
the author ran the two-stage least squares regression. Finally, an alternative corporate 
governance quality measure was used to check the sensitivity of results to control for 
self-selection bias, alternative specifications and procedures.  
 
Panel A of Table 6.19 reports the results of the Heckman two-stage estimations. In 
the first stage of the Heckman model, we use managers’ decision to disclose 
voluntary GHG emission information (DISC) as the dependent variable and 
incorporate earnings management proxy, corporate governance characteristics, and 
control variables as dependent variables. Our first stage model is as follows:  
 
DISCi,t = β0 + β1AUGi,t + β2INDi,t-1 + β3DUAi,t-1 + β4DIVi,t-1 + β5LATi,t-1 + β6MACi,t-1 + 
β7MSOi,t-1 + β8INSi,t-1 + β9LMVi,t-1 + β10TOBi,t-1 + β11ROAi,t-1 + β12LEVi,t-1 + β13AGEi,t-1  + 
β14VOLi,t-1  + β15CRLi,t-1 + β16CDPi,t-1 + β17Σyear + β18Σindustry + εi,t                                               (18) 
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Table 6.19 Heckman two-stage and OLS two-stage 
Panel A Panel B 
Heckman two-stage sample selection model Two-stage least squares regression 
Model 1 2 Model 1 2 
Intercept 
-0.1231 
(-0.61) 
-0.1047 
(-0.51) Intercept 
-0.0812 
(-0.96) 
-0.0802 
(-0.94) 
AUG 
-0.2043 
(-1.13) 
-0.2542 
(-1.37) Fitted-AUG 
-0.1039 
(-1.22) 
-0.1450 
(-1.63) 
AUG*DUA  
0.3816 
(0.33) AUG_DUA  
0.1821 
(0.92) 
IND 
0.1793 
(2.11)** 
0.2028 
(2.40)** IND 
0.1685 
(4.06)*** 
0.1688 
(4.10)*** 
DUA 
-0.1411 
(-2.69)*** 
-0.1706 
(-2.23)** DUA 
-0.0554 
(-2.87)*** 
-0.0705 
(-2.88)*** 
DIV 
0.0481 
(1.69)*  DIV 
0.0492 
(3.29)*** 
0.0484 
(3.20)*** 
LAT 
0.0841 
(2.54)** 
0.0847 
(2.53)** LAT 
0.0229 
(1.27) 
0.0240 
(1.34) 
MAC 
-0.0078 
(-0.75) 
-0.0036 
(-0.35) MAC 
-0.0191 
(-2.86)*** 
-0.0187 
(-2.81)*** 
MSO 
0.3738 
(1.75)* 
0.3926 
(1.81)* MSO 
-0.0534 
(-0.76) 
-0.0542 
(-0.78) 
INS 
0.0075 
(0.09) 
0.0147 
(0.17) INS 
0.0101 
(0.22) 
0.0129 
(0.28) 
LMV 
0.0373 
(2.52)** 
0.0391 
(2.62)*** LMV 
0.0441 
(4.97)*** 
0.0438 
(4.91)*** 
TOB 
-0.0125 
(-1.08) 
-0.0172 
(-1.52) TOB 
-0.0053 
(-1.42) 
-0.0056 
(-1.42) 
ROA 
0.0074 
(0.55) 
0.0099 
(0.73) ROA 
0.0164 
(2.04)** 
0.0164 
(2.05)** 
LEV 
0.0579 
(0.61) 
0.0216 
(0.23) LEV 
0.1213 
(2.58)*** 
0.1215 
(2.59)*** 
AGE 
0.0275 
(2.14)** 
0.0276 
(2.11)** AGE 
0.0324 
(3.82)*** 
0.0326 
(3.83)*** 
VOL 
1.3835 
(0.89) 
0.8331 
(0.54) VOL 
0.3759 
(0.78) 
0.3125 
(0.62) 
CRL 
0.0924 
(3.21)*** 
0.0850 
(2.95)*** CRL 
0.0604 
(3.42)*** 
0.0604 
(3.44)*** 
LAMBDA 
-0.0395 
(-1.98)** 
-0.0429 
(-2.12)** Year Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Industry Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Adj. R2 (%) 53.55 53.62 
Wald chi2 217.86 210.83 F-statistic 30.24 28.90 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 P value 0.0000 0.0000 
N 420 420 N 420 420 
   Max VIF 2.25 2.30 
This table provides the results of Heckman two-stage sample selection model and two-stage least squares method. The dependent 
variable is quality of GHG emission disclosure index calculated based on annual reports, sustainability reports, and corporate 
website using the CDP 2010 scoring methodology. AUG is the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated using the 
modified Jones model with ROA. AUG*DUA is an interaction variable between the CEO duality and the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones model with ROA. IND is board independence measured as proportion 
of independent directors on the board; DUA is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the CEO has a role as a chairman of the 
board, and 0 otherwise. DIV is a board diversity measured as an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the board has female director 
and 0 otherwise. LAT is natural logarithm of number of audit committee meetings. MAC is the size of the audit committee 
measured as number of members of an audit committee. MSO is proportion of ordinary shares held by all directors. INS is   
proportion of shareholding by the institutional investors measured from Top20 shareholding list of a firm excluding individual 
shareholding. LMV is the size of a firm measured as natural logarithm of market value in millions one month before disclosure 
annual report announcement date.  TOB is Tobin’s q measured as the market value of common equity plus book value of 
preferred stock and book value of long-term debt and current liabilities, all scaled by book value of total assets. ROA is firm 
profitability measured as net profit after tax before abnormal items all divided by total assets. LEV is leverage measured as total 
debt divided by total assets. AGE is natural logarithm of firm age calculate from its listing date (years). VOL is the volatility 
calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the annual report announcement period from day -260 to day -2. 
CRL is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm is listed other than ASX and 0 otherwise.  z/t statistics are reported in parenthesis.   
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Max VIF is the maximum variance inflation factor. 
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The second stage is modelled based on the following equation: 
 
QUALi,t = β0 + β1AUGi,t + β2INDi,t-1 + β3DUAi,t-1 + β4DIVi,t-1 + β5LATi,t-1 + β6MACi,t-1 + 
β7MSOi,t-1 + β8INSi,t-1 + β9LMVi,t-1 + β10TOBi,t-1 + β11ROAi,t-1 + β12LEVi,t-1 + β13AGEi,t-1  + 
β14VOLi,t-1 + β15CRLi,t-1 + β16Σyear + β17Σindustry + εi,t  t                                                                            (19) 
 
Higher corporate governance quality shows a positive relationship with voluntary 
GHG emission disclosure information implying that firms with higher corporate 
governance quality were more likely to disclose more information about GHG 
emission reduction strategies. The author found a similar finding with regards to the 
link between earnings management and GHG disclosure indicating that Australian 
managers are not motivated to use voluntary GHG emission information as  a means 
to distract the stakeholders.   
 
Panel B of Table 6.19 provides the results of two-stage least squares regression. The 
two-state least squares method is one of the most powerful and versatile tools, which 
allows for consistent estimation of simultaneous equations with endogenous 
predictors (Antonakis et al. 2012). In this method, firstly, the dependent 
(endogenous) variable is regressed on relevant independent and control variables, 
and the predicted value is extracted. For this purpose, this study uses AUGi,t as a 
dependent variable in  the first stage using the following equation and calculates  the 
fitted value. 
 
The equation for the first stage model is:  
 
AUGi,t = β0 + β1INDi,t-1 + β2DUAi,t-1 + β3DIVi,t-1 + β4LATi,t-1 + β5MACi,t-1 + β6MSOi,t-1 + 
β7INSi,t-1 + β8LMVi,t-1 + β9TOBi,t-1 + β10ROAi,t-1 + β11LEVi,t-1 + β12AGEi,t-1  + β13VOLi,t-1 + 
β15CRLi,t-1 + β16Σyear + β17Σindustry + εi,t  t                                                                                                            (20) 
 
In the second stage, the dependent variable is QUAL and the calculated predicted 
value of AUG is used as an independent variable. The following equation shows the 
details of variables used in this second stage. 
 
QUALi,t = β0 + β1AFitted_AUGi,t + β2INDi,t-1 + β3DUAi,t-1 + β4DIVi,t-1 + β5LATi,t-1 + 
β6MACi,t-1 + β7MSOi,t-1 + β8INSi,t-1 + β9LMVi,t-1 + β10TOBi,t-1 + β11ROAi,t-1 + β12LEVi,t-1 + 
β13AGEi,t-1  + β14VOLi,t-1 + β15CRLi,t-1 + β16Σyear + β17Σindustry + εi,t  t                                        (21) 
 
The author found no relationship between earnings management and voluntary GHG 
emission disclosure. The interaction effect between CEO duality and earnins 
management were insignificant. The author tested other corporate governance 
variables and found similar results.  These findings suggest that Australian corporate 
managers were unlikely to use voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information as 
a tool to mask their opportunitistic behaviour. 
     
The author also used the HCG measure which is the ranking of corporate governance 
of the top 250 Australian firms collected from the Horwath Corporate Governance 
reports to test the robustness of the results reported earlier. Table 6.20 presents the 
results of logistic and OLS regressions using this corporate governance measure.  
The results show insignificant negative association between GHG emission 
disclosures and earnings management consistent with the results reported earlier. The 
interaction effect between CEO duality and GHG emission disclosure was also 
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insignificant Overall, the author found only a weak support for the stakeholder value 
maximization hypothesis.  
 
Table 6.20 Analysis of an alternative measure of corporate governance  
Logistic Regression OLS Regression 
Dependent variables DISC  QUAL 
Intercept 
-3.5385 
(-2.38)
** 
Intercept 
0.1378 
(1.56) 
AUG 
-1.6593 
(-0.79) AUG 
-0.1461 
(-1.62) 
HCG 
-0.0060 
(-2.67)
*** 
HCG 
-0.0005 
(-4.35)
*** 
LMV 
0.6737 
(3.98)
*** 
LMV 
0.0390 
(4.11)
*** 
TOB 
-0.2301 
(-2.11)
** 
TOB 
-0.0044 
(-1.19) 
ROA 
0.3147 
(1.05) ROA 
0.0157 
(1.89)
* 
LEV 
0.5864 
(0.65) LEV 
0.1251 
(2.60)
*** 
AGE 
-0.1707 
(-1.06) AGE 
0.0321 
(3.51)
*** 
VOL 
-11.0967 
(-1.09) VOL 
-0.1864 
(-0.34) 
CRL 
-0.2726 
(-0.83) CRL 
0.0700 
(3.77)
*** 
Year Yes Year  Yes 
Industry  Yes Industry  Yes 
Pseudo R2 (%) 20.58 Adj R2 (%) 54.05 
Wald chi2 61.56 F-statistic 55.60 
Probability 0.0000 P value 0.0000 
N 367 N 371 
  Max VIF 2.30 
This table provides the results of multivariate logistic and OLS regression analysis. This table provides 
the results of multivariate logistic and OLS regression analysis. The dependent variables for logistic  
and OLS regressions are quality of GHG emission disclosure index calculated based on annual reports, 
sustainability reports, and corporate website using the CDP 2010 scoring methodology (QUAL) and 
DISC is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm discloses GHG emission information to the CDP  
and 0 otherwise respectively. AUG is the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated using the 
modified Jones model with ROA. HCG is the ranking of corporate governance of the top 250 Australian 
firms collected from the Horwath Corporate Governance reports. LMV is the size of a firm measured as 
natural logarithm of market value in millions one month before disclosure annual report announcement 
date.  TOB is Tobin’s q measured as the market value of common equity plus book value of preferred 
stock and book value of long-term debt and current liabilities, all scaled by book value of total assets. 
ROA is firm profitability measured as net profit after tax before abnormal items divided by total assets. 
LEV is leverage measured as total debt divided by total assets. AGE is natural logarithm of firm age 
calculate from its listing date (years). VOL is the volatility calculated as the standard deviation of daily 
stock returns over the annual report announcement period from day -260 to day -2. CRL is an indicator variable 
that equals to 1 if a firm is listed other than ASX and 0 otherwise.  z/t and z-statistics are reported in parenthesis.   
***
, 
**
, 
* 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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6.4. Stock market liquidity and voluntary 
disclosure of GHG information 
 
This section reports the results of the relationship between stock market liquidity and 
voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information as proposed in Chapter 3. We 
posited the following hypothesis which is repeated below for convenience. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information will be associated 
with an improvement in the liquidity of its shares, ceteris paribus. 
6.4.1. Correlation results 
Table 6.21 presents the Pearson and Spearman correlation between stock market 
liquidity measures, voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information and other 
control variables. There are two proxies that are used to capture stock market 
liquidity. First, Amihud’s measure of illiquidity (AMILOG) which is measured as the 
square root of the absolute value of the daily return divided by daily trading volume 
over the periods of one year and expressed in natural log terms.  Second, the relative 
bid-ask spread which is calculated as the difference the closing ask and bid prices, 
divided by the midpoint of ask and bid prices and expressed in natural log terms 
(BIDLOG). The correlation between dependent variables AMILOG and BIDLOG is 
0.80 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6.21 Correlation between liquidity and disclosure of GHG (Pearson above diagonal and 
Spearman below diagonal) 
 
AMILOG BIDLOG DISC QUAL INS LTA VOL LSP 
AMILOG 1 0.805
***
 -0.385
***
 -0.387
***
 -0.016 -0.786
***
 0.444
***
 -0.517
***
 
BIDLOG 0.803
***
 1 -0.198
***
 -0.193
***
 0.161
***
 -0.577
***
 0.533
***
 -0.448
***
 
DISC -0.388
***
 -0.206
***
 1 0.489
***
 0.064 0.392
***
 -0.118
***
 0.193
***
 
QUAL -0.338
***
 -0.128
***
 0.466
***
 1 0.032 0.390
***
 -0.055 0.169
***
 
INS -0.030 0.166
***
 0.053 0.044 1 -0.038 0.091
**
 -0.161
***
 
LTA -0.778
***
 -0.557
***
 0.411
***
 0.382
***
 0.005 1 -0.324
***
 0.393
***
 
VOL 0.507
***
 0.658
***
 -0.087
*
 0.021 0.097
**
 -0.385
***
 1 -0.168
***
 
LSP -0.508
***
 -0.437
***
 0.189
***
 0.127
***
 -0.138
***
 0.325
***
 -0.215
***
 1 
This table reports the Pearson correlations between variables related to stock market liquidity and 
voluntary disclosure of GHG emissions, and control variables. AMILOG is measured as the square root 
of the absolute value of the daily return divided by daily trading volume over the periods of one year 
and expressed in natural log terms. BIDLOG is calculated as the difference the closing ask and bid 
prices, divided by the midpoint of ask and bid prices and expressed in natural log terms. DISC is a 
dummy variable which takes the value of one if a firm responds to CDP and that information is 
disclosed publicly. QUAL is the voluntary GHG emission disclosure index calculated based on annual 
reports, sustainability reports, and corporate website using the CDP 2010 scoring methodology. INS is 
the institutional shareholding calculated from Top20 shareholding excluding individuals. LTA is the 
logarithm of total assets. VOL is the volatility calculated as standard deviation of daily stock returns 
over the annual report announcement period from day -260 to day -2. LSP is natural logarithm of stock 
price over the annual report announcement period from day -260 to day -2. 
*** 
Correlation is significant 
at 1% level, 
** 
correlation is significant at 5% level, and 
*
 correlation is significant at 10% level.  
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Table 6.21 reports Pearson and Spearman  correlations between Amihud’s illiquidity 
ratio and both measures of GHG emission disclosures namely DISC and QUAL are -
0.385 and -0.387 (Pearson) -0.388 and -0.338 (Spearman) and are statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  Similarly, the relative bid-ask spread and both measures 
of GHG emission disclosure are negatively correlated and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. These results indicate that firms with more GHG emission disclosure 
have higher liquidity of shares, which implies lower information asymmetry. The 
correlation between Amihud’s illiquidity measure and institutional shareholding is 
insignificant. The correlation between relative bid-ask spread and institutional 
ownership is positively significant at the 1% level.  
 
The correlations between Amihud’s illiquidity ratio and the size of the firms and 
relative bid-ask spread and the size of the firms are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. We use logarithm of book value of total assets (LTA) as a size of the firms 
instead of LMV due to multicollineraity problem. The results show that larger firms 
are more liquid compared to smaller firms.  Stock return volatility appears to have 
statistically significantly positive correlations with both measures of illiquidity 
suggesting that illiquid shares are more volatile. The correlation between both 
illiquidity measures and average share prices are strongly negatively statistically 
significant indicating that firms with higher share prices have higher liquidity. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Data analysis and results 
 
141 
 
6.4.2. Stock liquidity and voluntary disclosure of GHG 
emissions 
Table 6.22 Liquidity and disclosure of GHG information 
 
Panel A: Effect of voluntary disclosure 
of GHG emissions  on Amihud’s 
Liquidity 
Panel B: Effect of voluntary disclosure 
of GHG emissions  on BIDASK Spread 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Intercept 
1.5902 
(12.71)*** 
1.5947 
(12.61)*** 
-0.1677 
(-1.42) 
-0.1539 
(-1.29) 
DISC 
-0.0552 
(-3.63)***  
-0.0108 
(-0.75)  
QUAL  
-0.1329 
(-3.05)***  
-0.0090 
(-0.22) 
INS 
-0.1581 
(-3.62)*** 
-0.1687 
(-3.87)*** 
0.1462 
(3.54)
*** 
0.1436 
(3.49)
*** 
LTA 
-0.2913 
(-24.27)*** 
-0.2882 
(-22.79)*** 
-0.1797 
(-15.83)
*** 
-0.1812 
(-15.19)
*** 
VOL 
6.0445 
(6.51)*** 
5.9533 
(6.36)*** 
1.6767 
(1.91)
* 
1.7060 
(1.93)
* 
LSP 
-0.0655 
(-9.27)*** 
-0.0665 
(-9.39)*** 
-0.0488 
(-7.30)
*** 
-0.0490 
(-7.34)
*** 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.7799 0.7784 0.7532 0.7529 
F-statistic 117.55 116.51 101.33 101.21 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 560 560 560 560 
Max VIF 2.70 2.72 2.70 2.72 
This table provides the results of regression analysis that examines the cross-sectional effects on stock 
market liquidity, as proxied by Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure and relative Bid-ask spread. The 
dependent variables are AMILOG and BIDLOG. AMILOG is measured as the square root of the 
absolute value of the daily return divided by daily trading volume over the periods of one year and 
expressed in natural log terms. BIDLOG is calculated as the difference the closing ask and bid prices, 
divided by the midpoint of ask and bid prices and expressed in natural log terms. DISC is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of one if a firm responds to CDP and that information is disclosed 
publicly. QUAL is the voluntary GHG emission disclosure index calculated based on annual reports, 
sustainability reports, and corporate website using the CDP 2010 scoring methodology. INS is the 
institutional shareholding calculated from Top20 shareholding excluding individuals. LTA is the 
logarithm of total assets. VOL is the volatility calculated as standard deviation of daily stock returns 
over the annual report announcement period from day -260 to day -2. LSP is natural logarithm of stock 
price over the annual report announcement period from day -260 to day -2. 
***
, 
** 
and 
* 
indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Panel A and B in Table 6.22, we use Amihud’s illiquidity and relative bid-ask spread 
as dependent variables respectively.  The association between stock market 
illiquidity and voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information is expected to be 
positive.  Lower values of Amihud’s illiquidity and relative bid-ask spread measures 
indicate greater liquidity. Panel A of Table 6.22 indicate that Amihud’s illiquidity 
ratio and DISC are inversely related suggesting that firms that disclose more GHG 
emission information voluntarily tend to have higher liquidity supporting hypothesis 
(3). The coefficient on the quality of GHG emission disclosure is negative and 
significant suggesting that high quality disclosure firm benefit from improved stock 
market liquidity as compared to low quality disclosure firms supporting hypothesis 
(3). Prior empirical evidence supports the view that the quality of information 
disclosure improves stock market liquidity (Balakrishnan et al. 2013; Bardos 2011; 
Lang & Maffett 2011; Ng 2011).  
 
There is an inverse relationship between institutional shareholding and Amihud’s 
illiquidity and relative bid-ask spread measure. These results suggest that firms that 
have more institutional shareholding have increased market liquidity. With regards to 
other variables, firm size and stock prices are negatively associated with Amihud’s 
illiquidity indicating that firms with higher value and share price seem to have better 
liquidity. Stock return volatility has a very strong positive association with Amihud’s 
illiquidity ratio. This result shows that firms with more volatile share prices tend to 
have lower liquidity. 
 
When the alternative illiquidity measure of relative bid-ask spread is used, the results 
are weaker. The association between DISC and relative bid-ask spread is 
insignificant in the regression model Panel B of model 3. The quality of voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emission information and relative bid-ask spread is 
insignificantly associated in models 4 of Panel B. Surprisingly, the author found a 
positive association between institutional investors’ shareholding and relative bid-ask 
spreads. The other variables namely size, stock return volatility and stock prices 
show the similar results as indicated in Panel A of Table 6.22. 
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6.4.3. Year-by-year regression results 
Table 6.23 Liquidity and disclosure of GHG information by years 
Panel A: Effect of decision to disclose (CDP)  on illiquidity by year 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Variable AMILOG BIDLOG AMILOG BIDLOG AMILOG BIDLOG AMILOG BIDLOG 
Intercept 
1.5616 
(5.37)*** 
-0.1323 
(-0.53) 
1.5168 
(4.92)*** 
-0.4232 
(-1.49) 
1.8614 
(7.08)*** 
-0.3381 
(-1.37) 
1.4716 
(7.17)*** 
-0.1460 
(-0.75) 
DISC 
0.0007 
(0.02) 
-0.0055 
(-0.20) 
-0.0461 
(-1.44) 
-0.0155 
(-0.53) 
-0.0863 
(-2.86)*** 
-0.0177 
(-0.63) 
-0.0595 
(-2.02)** 
-0.0100 
(-0.36) 
INS 
-0.3053 
(-2.96)*** 
-0.0017 
(-0.02) 
-0.0380 
(-0.33) 
0.2059 
(1.97)* 
-0.2023 
(-2.64)*** 
0.0558 
(0.77) 
-0.1164 
(-1.45) 
0.2477 
(3.25)*** 
LTA 
-0.2956 
(-10.74)*** 
-0.2089 
(-8.90)*** 
-0.2987 
(-10.15)*** 
-0.1875 
(-6.94)*** 
-0.3113 
(-12.46)*** 
-0.1746 
(-7.43)*** 
-0.2811 
(-13.63)*** 
-0.1912 
(-9.75)*** 
VOL 
9.1995 
(2.16)** 
1.1715 
(0.32) 
0.2050 
(0.06) 
-2.9410 
(-0.88) 
2.5123 
(0.97) 
-0.1659 
(-0.07) 
6.8450 
(5.75)*** 
2.3134 
(2.04)** 
LSP 
-0.0659 
(-3.55)*** 
-0.0876 
(-5.54)*** 
-0.0469 
(-2.62)*** 
-0.0573 
(-3.49)*** 
-0.0663 
(-4.79*** 
-0.0437 
(-3.35)*** 
-0.0685 
(-5.97)*** 
-0.0403 
(-3.70)*** 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.7507 0.6723 0.6774 0.8582 0.7380 0.4712 0.7586 0.5577 
F-statistic 20.36 14.19 14.95 8.44 38.21 12.77 43.20 17.94 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 91 91 94 94 186 186 189 189 
Max VIF 1.83 1.83 2.18 2.18 2.41 2.41 1.84 1.84 
Panel B: Effect of quality of GHG emissions information on illiquidity by year 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Variable AMILOG BIDLOG AMILOG BIDLOG AMILOG BIDLOG AMILOG BIDLOG 
Intercept 
1.5371 
(5.29)*** 
-0.1233 
(-0.50) 
1.5097 
(4.90)*** 
-0.4476 
(-1.60) 
1.9259 
(7.22)*** 
-0.2577 
(-1.04) 
1.4554 
(7.00)*** 
-0.1937 
(-0.98) 
QUAL 
-0.0632 
(-0.61) 
0.0087 
(0.10) 
-0.1416 
(-1.50) 
-0.1194 
(-1.39) 
-0.1700 
(-1.93)* 
0.0441 
(0.54) 
-0.1554 
(-2.01)** 
-0.0742 
(-1.01) 
INS 
-0.3136 
(-3.02)*** 
-0.0008 
(-0.01) 
-0.0347 
(-0.31) 
0.2011 
(1.95)* 
-0.2234 
(-2.90)*** 
0.0473 
(0.66) 
-0.1214 
(-1.52) 
0.2535 
(3.35)*** 
LTA 
-0.2903 
(-10.21)*** 
-0.2104 
(-8.66)*** 
-0.2929 
(-9.67)*** 
-0.1789 
(-6.50)*** 
-0.3128 
(-11.87)*** 
-0.1847 
(-7.54)*** 
-0.2771 
(-12.91)*** 
-0.1843 
(-9.05)*** 
VOL 
8.9896 
(2.11)** 
1.2355 
(0.34) 
-0.9517 
(-0.26) 
-3.9735 
(-1.17) 
2.0515 
(0.78) 
0.0400 
(0.02) 
6.8889 
(5.80)*** 
2.2200 
(1.97)* 
LSP 
-0.0667 
(-3.60)*** 
-0.0875 
(-5.52)*** 
-0.0507 
(-2.78)*** 
-0.0617 
(-3.72)*** 
-0.0723 
(-5.20)*** 
-0.0447 
(-3.46)*** 
-0.0659 
(-5.69)*** 
-0.0389 
(-3.54)*** 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 0.7519 0.6722 0.6780 0.0.5378 0.7313 0.4708 0.7586 0.5600 
F-statistic 20.49 14.18 14.99 8.73 36.97 12.76 43.19 18.09 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 91 91 94 94 186 186 189 189 
Max VIF 2.27 2.27 2.56 2.56 2.70 2.70 2.07 2.07 
This table provides the results of regression analysis on voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information by CDP 
reporting years. The dependent variables are Amihud’s illiquidity measure (AMILOG) and Bid-ask spreads 
(BIDLOG).  AMILOG is measured as the square root of the absolute value of the daily return divided by 
daily trading volume over the periods of one year and expressed in natural log terms. BIDLOG is 
calculated as the difference the closing ask and bid prices, divided by the midpoint of ask and bid prices 
and expressed in natural log terms. DISC is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if a firm 
responds to CDP and that information is disclosed publicly. QUAL is the voluntary GHG emission 
disclosure index calculated based on annual reports, sustainability reports, and corporate website using 
the CDP 2010 scoring methodology. INS is the institutional shareholding calculated from Top20 
shareholding excluding individuals. LTA is the logarithm of total assets. VOL is the volatility 
calculated as standard deviation of daily stock returns over the annual report announcement period from 
day -260 to day -2. LSP is natural logarithm of stock price over the annual report announcement period 
from day -260 to day -2.  
***
, 
** 
and 
* 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Next, this study examines the impact of voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information on liquidity for each year to test whether there is any difference between 
years. Panel A of Table 6.23 shows the relationship between Amihud’s illiquidity 
measure and voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information and Panel B shows 
the relationship between voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information and bid-
ask spread.  The author found a negative and significant association between Amihud 
illiquidity measure and two proxies of voluntary GHG emission disclosures of DISC 
and QUAL only for the years 2008 and 2009.  
 
Table 6.24 presents the results of multivariate regression of the association between 
sub-scores of quality of GHG emission information and liquidity measures. 
Regressions are run with year and industry fixed effects. The governance component 
appears to be significantly negatively associated with both illiquidity measures. As 
far as the strategy component is concerned, it seems to be positively associated with 
both illiquidity measures. With regards to GHG accounting, energy and fuel use, and 
trading sub-score, it is negatively and statistically significantly related to the 
Amihud’s illiquidity ratio. The governance, risks and opportunities, and 
communication components are not associated with either of the liquidity measures. 
 
Overall, the author has found support for hypothesis 3 which states that firms with 
more voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information are more likely to 
experience increases in stock liquidity.  
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6.4.4. Market liquidity and sub-disclosures of GHG  
  emission information 
 
Table 6.24 Liquidity and sub-scores of GHG emission information disclosure 
Dependent Variable AMILOG BIDLOG 
Model 1 2 
Intercept 1.5622 
(12.22)*** 
-0.1626 
(-1.35) 
GOVE -0.8516 
(-1.38) 
-0.4407 
(-0.76) 
RISK -0.0955 
(-0.70) 
-0.0671 
(-0.52) 
STRA 1.1027 
(2.09)** 
1.2542 
(2.53)** 
GHGE -0.3550 
(-2.88)*** 
-0.2574 
(-2.22)** 
COMM -0.0193 
(-0.01) 
1.7069 
(1.31) 
INS -0.1630 
(-3.70)*** 
0.1545 
(3.74)*** 
LTA -0.2910 
(-22.86)*** 
-0.1861 
(-15.56)*** 
VOL 5.8012 
(6.20)*** 
1.4913 
(1.70)* 
LSP -0.0653 
(-9.21)*** 
-0.0477 
(-7.16)*** 
Year  Yes Yes 
Industry  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.7804 0.7570 
F-statistic 95.78 83.94 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 
N 560 560 
Max VIF 3.42 3.42 
This table provides the results of regression analysis of components of voluntary disclosure of GHG 
emission information on measures of stock illiquidity. The dependent variables are Amihud’s illiquidity 
(AMILOG) and Bid-ask spreads (BIDLOG). AMILOG is measured as the square root of the absolute 
value of the daily return divided by daily trading volume over the periods of one year and expressed in 
log terms. BIDLOG is calculated as the difference the closing ask and bid prices, divided by the 
midpoint of ask and bid prices and expressed in log terms. Independent variables are: GOVE: 
governance; RISK: risks and opportunities; STRA: strategy; GHGE: GHG accounting, energy and fuel 
use, and trading; COMM: communications. INS: institutional shareholding calculated from Top20 
shareholding excluding individuals. LTA is the logarithm of total assets. VOL is the volatility 
calculated as standard deviation of daily stock returns over the annual report announcement period from 
day -260 to day -2. LSP is natural logarithm of stock price over the annual report announcement period 
from day -260 to day -2. 
***
, 
** 
and 
* 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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6.4.5. Market liquidity,GHG emission information and 
corporate governance 
Table 6.25 Liquidity, disclosure and corporate governance 
 AMILOG BIDLOG 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Intercept 
2.3213 
(11.73)
*** 
2.3075 
(11.72)
*** 
0.2146 
(1.38) 
0.2127 
(1.37) 
DISC 
-0.0389 
(-2.38)
** 
 
-0.0067 
(-0.47)  
QUAL  
-0.1243 
(-2.91)
*** 
 
-0.0206 
(-0.49) 
IND 
-0.1569 
(-3.25)
*** 
-0.1512 
(-3.14)
*** 
-0.0388 
(-0.96) 
-0.0380 
(-0.94) 
DUA 
-0.0559 
(-2.82)
*** 
-0.0624 
(-3.18)
*** 
-0.0474 
(-2.84)
*** 
-0.0485 
(-2.89)
*** 
DIV 
-0.0305 
(-1.81)
* 
-0.0308 
(-1.83)
* 
-0.0178 
(-1.27) 
-0.0179 
(-1.29) 
LAT 
-0.0117 
(-0.76) 
-0.0101 
(-0.66) 
-0.0030 
(-0.22) 
-0.0028 
(-0.20) 
MAC 
0.0044 
(0.68) 
0.0038 
(0.59) 
-0.0054 
(-0.98) 
-0.0055 
(-1.01) 
MSO 
0.0984 
(1.40) 
0.1092 
(1.53) 
-0.0278 
(-0.44) 
-0.0259 
(-0.41) 
INS 
-0.1761 
(-3.69)
*** 
-0.1835 
(-3.86)
*** 
0.1512 
(3.18)
*** 
0.1499 
(3.20)
*** 
LTA 
-0.1455 
(-16.60)
*** 
-0.1441 
(-16.38)
*** 
-0.0887 
(-12.37)
*** 
-0.0885 
(-12.40)
*** 
TOB 
-0.0238 
(-3.06)
*** 
-0.0238 
(-3.00)
*** 
-0.0199 
(-3.87)
*** 
-0.0199 
(-3.86)
*** 
ROA 
0.0038 
(0.33) 
0.0027 
(0.24) 
-0.0339 
(-3.49)
*** 
-0.0341 
(-3.50)
*** 
LEV 
0.0430 
(0.99) 
0.0530 
(1.21) 
0.0753 
(2.06)
** 
0.0770 
(2.08)
** 
AGE 
-0.0132 
(-1.73)
* 
-0.0086 
(-1.10) 
-0.0071 
(-1.02) 
-0.0063 
(-0.87) 
VOL 
1.0949 
(1.84)
* 
1.1377 
(1.91)
* 
-0.1426 
(-0.39)
 
-0.1349 
(-0.37) 
LSP 
-0.0549 
(-7.14)
*** 
-0.0553 
(-6.92)
*** 
-0.0251 
(-4.28)
*** 
-0.0252 
(-4.27)
*** 
CRL 
0.0221 
(1.22) 
0.0290 
(1.60) 
0.0026 
(0.15) 
0.0037 
(0.21) 
SWT 
-0.0001 
(0.01) 
-0.0130 
(-0.65) 
-0.0007 
-0.03 
-0.0029 
(-0.15) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 79.65 79.70 78.57 78.57 
F-statistic 120.47 116.69 95.77 96.19 
P value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 561 561 561 561 
Max VIF 3.53 3.62 3.53 3.62 
The dependent variables are Amihud’s illiquidity (AMILOG) and Bid-ask spreads (BIDLOG). Independent variables are: DISC is a 
dummy variable which takes the value of one if a firm responds to CDP and that information is disclosed publicly. QUAL is the voluntary 
GHG emission disclosure index calculated based on annual reports, sustainability reports, and corporate website using the CDP 2010 
scoring methodology. IND is board independence measured as proportion of independent directors on the board.  DUA is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the CEO has a role as a chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. DIV is board diversity measured as an indicator 
variable that equals to 1 if the board has female director and 0 otherwise. LAT is natural logarithm of number of audit committee meetings. 
MAC is the size of the audit committee measured as number of members of an audit committee. MSO is the proportion of ordinary shares 
held by all directors. INS is the proportion of shareholding by the institutional investors measured from the Top20 shareholding list of a 
firm excluding individual shareholdings. LMV is the size of a firm measured as natural logarithm of market value in millions one month 
before the annual report release date.  TOB is Tobin’s q measured as the market value of common equity plus book value of preferred stock 
and book value of long-term debt and current liabilities, all scaled by book value of total assets. ROA is firm profitability measured as net 
profit after tax before abnormal items divided by total assets. LEV is leverage measured as total debt divided by total assets. AGE is the 
natural logarithm of firm age calculated from its listing date (years). VOL is the volatility calculated as the standard deviation of daily 
stock returns over the annual report announcement period from day -260 to day -2. LSP is natural logarithm of stock price over the annual 
report announcement period from day -260 to day -2CRL is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if a firm is listed other than ASX and 0 
otherwise. SWT is a dummy variable that takes 1 if a firm switches its decision on GHG information disclosure from one year to next year.  
t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.   
***
, 
**
, 
* 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Max VIF is the maximum 
variance inflation factor. 
 
Chapter 6: Data analysis and results 
 
147 
 
Table 6.25 reports the results of regression on the association between stock market 
liquidity, voluntary disclosures of GHG emission information, and the characteristics 
of corporate governance. Corporate governance variables such as board independence, 
CEO duality, and institutional share ownership have an impact on stock market 
liquidity. Most importantly, higher the board independence and institutional investors’ 
holdings higher the firms’ share liquidity.  
6.4.6. Conclusion 
This Chapter discusses in detail the results of the associations between voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emission information and corporate governance aspects. The 
results suggest that better governed firms tend to voluntarily disclose more 
information regarding GHG emissions. This result suggests that a range of effective 
corporate governance mechanisms mitigate agency costs and support the stakeholder 
value maximisation view hypothesis (1a). In addition to that, firms that disclose more 
voluntary GHG information to the public are less likely to engage in earnings 
management suggesting that managers are more likely to be ethically oriented and 
disclose more GHG emission information to the investors. This finding also supports 
partially the stakeholder value maximisation view hypothesis (2a).  Overall, these 
findings are the stakeholder value maximisation view which is based on stakeholder 
and legitimacy theories. There is no support for the shareholder expense view.  
 
Moreover, firms that disclose more voluntary GHG information to the public are 
more likely to have liquid stocks suggesting that information asymmetry will be 
reduced when firms disclose more transparent and high quality information to the 
investors supporting hypothesis (3).  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
7.1. Introduction 
In this concluding Chapter, the main findings are summarised and implications are 
discussed. Section 7.2 presents a summary of the research questions, reports the 
findings and discusses the validity of the hypotheses developed in this thesis. Section 
7.3 provides the implications of the research. Section 7.4 discusses the limitations of 
the study. The suggestions for the future research are provided in Section 7.5. This 
Chapter concludes with the chapter summary in Section 7.6. 
7.2. Research questions 
This thesis seeks to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on 
voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information and to what extent are disclosure 
of GHG emission information associated with the earnings management and the 
liquidity of firms’ shares. The following research questions are addressed 
empirically: 
1. What are the impacts of corporate governance attributes on disclosure of 
voluntary GHG emission information? 
2. What is the relationship between voluntary disclosures of GHG emission 
information and earnings management and to what extent do corporate 
governance mechanisms affect this relationship? 
3. Do Australian firms with higher voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information have higher liquidity of the firms’ shares, ceteris paribus? 
 
This thesis draws conclusions using empirical tests regarding the above questions. 
7.2.1. What are the impacts of corporate governance  
  characteristics on  voluntary GHG emission  
  information disclosure? 
This study examines the impact of corporate governance characteristics on voluntary 
GHG emission disclosure information using two competing views stakeholder value 
maximisation and shareholder expense. Stakeholder value maximisation view 
supports the notion that firms engage in socially responsible initiatives such as GHG 
emission reduction strategies and targets associated with climate change to fulfil the 
demands and interest of stakeholders in order to have long-term relationship with 
stakeholders and to achieve long term wealth maximisation. The stakeholder value 
maximisation view expects that a firm’s voluntary GHG emission disclosure decision 
can be seen as a result of effective internal and external monitoring through various 
corporate governance mechanisms to resolve conflicts among various stakeholders. 
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Therefore, the author expected to find a positive association between effective 
corporate governance characteristics and voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information.  
 
On the other hand, the shareholder expense view argues that managers may use 
voluntary GHG emission information disclosure for their personal interests. Thus 
effective internal and external monitoring through various corporate governance 
mechanisms may reduce managerial incentives and opportunistic use of GHG 
emission information disclosure. As a result, it is expected that there will be a 
negative association between effective corporate governance mechanisms and 
voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information. 
 
The corporate governance characteristics of Australian publicly listed firms that 
voluntarily disclosed their greenhouse gas emission information through voluntary 
disclosure channels such as the CDP, annual reports, standalone sustainability 
reports, and corporate websites are board independence, CEO duality, board gender 
diversity, directors’ share ownership, institutional shareholding, blockholder 
ownership, frequency of audit committee meetings and the size of the audit 
committee. This study finds empirical evidence suggesting that a firm’s voluntary 
GHG emission information disclosure may be driven by corporate governance 
mechanisms. The author has found that corporate governance mechanisms such as 
board independence, CEO duality, board gender diversity, directors’ share 
ownership, institutional ownership, blockholder ownership, the size of the audit 
committee all have a significant influence on voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information. There is no evidence to support the impact of frequency of audit 
committee meetings on GHG emissions disclosure.  
 
Independent boards representing outsider members have a significant impact on 
voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information made by Australian firms 
suggesting that as independent directors tend to have long-term perspective, they are 
expected to encourage top management to disclose a wide range of information on 
GHG. This result is consistent with prior studies (Khan, Muttakin & Siddiqui 2013; 
Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013; Rupley, Brown & Marshall 2012) that have found that a 
greater percentage of independent non-executive directors have significant and 
positive effect on disclosure about GHG emission reduction initiatives. 
 
CEO duality provides more power to the CEO which may enable him/her to neglect 
climate change related issues and demands of stakeholders. This study has found a 
negative relationship between CEO duality and managers’ decisions to disclose GHG 
emission information voluntarily and supports the separation of the role of chairman 
and CEO to improve monitoring quality in socially responsible decision making.  
Board gender diversity has positive effect on voluntary GHG emission disclosure. 
This study has found a positive impact on voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information suggesting that since women directors are more socially responsible, the 
presence of women on the board would increase voluntary disclosure of GHG 
emission information. This result is consistent with existing studies (Boulouta 2013; 
Liao, Luo & Tang 2014) which suggest that since women directors have more social 
empathy and caring qualities they are more likely to be in favour of disseminating 
more socially responsible disclosures. 
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This study has found that directors’ share ownership is negatively associated with 
voluntary GHG emission disclosures. This indicates that a greater share ownership 
concentration by the directors influence top management to involve less in GHG 
emission reduction activities because of their shareholding power and report less on 
such GHG emission disclosure. This finding is consistent with previous research 
finding (Khan, Muttakin & Siddiqui 2013) that firms with higher managerial 
shareholding are less likely to report less amount of CSR disclosure. We document a 
positive association between institutional ownership and voluntary GHG emission 
disclosure suggesting that institutional investors are playing a vital role in ensuring 
the interests of a variety of stakeholders through voluntary GHG emission disclosure. 
 
This study has found that the size of the audit committee is negatively related to the 
voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information. This finding is consistent of 
previous research finding of a negative association between the size of the audit 
committee and disclosure (Lin, Xiao & Tang 2008; Scarbrough, Rama & 
Raghunandan 1998; Yermack 1996) that more members in an audit committee may 
lead to unnecessary debates and delays in decision making processes, and this in 
turn, is not necessarily considered as an effective functioning mechanisms.  In 
supporting the above argument, we find that firms with more members in an audit 
committee are less likely to provide GHG emission related information to 
stakeholders. 
 
An independent, diverse group of members with some degree of separation from the 
CEO and chairman on the board may balance a stakeholders’ conflicting demand 
from a variety of stakeholder groups. In addition, ownership aspects of corporate 
governance impact on voluntary GHG emission disclosure. For instance, the increase 
in the proportion of shares owned by institutional investors induces GHG emission 
disclosure whereas the shares held by executive and non-executive directors do the 
opposite. Interestingly, the smaller audit committees are more likely to have an 
impact on firms’ GHG emission reduction strategies and initiatives. Overall, these 
results suggest that Australian firms adopt corporate governance mechanisms that are 
indeed stakeholder-focused, which balance the interests of a broader group of 
stakeholders’ with regards to climate change, particularly in reporting GHG emission 
reduction initiatives and strategies. Overall, our results are consistent with the 
stakeholder value maximisation view of the firm which is based on stakeholder 
theory and legitimacy theory.  
 
With regards to control variables, the size of the firms is positively and significantly 
associated with firms’ decisions to disclose GHG emission information. The larger 
and more visible firms are responding to the information requests made by the CDP 
due to social pressure and support legitimacy theory.  Tobin’s q, which is used as an 
indicator for firms’ growth opportunities, has a negative and significant relationship 
with managers’ decisions to disclose GHG emission information. This result 
indicates that the firms with higher growth opportunities are less likely to disclose 
GHG information. Firms may respond to pressure from debtholders; therefore, there 
is a positive association between quality of GHG emission disclosure and leverage. 
Firm age is positively associated with the quality of GHG emission disclosure, which 
indicates that older firms may disclose more information on GHG emission to 
maintain their reputation among the stakeholders (Dhaliwal et al. 2012).  
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7.2.2. What is the relationship between voluntary    
 disclosures of GHG emission  information and  
 earnings management? 
This study investigates the relationship between voluntary disclosure of GHG 
emission information and earnings management and the extent to which corporate 
governance mechanisms affect the relationship.  This study has found a negative 
relationship between voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information and 
earnings management indicating that socially responsible firms provide better quality 
of environmental information to stakeholders (Cho, Lee & Pfeiffer 2013; Kim, Park 
& Wier 2012) and are less likely to engage in earnings management supporting 
stakeholder value maximisation view. When control variables are included, this 
research has found an insignificant negative relationship between voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emission disclosure and earnings management. The sub-
categories of quality of GHG emission disclosure namely, strategy and 
communication reveals significant and negative associations with earnings 
management, which support the previous argument that socially responsible firms are 
less likely to engage in earnings management. Overall, the author has found weak 
support for the stakeholder value maximisation hypothesis. 
 
When the relationship between voluntary disclosure of GHG emission disclosure and 
earnings management is examined while controlling for corporate governance 
attributes, this thesis finds similar weak results. Effective corporate governance 
mechanisms play a marginal role in limiting Australian firms engaging in earnings 
management practice. This study has found some support for the premise that 
Australian firms with effective corporate governance engage in less earnings 
management supporting stakeholder value maximisation view.  These results suggest 
that Australian firms with effective corporate governance mechanisms encourage 
management to focus on a broader group of stakeholders’ interests with regards to 
climate change. These results are robust to controls for endogeneity using the two-
stage least squared method. 
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7.2.3. Do Australian firms with higher voluntary 
disclosure of GHG emission information have 
higher liquidity of the firms’ shares? 
 
This thesis seeks to identify whether voluntary disclosure of GHG emission 
information may have an effect on liquidity of the firms’ shares. Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity and relative bid-ask spread are the measures which are used to see whether 
the firms with higher voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information have higher 
liquidity in the firms’ shares.  The Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measures are 
inversely related voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information. These results 
indicate that firms disclosing more GHG emission information voluntarily 
experience an increase in the liquidity of the firms’ shares. These results support the 
view of Balakrishnan et al. (2013) that managers’ decisions to disclose more 
voluntary information could affect the liquidity of their firms’ liquidity directly. 
Managers may shape the liquidity of their firms’ shares by providing more GHG 
emission information voluntarily through the CDP and their corporate reporting 
channels. Overall, these results support the view that Australian firm with higher 
voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information have higher liquidity of the firms’ 
shares. 
 
7.3. The contributions of the study 
 
7.3.1. Contributions to the literature 
Firstly, this thesis contributes to the link between carbon disclosure and corporate 
governance literature by examining two competing views, namely, stakeholder value 
maximisation view and shareholder expense view. This study supports the 
stakeholder value maximisation view which predicts that better governed firms tend 
to be more socially responsible and take care of the interests of stakeholders. This 
study finds evidence that a range of effective corporate governance mechanisms 
enhance voluntary GHG emission disclosure information to fulfil the needs of 
stakeholders.  
 
Secondly, this study adds to the existing literature by investigating the relationship 
between earnings management and voluntary GHG emission disclosure information. 
This study finds a weak negative relationship between earnings management and 
voluntary GHG emission disclosure information. Similar findings are reported when 
we use corporate governance mechanisms as moderating variables.  
 
Finally, this thesis adds to the large body of literature on the link between voluntary 
disclosure and stock market liquidity. The author has found that firms with higher 
voluntary disclosure of GHG emission information experience higher liquidity of 
their shares. 
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7.3.2. Contributions to the practice 
Firstly, this study could benefit regulatory bodies that are considering effective 
corporate governance reforms. The author has found that effective corporate 
governance mechanism such as greater board independence, the absence of CEO 
duality, the presence of board gender diversity, lower directors’ share ownership, 
greater institutional shareholding and smaller size of the audit committee drive 
voluntary GHG emission disclosure.  The Australian Corporate Governance Council 
may consider suggesting these as best practices of effective corporate governance 
mechanisms to address climate change related issues at the firm level.  
 
Secondly, the findings of this study are useful for potential and current investors in 
firms who are concerned about climate change information from firms’ operations. 
For example, currently investors have started incorporating GHG emission 
information related to climate change in their investment decisions. This study 
provides evidence that firms with better corporate governance mechanisms are more 
likely to be stakeholder focused.  Thus investors who seek to mitigate climate change 
related risk are better off in investing in firms with effective corporate governance 
mechanisms in place. In addition to that, this study provides evidence that firms that 
disclose higher quality of GHG emission information through the CDP, annual 
reports, standalone sustainability reports, and corporate websites experience 
improved liquidity of shares. Therefore, potential and current investors may 
incorporate these findings in their investment decisions.  
7.4. The limitations of the study 
The quality of GHG emission disclosure is measured using the CDP 2010 scoring 
methodology, which was the latest methodology available when measuring the 
scores. Firm’s annual reports, sustainability reports, and corporate website are 
sources for scoring the quality of GHG emission information. Some firms may have 
other different channels to disclose their GHG emission information to the 
stakeholders. This study did not consider channels consider other than annual reports, 
sustainability reports, and each firm’s corporate website.  These could include social 
networking sites, disclosure through radio and television channels and press releases.  
 
This study uses the absolute value of discretionary accrual methods as a proxy for 
earnings management.  Prior research on earnings management criticises these 
models and argue that these models provide noisy and biased results (Kothari, Leone 
& Wasley 2005; Teoh, Wong & Rao 1998).   In recent years, researchers have shown  
their interest in measuring earnings management through real activities in addition to 
accrual based activities (Roychowdhury 2006). Managers may prefer to use real 
activities manipulation over accruals manipulation as a way to manage reported 
earnings. This study did not use real earnings management proxies due to 
unavailability of data and time. 
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7.5. Recommendations for future research 
This research considers GHG emission disclosure in a voluntary disclosure setting in 
Australia. Since corporate governance practice and climate change related 
legislations vary from country to country, future research must consider other 
countries as well to see the relationships among corporate governance, GHG 
emission disclosure, and earnings management.  
 
This thesis calculates earnings management using absolute values of discretionary 
accruals methods. Future research should consider other methods such as real 
earnings management and signed accrual methods. 
 
This study focuses on GHG emission disclosure before implementation of NEGR 
Act. Future research could compare disclosures consider pre and post NEGR Act. 
 
This study depends entirely on secondary data. Future studies could consider a case 
study approach augmented with primary data collected from interviews with 
directors and management regarding GHG emission reduction management and their 
disclosure practices. 
 
This study considers four sources to measure the GHG emission disclosure such as 
firms’ responses to the CDP, annual reports, standalone sustainability reports, and 
corporate websites. Firms may have other reporting channels such as social media to 
disclose their GHG emission information. Future research may consider these 
sources in addition to the sources used in this research to score the quality of GHG 
emission disclosure. 
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APPENDICES  
Appendix 1: CDP 2010 scoring methodology 
 
This appendix provides an explanation about the quality of GHG emission disclosure 
scoring methodology (CDP 2010 scoring methodology).  This methodology has been 
developed jointly by CDP and their global advisor PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). 
All questions are not applicable for all companies. It provides a detail scoring 
approach, which includes different types of questions such as lead question and 
conditional questions as well as scales questions. 
 
The number of points allocated to each question depends on the amount of data 
availability at a particular financial year of a firm’s voluntary communication 
channels such as annual report, sustainability report or corporate website. Some 
questions have more than one point attached to a single piece of information where 
the information is of particularly high importance, e.g. scope 1 emissions figure. 
Questions which allow data available at corporate channels are usually judge 
according to how many points of the required data points they achieve. At the end of 
scoring, the number of points a company has been awarded is divided by the 
maximum number that could have been awarded. The fraction is then converted to a 
percentage by multiplying by 100 and rounded to the nearest whole number. 
 
(Points awarded / points attainable) = Disclosure Score 
With respect to the scales, this methodology has been using two types of scaling 
namely scale A and scale B. Scale A consists of a two point scales. First point 
provides the reader direct answer to the question. Second point provides the reader 
increased level of detail of a specific company. Scale B contains a three point scales. 
Third point provides the reader further details of quantitative information with 
respective to a particular question in addition to first and second points 
 
Unavailable disclosure information with respect to a particular question/a set of 
questions will be scored zero out of the maximum available points for that question 
or set of questions. If a question is not relevant to a firm, it will be scored a zero. 
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 Denominator range 
Categorise Minimum  Maximum 
Governance 
Governance 4 5 
Total range for this section 4 5 
Risks and Opportunities 
Risks and Opportunities identification process 2 2 
Regulatory risks 10 11 
Physical risks 10 11 
Other risks 10 11 
Regulatory opportunities 10 11 
Physical opportunities 10 11 
Other opportunities 10 11 
Total range for this section 62 68 
Strategy 
Strategy 6 14 
Total range for this section 6 14 
GHG accounting, energy and fuel use, and trading 
Emissions – boundary and methodology 8 9 
Scope 1 13 13 
Scope 2  11 11 
Contractual Scope 2 2 7 
Scope 3 3 9 
Emissions – other 1 2 4 
Emissions – other 2 18.5 21.5 
Emissions trading 2 8 
Total range for this section 59.5 82.5 
Communications 
Communications 1 2 
Total range for this section 1 2 
Overall total 133 171.5 
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CDP 2010 scoring methodology 
 
Governance       
No
. 
Question 
D
is
cl
o
su
re
 
S
co
re
 
  Answer - This column shows the 
answer options from which a 
company is asked to select. If the 
question is answered in a free text 
field, this is indicated.  
    
P
o
in
ts
  
D
en
o
m
in
at
o
r 
  
  Group and Individual Responsibility       
  1.1 "Board Committee" route       
1.1 Where is the highest level of responsibility 
for climate change within your company? 
 0.5 Drop down menu option: Board 
committee or other executive body 
1.1
a 
Please specify who is responsible.   0.5 Selection made from the drop 
down menu or, if selecting 
"Other", answer given in text box. 
1.2 What is the mechanism by which the board 
committee or other executive body reviews 
the company’s progress and status regarding 
climate change?  
  2 Scale A 
      3 Denominator for this route 
  1.1 "Lower level" route       
1.1 Where is the highest level of responsibility 
for climate change within your company? 
 0.5 Drop down menu option: Other, 
lower level departments.  
1.1
b 
Select the lower level department responsible. 0.5 Selection made from the drop 
down menu or, if selecting 
"Other", answer given in text box. 
1.3 Please explain how overall responsibility for 
climate change is managed within your 
company.  
  2 Scale A. 
      3 Denominator for this route 
  1.1 "No individual / committee" route       
1.1 Where is the highest level of responsibility 
for climate change within your company? 
 1 Drop down menu option: There 
is no individual or committee with 
overall responsibility for climate 
change 
1.3 Please explain how overall responsibility for 
climate change is managed within your 
company.  
  2 Scale A 
      3 Denominator for this route 
  1.1 No answer given       
1.1 Where is the highest level of responsibility 
for climate change within your company? 
 1 No selection made from drop 
down menu 
     3 Maximum denominator as no 
selection made 
  Individual Performance Incentives       
  1.4 "Yes" route       
1.4 Do you provide incentives for the 
management of climate change issues, 
including the attainment of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) targets?  
 1 Drop down menu option: Yes 
1.5 Please complete the table.   1 1 point  
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      2 Denominator for this route 
  1.4 "No" route       
1.4 Do you provide incentives for the 
management of climate change issues, 
including the attainment of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) targets?  
 1 Drop down menu option: No. 
     1 Denominator for this route 
  1.4 "No answer" route       
1.4 Do you provide incentives for the 
management of climate change issues, 
including the attainment of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) targets?  
 1 No selection made from drop 
down menu 
     2 Maximum denominator as no 
selection made 
      5 Total Points 
Risk & Opportunity Identification Process     
2.1 Describe your company’s process for 
identifying significant risks and/or 
opportunities from climate change and 
assessing the degree to which they could 
affect your business, including the financial 
implications.  
  2 Scale A 
      2 Denominator  
  Regulatory Risks       
  3.1 Lead question - "Yes" route       
3.1 Do current and/or anticipated regulatory 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant risks for your company? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Yes 
3.2
A/
B 
What are the current and/or anticipated 
significant regulatory risks related to climate 
change and the associated countries/regions 
and timescales?  
  2 Table format data entry: Selection 
of risk category (0.5 points), 
geographical area affected (0.5), 
timescale of impact (0.5). 
Elaboration of risk in comment 
field (0.5). If geography, timescale 
& comment given, but no risk is 
selected - 0 points. 
  
Text box data entry: Answer must 
describe risk (1 point), the 
geographical area affected (0.5), 
and timescale of impact (0.5). If 
geography and timescale given, 
but no risk is described - 0 points. 
3.3 Describe the ways in which the identified 
risks affect or could affect your business and 
your value chain. 
  3 Scale B 
      6 Denominator for this route - 
sub-total 
  3.4 Sub-lead question financial implications - 
"Yes" route 
    
3.4 Are there financial implications associated 
with the identified risks? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Yes 
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3.5 Please describe them.   1 If the financial implications are 
described (0.5). If they are 
quantified in some way (0.5).  
      2 Denominator for this route - 
sub-total 
  3.4 Sub-lead question financial implications - 
"No" route 
    
3.4 Are there financial implications associated 
with the identified risks? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: No 
     1 Denominator for this route - 
sub-total 
  3.4 Sub-lead question financial implications - "No selection made" route 
3.4 Are there financial implications associated 
with the identified risks? 
 1 No selection made from the drop-
down menu 
     2 Maximum denominator as no 
selection made 
  All companies that answer "Yes" at 3.1 will be 
asked 3.6 
    
3.6 Describe any actions the company has taken 
or plans to take to manage or adapt to the 
risks that have been identified, including the 
cost of those actions. 
  3 Scale A 
        Possible denominators: the 
denominator is 11 if "Yes" selected 
at 3.4; 10 if "No" selected at 3.4; 11 
if no selection made at 3.4.  
  3.1 Lead question  - "No" route       
3.1 Do current and/or anticipated regulatory 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant risks for your company? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: No 
3.7 Please explain why you do not consider your 
company to be exposed to significant 
regulatory risks - current or anticipated. 
  10 Text answer which is awarded either 
5/10 or 10/10. 5/10 for a direct 
answer. 10/10 for an increased level 
of detail that is specific to the 
company. 
      11 Denominator for this route 
  3.1 Lead question  - "Don't know" route       
3.1 Do current and/or anticipated regulatory 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant risks for your company? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Don't 
know 
3.8 Please explain why not.   1 Explanation given (1) No 
explanation given (0) 
      11 Maximum denominator has been 
selected for this route 
  3.1 Lead question - No answer       
3.1 Do current and/or anticipated regulatory 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant risks for your company? 
 1 No selection made from the drop-
down menu 
     11 Maximum denominator as no 
selection made 
  Physical Risks       
  4.1 Lead question - "Yes" route       
4.1 Do current and/or anticipated Physical 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant risks for your company? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Yes 
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4.2
A/
B 
What are the current and/or anticipated 
significant Physical Risks related to climate 
change and the associated countries/regions 
and timescales?  
  2 Table format data entry: Selection of 
risk category (0.5 points), 
geographical area affected (0.5), 
timescale of impact (0.5). 
Elaboration of risk in comment field 
(0.5). If geography, timescale & 
comment given, but no risk is 
selected - 0 points. 
  
Text box data entry: Answer must 
describe risk (1 point), the 
geographical area affected (0.5), and 
timescale of impact (0.5). If 
geography and timescale given, but 
no risk is described - 0 points. 
4.3 Describe the ways in which the identified 
risks affect or could affect your business and 
your value chain. 
  3 Text answer scored under Scale B 
      6 Denominator for this route - sub-
total 
  4.4 Sub-lead question financial implications - 
"Yes" route 
    
4.4 Are there financial implications associated 
with the identified risks? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Yes 
4.5 Please describe them.   1 If the financial implications are 
described (0.5). If they are quantified 
in some way (0.5).  
      2 Denominator for this route - sub-
total 
  4.4 Sub-lead question financial implications - 
"No" route 
    
4.4 Are there financial implications associated 
with the identified risks? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: No 
     1 Denominator for this route - sub-
total 
  4.4 Sub-lead question financial implications - "No selection made" route 
4.4 Are there financial implications associated 
with the identified risks? 
 1 No selection made from the drop-
down menu 
     2 Maximum denominator as no 
selection made 
  All companies that answer "Yes" at 3.1 will be 
asked 3.6 
    
4.6 Describe any actions the company has taken 
or plans to take to manage or adapt to the 
risks that have been identified, including the 
cost of those actions. 
  3 Description of actions scored on 
Scale A. Additionally 1 point is 
scored if the costs of the actions are 
given - or, if there are none, this is 
made clear. 
        Possible denominators: the 
denominator is 11 if "Yes" selected 
at 3.4; 10 if "No" selected at 3.4; 11 
if no selection made at 3.4.  
  4.1 Lead question  - "No" route       
3.1 Do current and/or anticipated Physical 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant risks for your company? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: No 
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4.7 Please explain why you do not consider your 
company to be exposed to significant 
Physical Riskis - current or anticipated. 
  10 Text answer which is awarded either 
5/10 or 10/10. 5/10 for a direct 
answer. 10/10 for an increased level 
of detail that is specific to the 
company. 
      11 Denominator for this route 
  3.1 Lead question  - "Don't know" route       
4.1 Do current and/or anticipated Physical 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant risks for your company? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Don't 
know 
4.8 Please explain why not.   1 Explanation given (1) No 
explanation given (0) 
      11 Maximum denominator has been 
selected for this route 
  3.1 Lead question - No answer       
4.1 Do current and/or anticipated Physical 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant risks for your company? 
 1 No selection made from the drop-
down menu 
     11 Maximum denominator as no 
selection made 
  This pattern will be repeated for both the other risk 
questions. 
  
  Oil and gas sector companies should include 
their estimated value of assets exposed to 
extreme weather events in table O&G2.1. A 
cross-reference from question 4 on physical 
risks to O&G2.1 will be scored. 
      
  Other Risks       
  5.1 Lead question - "Yes" route       
5.1 Do current and/or anticipated Other 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant risks for your company? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Yes 
5.2
A/
B 
What are the current and/or anticipated 
significant Other risks related to climate 
change and the associated countries/regions 
and timescales?  
  2 Table format data entry: Selection of 
risk category (0.5 points), 
geographical area affected (0.5), 
timescale of impact (0.5). 
Elaboration of risk in comment field 
(0.5). If geography, timescale & 
comment given, but no risk is 
selected - 0 points. 
  
Text box data entry: Answer must 
describe risk (1 point), the 
geographical area affected (0.5), and 
timescale of impact (0.5). If 
geography and timescale given, but 
no risk is described - 0 points. 
5.3 Describe the ways in which the identified 
risks affect or could affect your business and 
your value chain. 
  3 Text answer scored under Scale B 
      6 Denominator for this route - sub-
total 
  5.4 Sub-lead question financial implications - 
"Yes" route 
    
5.4 Are there financial implications associated 
with the identified risks? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Yes 
5.5 Please describe them.   1 If the financial implications are 
described (0.5). If they are quantified 
in some way (0.5).  
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      2 Denominator for this route - sub-
total 
  5.4 Sub-lead question financial implications - 
"No" route 
    
5.4 Are there financial implications associated 
with the identified risks? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: No 
     1 Denominator for this route - sub-
total 
  3.4 Sub-lead question financial implications - "No selection made" route 
5.4 Are there financial implications associated 
with the identified risks? 
 1 No selection made from the drop-
down menu 
     2 Maximum denominator as no 
selection made 
  All companies that answer "Yes" at 3.1 will be 
asked 3.6 
    
5.6 Describe any actions the company has taken 
or plans to take to manage or adapt to the 
risks that have been identified, including the 
cost of those actions. 
  3 Description of actions scored on 
Scale A. Additionally 1 point is 
scored if the costs of the actions are 
given - or, if there are none, this is 
made clear. 
        Possible denominators: the 
denominator is 11 if "Yes" selected 
at 3.4; 10 if "No" selected at 3.4; 11 
if no selection made at 3.4.  
  5.1 Lead question  - "No" route       
5.1 Do current and/or anticipated Other 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant risks for your company? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: No 
5.7 Please explain why you do not consider your 
company to be exposed to significant Other 
risks - current or anticipated. 
  10 Text answer which is awarded either 
5/10 or 10/10. 5/10 for a direct 
answer. 10/10 for an increased level 
of detail that is specific to the 
company. 
      11 Denominator for this route 
  5.1 Lead question  - "Don't know" route       
5.1 Do current and/or anticipated Other 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant risks for your company? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Don't 
know 
5.8 Please explain why not.   1 Explanation given (1) No 
explanation given (0) 
      11 Maximum denominator has been 
selected for this route 
  5.1 Lead question - No answer       
5.1 Do current and/or anticipated Other 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant risks for your company? 
 1 No selection made from the drop-
down menu 
     11 Maximum denominator as no 
selection made 
  This pattern will be repeated for both the other 
risk questions. 
  
  Oil and gas sector companies should include 
their estimated value of assets exposed to 
extreme weather events in table O&G2.1. A 
cross-reference from question 4 on physical 
risks to O&G2.1 will be scored. 
      
Opportunities        
  Regulatory Opportunities       
  6.1 Lead question - "Yes" route       
Appendices 
 
 
 
187 
 
6.1 Do current and/or anticipated regulatory 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant opportunities for your 
company? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Yes 
6.2A
/B 
What are the current and/or anticipated 
significant opportunities and their 
associated countries/regions and 
timescales? 
  2 Table format data entry: Selection of 
risk category (0.5 points), 
geographical area affected (0.5), 
timescale of impact (0.5). 
Elaboration of risk in comment field 
(0.5). If geography, timescale & 
comment given, but no risk is 
selected - 0 points. 
  
Text box data entry: Answer must 
describe risk (1 point), the 
geographic area affected (0.5), and 
timescale of impact (0.5). If 
geography and timescale given, but 
no risk is described - 0 points. 
6.3 Describe the ways in which the identified 
opportunities affect or could affect your 
business and your value chain. 
  3 Text answer scored on Scale B 
      6 Denominator for this route - sub-
total 
  6.4 Sub-lead question financial implications - 
"Yes" route 
    
6.4 Are there financial implications associated 
with the identified opportunities? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Yes 
6.5 Please describe them.   1 If the financial implications are 
described (0.5). If they are quantified 
in some way (0.5).  
      2 Denominator for this route - sub-
total 
  6.4 Sub-lead question financial implications - 
"No" route 
    
6.4 Are there financial implications associated 
with the identified opportunities? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: No 
      1 Denominator for this route - sub-
total 
  6.4 Sub-lead question financial implications - "No selection made" route 
6.4 Are there financial implications associated 
with the identified opportunities? 
 1 No selection made from the drop-
down menu 
     2 Maximum denominator as no 
selection made 
  All companies that answer "Yes" at 6.1 will 
be asked 6.6 
    
6.6 Describe any actions the company has 
taken or plans to take to exploit the 
opportunities that have been identified, 
including the investment needed to take 
those actions. 
  3 Description of actions scored on 
Scale A. Additionally 1 point is 
scored if the amount of investment 
needed is given - or, if it is nil, this is 
made clear. 
        Possible denominators: the 
denominator is 11 if "Yes" selected 
at 6.4; 10 if "No" selected at 6.4; 11 
if no selection made at 6.4.  
  6.1 Lead question  - "No" route       
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6.1 Do current and/or anticipated regulatory 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant opportunities for your 
company? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: No 
6.7 Please explain why you do not consider 
your company to be presented with 
significant opportunities – current or 
anticipated. 
  10 Text answer which is awarded either 
5/10 or 10/10. 5/10 for a direct 
answer. 10/10 for an increased level 
of detail that is specific to the 
company. 
      11 Denominator for this route 
  6.1 Lead question - "Don't know" route       
6.1 Do current and/or anticipated regulatory 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant opportunities for your 
company? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Don't 
know 
6.8 Please explain why not.   1 Explanation given (1) No 
explanation given (0) 
      11 Maximum denominator has been 
selected for this route 
  6.1 Lead question - No answer       
6.1 Do current and/or anticipated regulatory 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant opportunities for your 
company? 
 1 No selection made from the drop-
down menu 
     11 Maximum denominator as no 
selection made 
Opportunities        
  Physical Opportunities       
  7.1 Lead question - "Yes" route       
7.1 Do current and/or anticipated Physical 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant opportunities for your 
company? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Yes 
7.2A
/B 
What are the current and/or anticipated 
significant opportunities and their 
associated countries/regions and 
timescales? 
  2 Table format data entry: Selection of 
risk category (0.5 points), 
geographical area affected (0.5), 
timescale of impact (0.5). 
Elaboration of risk in comment field 
(0.5). If geography, timescale & 
comment given, but no risk is 
selected - 0 points. 
  
Text box data entry: Answer must 
describe risk (1 point), the 
geographic area affected (0.5), and 
timescale of impact (0.5). If 
geography and timescale given, but 
no risk is described - 0 points. 
6.3 Describe the ways in which the identified 
opportunities affect or could affect your 
business and your value chain. 
  3 Text answer scored on Scale B 
      6 Denominator for this route - sub-
total 
  7.4 Sub-lead question financial implications - 
"Yes" route 
    
7.4 Are there financial implications associated 
with the identified opportunities? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Yes 
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7.5 Please describe them.   1 If the financial implications are 
described (0.5). If they are quantified 
in some way (0.5).  
      2 Denominator for this route - sub-
total 
  7.4 Sub-lead question financial implications - 
"No" route 
    
7.4 Are there financial implications associated 
with the identified opportunities? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: No 
      1 Denominator for this route - sub-
total 
  7.4 Sub-lead question financial implications - "No selection made" route 
7.4 Are there financial implications associated 
with the identified opportunities? 
 1 No selection made from the drop-
down menu 
     2 Maximum denominator as no 
selection made 
  All companies that answer "Yes" at 6.1 will 
be asked 6.6 
    
7.6 Describe any actions the company has 
taken or plans to take to exploit the 
opportunities that have been identified, 
including the investment needed to take 
those actions. 
  3 Description of actions scored on 
Scale A. Additionally 1 point is 
scored if the amount of investment 
needed is given - or, if it is nil, this is 
made clear. 
        Possible denominators: the 
denominator is 11 if "Yes" selected 
at 6.4; 10 if "No" selected at 6.4; 11 
if no selection made at 6.4.  
  6.1 Lead question  - "No" route       
6.1 Do current and/or anticipated Physical 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant opportunities for your 
company? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: No 
6.7 Please explain why you do not consider 
your company to be presented with 
significant opportunities – current or 
anticipated. 
  10 Text answer which is awarded either 
5/10 or 10/10. 5/10 for a direct 
answer. 10/10 for an increased level 
of detail that is specific to the 
company. 
      11 Denominator for this route 
  7.1 Lead question - "Don't know" route       
7.1 Do current and/or anticipated Physical 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant opportunities for your 
company? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Don't 
know 
7.8 Please explain why not.   1 Explanation given (1) No 
explanation given (0) 
      11 Maximum denominator has been 
selected for this route 
  7.1 Lead question - No answer       
7.1 Do current and/or anticipated Physical 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant opportunities for your 
company? 
 1 No selection made from the drop-
down menu 
     11 Maximum denominator as no 
selection made 
  This pattern will be repeated for both the other 
risk questions. 
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  Oil and gas sector companies should 
include their estimated value of assets 
exposed to extreme weather events in table 
O&G2.1. A cross-reference from question 
4 on physical risks to O&G2.1 will be 
scored. 
      
  Other Opportunities       
  8.1 Lead question - "Yes" route       
8.1 Do current and/or anticipated Other 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant opportunities for your 
company? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Yes 
8.2A
/B 
What are the current and/or anticipated 
significant opportunities and their 
associated countries/regions and 
timescales? 
  2 Table format data entry: Selection of 
risk category (0.5 points), 
geographical area affected (0.5), 
timescale of impact (0.5). 
Elaboration of risk in comment field 
(0.5). If geography, timescale & 
comment given, but no risk is 
selected - 0 points. 
  
Text box data entry: Answer must 
describe risk (1 point), the 
geographic area affected (0.5), and 
timescale of impact (0.5). If 
geography and timescale given, but 
no risk is described - 0 points. 
6.3 Describe the ways in which the identified 
opportunities affect or could affect your 
business and your value chain. 
  3 Text answer scored on Scale B 
      6 Denominator for this route - sub-
total 
  8.4 Sub-lead question financial implications - 
"Yes" route 
    
8.4 Are there financial implications associated 
with the identified opportunities? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Yes 
8.5 Please describe them.   1 If the financial implications are 
described (0.5). If they are quantified 
in some way (0.5).  
      2 Denominator for this route - sub-
total 
  8.4 Sub-lead question financial implications - 
"No" route 
    
8.4 Are there financial implications associated 
with the identified opportunities? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: No 
      1 Denominator for this route - sub-
total 
  8.4 Sub-lead question financial implications - "No selection made" route 
8.4 Are there financial implications associated 
with the identified opportunities? 
 1 No selection made from the drop-
down menu 
     2 Maximum denominator as no 
selection made 
  All companies that answer "Yes" at 6.1 will 
be asked 6.6 
    
8.6 Describe any actions the company has 
taken or plans to take to exploit the 
opportunities that have been identified, 
including the investment needed to take 
those actions. 
  3 Description of actions scored on 
Scale A. Additionally 1 point is 
scored if the amount of investment 
needed is given - or, if it is nil, this is 
made clear. 
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        Possible denominators: the 
denominator is 11 if "Yes" selected 
at 6.4; 10 if "No" selected at 6.4; 11 
if no selection made at 6.4.  
  8.1 Lead question  - "No" route       
8.1 Do current and/or anticipated Other 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant opportunities for your 
company? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: No 
8.7 Please explain why you do not consider 
your company to be presented with 
significant opportunities – current or 
anticipated. 
  1
0 
Text answer which is awarded either 
5/10 or 10/10. 5/10 for a direct 
answer. 10/10 for an increased level 
of detail that is specific to the 
company. 
      1
1 
Denominator for this route 
  8.1 Lead question - "Don't know" route       
8.1 Do current and/or anticipated Other 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant opportunities for your 
company? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Don't 
know 
8.8 Please explain why not.   1 Explanation given (1) No 
explanation given (0) 
      1
1 
Maximum denominator has been 
selected for this route 
  8.1 Lead question - No answer       
8.1 Do current and/or anticipated Other 
requirements related to climate change 
present significant opportunities for your 
company? 
 1 No selection made from the drop-
down menu 
     1
1 
Maximum denominator as no 
selection made 
Strategy       
  Strategy       
9.1 Please describe how your overall group 
business strategy links with actions taken 
on risks and opportunities (identified in 
questions 3 to 8), including any emissions 
reduction targets or achievements, public 
policy engagement and external 
communications. 
  3  Scale B 
      3 Denominator  
  Targets       
  9.2 "No current target" route       
9.2 Do you have a current emissions reduction 
target? 
 1 Drop down menu option: No  
9.3 Please explain why not and forecast how 
your Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions will 
change over the next 5 years. 
  2  Explanation (1) Forecast - 0.5 point 
if qualitative; 1 if quantitative. 
      3 Denominator for this route 
  9.2 "Target in development" route       
9.2 Do you have a current emissions reduction 
target? 
 1 Drop down menu option: No, but 
we are developing one.  
9.4 Please give details of the target(s) you are 
developing and when you expect to 
announce it/them. 
  2 Details of target (1). Announcement 
date (1). 
      3 Denominator for this route 
  9.2 "Target completed" route       
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9.2 Do you have a current emissions reduction 
target? 
 1 Drop down menu option: No, we 
had a target and the date for 
completing it fell within our 
reporting year. 
9.5 Please explain if you intend to set a new target. 1 If disclosed (1). If not (0). 
9.6 Please complete the table.   1 To score 1 point, companies with an 
absolute or an intensity target need to 
complete columns 1-8. Companies 
with other types of target do not need 
to supply base year emissions. 
      3 Denominator for this route 
  9.2 "Yes, we have a target" route       
9.2 Do you have a current emissions reduction 
target? 
 1 Drop down menu option: Yes 
9.6 Please complete the table.   1  To score 1 point, companies with an 
absolute or an intensity target need to 
complete columns 1-8. Companies 
with other types of target do not need 
to supply base year emissions. Target 
met? column does not have to be 
completed or can be completed with 
selection of "Target ongoing".  
      2 Denominator for this route 
  9.2 "No selection made" route       
9.2 Do you have a current emissions reduction 
target? 
 1 No selection made from the drop-
down menu 
     3 Maximum denominator selected as 
no selection made. 
  Emission Reduction Activities       
  Organisations answer 9.7 & 9.9 or 9.8       
  9.7 "Question relevant" route        
9.7 Please use the table below to describe your 
company’s actions to reduce its GHG 
emissions. 
  5 Actions (2). 
Emissions reduction (1) 
Achieved/anticipated (1) 
  
If relevant, investment amount, 
currency & timescale (all data points 
required - 0.5) - or if stated not 
relevant (0.5). 
  
If relevant, monetary savings 
amount, currency and 
achieved/anticipated (all data points 
required - 0.5) - or if stated not 
relevant/not quantified (0.5).  
9.9 Please provide any other information you 
consider necessary to describe your 
emissions reduction activities. 
  0 Optional 
      5 Denominator for this route 
  9.8 "Question not relevant" route        
¿9.8 Please explain why not.   3 Text answer scored on Scale B 
      3 Denominator for this route 
  9.7 & 9.8 "No answer given to either" 
route 
      
9.7/ 
9.8 
No answer given to either 9.7 or 9.8  5   
     5 Maximum denominator selected as 
no selection made 
  Engagement with Policy Makers       
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  9.10 "Yes, we engage with policy-makers" 
route 
    
9.1 Do you engage with policy makers on 
possible responses to climate change 
including taxation, regulation and carbon 
trading? 
 1 Drop down menu option: Yes 
9.11 Please describe.   2 Text answer scored on Scale A 
      3 Denominator for this route 
  9.11 "No, we don't engage with policy-
makers" route 
    
9.1 Do you engage with policy makers on 
possible responses to climate change 
including taxation, regulation and carbon 
trading? 
 1 Drop down menu option: No 
      1 Denominator for this route 
  9.11 "No answer" route       
9.1 Do you engage with policy makers on 
possible responses to climate change 
including taxation, regulation and carbon 
trading? 
 1 No selection made from the drop-
down menu 
     3 Maximum denominator selected as 
no selection made 
Emissions - Boundary and Methodology     
  Reporting Boundary       
10.1 Please indicate the category that describes 
the company, entities, or group for which 
Scope 1 and Scope 2 GHG emissions are 
reported. 
  1 Selection made (1) no selection made 
(0). If "Other" selected, a description 
of the reporting boundary must be 
provided in the text box to score 1. 
      1 Denominator  
  10.2 "Yes, there are excluded sources" 
route 
      
10.2 Are there are any sources (e.g. facilities, 
specific GHGs, activities, geographies, 
etc.) of Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions 
within this boundary which are not 
included in your disclosure? 
 1 Drop down menu option: Yes 
10.3 Please complete the following table.   1 1 point scored if all 3 data points 
supplied i.e. source, scope, 
explanation. 0 if one element is 
missing. 
      2 Denominator for this route 
  10.2 "No excluded sources" route       
10.2 Are there are any sources (e.g. facilities, 
specific GHGs, activities, geographies, 
etc.) of Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions 
within this boundary which are not 
included in your disclosure? 
 1 Drop down menu option: No 
     1 Denominator for this route 
  10.2 "No answer" route       
10.2 Are there are any sources (e.g. facilities, 
specific GHGs, activities, geographies, 
etc.) of Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions 
within this boundary which are not 
included in your disclosure? 
 1 No selection made from the drop-
down menu 
     2 Maximum denominator selected as 
no selection made. 
  Methodology       
11.1
A 
Please give the name of the standard, 
protocol or methodology you have used to 
  3 Companies are asked to provide the 
name of the published standard(s) 
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& 
11.1
B 
collect activity data and calculate Scope 1 
and Scope 2 emissions and/or describe the 
procedure you have used. 
they use (if applicable) in 11.1A (1) 
AND how they apply it in their 
company in 11.1B (Scale A). 
  
Companies not using a published 
standard should describe the 
procedure used in 11.1B (Scale B) 
  
11.2 Please also provide the names of and links 
to any calculation tools used. 
  1 Selection made and/or text answer 
given (1), no answer (0) 
11.3 Please give the global warming potentials 
you have applied and their origin. 
  1 Gas, origin, & figure must all be 
supplied to score 1  
11.4 Please give the emission factors you have 
applied and their origin. 
  1 Fuel/material, number, unit & 
reference must all be supplied to 
score 1. 
      6 Denominator  
Scop
e 1  
        
  Total Scope 1        
12.1 Please give your total gross global Scope 1 
GHG emissions in metric tonnes of CO2-e. 
  6 Number given (6) No number given 
(0) 
      6 Denominator  
  Scope 1 by country       
  Organisations answer 12.2 or 12.3.       
  12.2 "Question relevant" route       
12.2 Please break down your total gross global 
Scope 1 emissions in metric tonnes CO2-e 
by country/region. 
  2 Number & country/region given (2) 
No number or no country/region (0) 
      2 Denominator for this route 
  12.3 "Question not relevant" route       
¿12.3 ¿Please explain why not.   2 Explanation scored on Scale A 
      2 Denominator for this route 
  12.2 & 12.3 "No answer given to either" 
route 
      
12.2/
12.3 
No answer given for either 12.2 or 12.3  2   
     2 Denominator for this route 
  Scope 1 by business division/facility       
  Where it will facilitate a better 
understanding of your business, please also 
break down your total gross global Scope 
1 emissions by business division and/or 
facility. 
      
12.4 Business division   0 Optional 
12.5 Facility   0 Optional 
      0 Denominator  
  Scope 1 by GHG type       
  Organisations answer 12.6 or12.7       
  12.6 "Question relevant" route       
12.6 Please break down your total gross global 
Scope 1 emissions by GHG type. (Only 
data for the current reporting year 
requested.) 
  1 Numbers for more than one gas 
entered in the table (1), Number for 
only one gas entered (0) 
      1 Denominator for this route 
  12.7 "Question not relevant" route       
¿12.7 Please explain why not.   1 Explanation given (1), No 
explanation given (0) 
      1 Denominator for this route 
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  12.6 & 12.7  "No answer given to either" 
route 
      
12.6/
12.7 
No answer given for either 12.6 or 12.7  1   
     1 Maximum denominator selected as 
no selection made. 
  Fuel consumption       
  Organisations answer 12.8 or 12.9       
  12.8 "Question relevant" route       
12.8 Please use the table to give the total 
amount of fuel in MWh that your 
organisation has consumed during the 
reportingyear. 
  1 Number entered (1). No number 
entered (0) 
      1 Denominator for this route 
  12.9 "Question not relevant" route       
¿12.9 Please explain why not.   1 Explanation given (1), No 
explanation given (0) 
      1 Denominator for this route 
  12.8 & 12.9 "No answer given to either" 
route 
      
12.8/
12.9 
No answer given for either 12.8 or 12.9  1   
     1 Maximum denominator selected as 
no selection made. 
  Fuel consumption breakdown       
  Organisations answer 12.10 or 12.11       
  12.10 "Question relevant" route       
12.1 Please complete the table by breaking 
down the total figure by fuel type. 
  1 Fuel type & number entered in table 
(1). No number or no fuel type (0). 
      1 Denominator for this route 
  12.11 "Question not relevant" route       
¿12.1
1 
Please explain why not.   1 Explanation given (1) No 
explanation given (0) 
      1 Denominator for this route 
  12.10 &12.11 "No answer given to 
either" route 
      
12.1
0/12.
11 
No answer given for either 12.10 or 12.11  1   
     1 Maximum denominator selected as 
no selection made. 
  Data Accuracy       
12.1
2 
Please estimate the level of uncertainty of 
the total gross global Scope 1 figure that 
you have supplied in answer to question 
12.1 and specify the sources of uncertainty 
in your data gathering, handling, and 
calculations. 
  2 Number entered in "Uncertainty 
range" (1), "Main sources of 
uncertainty in your data" (0.5), and 
explanation (0.5). 
      2 Denominator  
Scope 2 Indirect GHG Emissions       
  Total Scope 2       
13.1 Please give your total gross global Scope 2 
GHG emissions in metric tonnes of CO2-e. 
  6 Number given (6), No number given 
(0) 
      6 Denominator  
  Scope 2 by country       
  Organisations answer 13.2 or 13.3.       
  13.2 "Question relevant" route       
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13.2 Please break down your total gross global 
Scope 2 emissions in metric tonnes CO2-e 
by country/region. 
  2 Number & country/region given (2) 
No number or no country/region (0)  
      2 Denominator for this route 
  13.3 "Question not relevant" route       
¿13.3 Please explain why not.   2 Explanation scored on Scale A 
      2 Denominator for this route 
  13.2 & 13.3 "No answer given to either" route     
13.2/
13.3 
No answer given for 13.2 or 13.3  2   
     2 Denominator for this route 
  Scope 2 by business division/facility     
  Where it will facilitate a better 
understanding of your business, please also 
break down your total gross global Scope 
2 emissions by business division and/or 
facility. 
      
13.4 Business division   0 Optional 
13.5 Facility   0 Optional 
      0 Denominator  
  Purchased Energy       
  Organisations answer 13.6 or 13.7       
  13.6 "Question relevant" route       
13.6 How much electricity, heat, steam, and 
cooling in MWh has your organisation 
purchased for its own consumption during 
the reporting year? 
  1 Selection & 1 number entered in 
table (1), No selection or no number 
(0)  
      1 Denominator for this route 
  13.7 "Question not relevant" route       
¿13.7 Please explain why not.   1 Explanation given (1), No 
explanation given (0) 
      1 Denominator for this route 
  13.6&13.7 "No answer given to either" 
route 
      
13.6/
13.7 
No answer given for 13.6 or 13.7   1   
     1 Maximum denominator selected as 
no selection made. 
  Data Accuracy       
13.8 Please estimate the level of uncertainty of 
the total gross global Scope 2 figure that 
you have supplied in answer to question 
13.1 and specify the sources of uncertainty 
in your data gathering, handling, and 
calculations. 
  2 Number entered in "Uncertainty 
range" (1), "Main sources of 
uncertainty in your data" (0.5), 
explanation (0.5). 
      2 Denominator  
Scope 2 - Contractual        
  Contractual Arrangements Supporting 
Particular Types of Electricity 
Generation: 
      
  14.1 "Yes" route       
14.1 Do you consider that the grid average 
factors used to report Scope 2 emissions in 
question 13 reflect the contractual 
arrangements you have with electricity 
suppliers? 
 1 Drop down menu option: Yes 
     1 Denominator for this route 
  14.1 "No" route       
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14.1 Do you consider that the grid average 
factors used to report Scope 2 emissions in 
question 13 reflect the contractual 
arrangements you have with electricity 
suppliers? 
 1 Drop down menu option: No 
14.2 You may report a total contractual Scope 2 
figure in response to this question. Please 
provide your total global contractual Scope 
2 GHG emissions figure in metric tonnes 
CO2-e. 
  2 2 points awarded provided that an 
answer for 13.1 has been given. If no 
answer has been provided for 13.1, 
no point will be awarded for 14.2.  
14.3 Explain the origin of the alternative figure 
including information about the emission 
factors used and the tariffs. 
  2 Description of the tariffs via which 
electricity is purchased or 
explanation of circumstances if 
electricity not bought via tariffs (1); 
emission factors numerical values 
(0.5); process for calculating 
alternative figures (0.5). If no answer 
has been provided for 13.1, no points 
will be awarded for 14.3. 
      5 Denominator for this route 
  14.1 "Don't know" route       
14.1 Do you consider that the grid average 
factors used to report Scope 2 emissions in 
question 13 reflect the contractual 
arrangements you have with electricity 
suppliers? 
 1 Drop down menu option: Don't 
know 
     1 Denominator for this route 
  14.1 "No answer" route       
14.1 Do you consider that the grid average 
factors used to report Scope 2 emissions in 
question 13 reflect the contractual 
arrangements you have with electricity 
suppliers? 
 5 No selection made from drop-down 
menu. 
     5 Maximum denominator selected as 
no selection made 
  Retiring certificates       
  14.4 "Yes, certificates retired" route       
14.4 Has your organisation retired any 
certificates, e.g. Renewable Energy 
Certificates, associated with zero or low 
carbon electricity within the reporting year 
or has this been done on your behalf? 
 1 Drop down menu option: Yes 
14.5 Please provide details including the 
number and type of certificates. 
  1 Number and type (1), No number or 
no type (0) 
      2 Denominator for this route 
  14.4 "No, certificates not retired" route       
14.4 Has your organisation retired any 
certificates, e.g. Renewable Energy 
Certificates, associated with zero or low 
carbon electricity within the reporting year 
or has this been done on your behalf? 
 1 Drop down menu option: No 
     1 Denominator for this route 
  14.4 "No answer given" route       
14.4 Has your organisation retired any 
certificates, e.g. Renewable Energy 
Certificates, associated with zero or low 
carbon electricity within the reporting year 
or has this been done on your behalf? 
 2 No selection made from the drop-
down menu. 
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     2 Maximum denominator selected as 
no selection made. 
Scope 3 Other Indirect GHG Emissions     
  Scope 3 emissions       
  Organisations answer either 15.1 or 15.2       
  15.1 "Question relevant" route       
15.1 Please provide data on sources of Scope 3 
emissions that are relevant to your 
organisation. 
  9 Source (2) 
 Emission figure scores 4/4. If no 
figure given but emissions are 
described including an indication of 
scale 2/4. If another measure 
reflecting quantity of S3 emissions is 
used 1/4.                                                                    
 Methodology is scored on Scale B 
i.e. out of 3 points. 
      9 Denominator for this route 
  15.2 "Question not relevant" route       
¿15.2 Please explain why not.   3 Text scored on Scale B 
      3 Denominator  
  15.1&15.2 "No answer given to either" 
route  
      
15.1/
15.2  
No answer provided to either 15.1 or 15.2   9   
     9 Maximum denominator selected as 
no selection made 
Emissions - Other 1       
  Emissions Avoided Through Use of Goods and Services 
  16.1 "Yes" route       
16.1 Does the use of your goods and/or services 
enable GHG emissions to be avoided by a 
third party? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Yes 
16.2 Please provide details including the 
anticipated timescale over which the 
emissions are avoided, in which sector of 
the economy they might help to avoid 
emissions and their potential to avoid 
emissions. 
  2 Explain why products enable 
emissions to be avoided (0.5); where 
emissions will be avoided i.e. which 
economic sector (0.5); timescale over 
which emissions are avoided (0.5); 
give a quantitative indication of the 
emissions that may be avoided (0.5).  
      3 Denominator 
  16.1 "No" route       
16.1 Does the use of your goods and/or services 
enable GHG emissions to be avoided by a 
third party? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: No 
     1 Denominator  
  16.1 "No answer given" route       
16.1 Does the use of your goods and/or services 
enable GHG emissions to be avoided by a 
third party? 
 3 No selection made from the drop-
down menu. 
     3 Maximum denominator selected as 
no selection made 
  Carbon Dioxide Emissions from 
Biologically Sequestered Carbon 
      
  Organisations answer either 17.1 or 17.2       
  17.1 "Question relevant" route       
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17.1 Please provide your total carbon dioxide 
emissions in metric tonnes CO2 from the 
combustion of biologically sequestered 
carbon i.e. carbon dioxide emissions from 
burning biomass/biofuels. 
  1 Number given (1) No number given 
(0) 
      1 Denominator 
  17.2 "Question not relevant" route       
¿17.2 Please explain why not.   1 Explanation given (1) No 
explanation given (0) 
      1 Denominator 
  17.1&17.2 "No answer given" route       
  No answer provided to either 17.1 or 17.2.  1   
     1 Maximum denominator selected as 
no selection made. 
Emissions - Other 2       
  Emissions Intensity       
18.1 Please describe a financial and an activity-
related intensity measurement for the 
reporting year for your gross combined 
Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions. 
      
  Financial metric    2 Columns 1-5 must be completed (2). 
Not all completed (0). Column 6 - 
contextual information is optional. If 
a company says that a financial 
metric is not relevant, they must 
supply an explanation. Explanation 
to be scored on Scale A. Saying "not 
relevant" without an explanation 
scores 0/2. 
      2 Denominator 
  Activity-related metric   2 Columns 1-3 must be completed (2). 
Not all completed (0). Column 4 - 
contextual information is optional. If 
a company says that an activity 
metric is not relevant, they must 
supply an explanation. Explanation 
to be scored on Scale A. Saying "not 
relevant" without an explanation 
scores 0/2. 
      2 Denominator 
  Emissions History       
  19.1 "Yes, they vary significantly" route       
19.1 Do the absolute emissions (Scope 1 and 
Scope 2 combined) for the reporting year 
vary significantly compared to the 
previous year? 
 2 Drop-down menu option: Yes 
19.2 Please explain why they have varied and 
why the variation is significant. 
  3 Explanation of why they have varied 
(Scale A i.e. out of 2 points), 
explanation of why variation is 
significant (1)   
      5 Denominator 
  19.1 "No, they don't vary significantly" 
route 
      
19.1 Do the absolute emissions (Scope 1 and 
Scope 2 combined) for the reporting year 
vary significantly compared to the 
previous year? 
 2 Drop-down menu option: No 
     2 Denominator 
  19.1 "First year of estimation" route       
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19.1 Do the absolute emissions (Scope 1 and 
Scope 2 combined) for the reporting year 
vary significantly compared to the 
previous year? 
 2 Drop-down menu option: This is 
our first year of estimation. 
     2 Denominator  
  19.1 "No data/Data not provided/Not 
sufficient data" route 
    
19.1 Do the absolute emissions (Scope 1 and 
Scope 2 combined) for the reporting year 
vary significantly compared to the 
previous year? 
 2 Drop-down menu options: We 
don’t have any emissions data./Data 
not provided to CDP./We do not 
have sufficient emissions data to 
answer the question. 
     2 Denominator  
  19.1 "No selection made" route       
19.1 Do the absolute emissions (Scope 1 and 
Scope 2 combined) for the reporting year 
vary significantly compared to the 
previous year? 
 5 No selection made 
     5 Maximum denominator selected as 
no selection made. 
  External Verification/ Assurance       
20.1 Please complete the following table 
indicating the percentage of reported 
emissions that have been verified/assured 
and attach the relevant statement. 
      
  Scope 1       
  20.1 "Scope 1 emissions verified & statement 
provided" route 
  
20.1
A 
Scope 1 - % of reported emissions 
verified/assured 
    Selection indicates that some or all 
emissions have been verified. 
20.1
B 
Verification/assurance statement provided     S1 must be selected in answer to 
20.1B to score. 
     5 Denominator  
  20.1 "No selection made from S1 drop 
down but statement provided" route 
      
20.1
A 
Scope 1 - % of reported emissions 
verified/assured 
    No selection made 
20.1
B 
Verification/assurance statement provided     S1 must be selected in answer to 
20.1B to score. 
     5 Denominator 
  20.1 "Scope 1 emissions verified, but statement not provided" route 
20.1
A 
Scope 1 - % of reported emissions 
verified/assured 
    Selection indicates that some or all 
emissions have been verified. 
20.1
B 
Verification/assurance statement     No statement provided 
     5 Denominator  
  20.1 "Scope 1 emissions not verified" 
route 
      
20.1
A 
Scope 2 - % of reported emissions 
verified/assured 
    Emissions not verified 
20.1
B 
Verification/assurance statement     Not applicable 
     5 Denominator  
  20.1 "No selection made and no statement 
provided" route 
  
20.1
A 
Scope 2 - % of reported emissions 
verified/assured 
    No selection made 
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20.1
B 
Verification/assurance statement     No statement provided 
     5 Maximum denominator selected as 
no answers given. 
  Scope 2 is scored in the same way as Scope 1.   
  Scope 3       
  20.1 "Scope 3 emissions verified & statement 
provided" route 
  
20.1
A 
Scope 3 - % of reported emissions 
verified/assured 
    Selection indicates that some or all 
emissions have been verified. 
20.1
B 
Verification/assurance statement provided     S3 must be selected in answer to 
20.1B to score. 
     2.
5 
Denominator  
  20.1 "No selection made from S3 drop 
down but statement provided" route 
      
20.1
A 
Scope 3 - % of reported emissions 
verified/assured 
    No selection made 
20.1
B 
Verification/assurance statement provided     S3 must be selected in answer to 
20.1B to score. 
     2.
5 
Denominator 
  20.1 "Scope 3 emissions verified, but no statement 
provided" route 
  
20.1
A 
Scope 3 - % of reported emissions 
verified/assured 
    Selection indicates that some or all 
emissions have been verified. 
20.1
B 
Verification/assurance statement     No statement provided 
     2.
5 
Denominator  
  20.1 "Scope 3 emissions not verified" 
route 
      
20.1
A 
Scope 3 - % of reported emissions 
verified/assured 
    Emissions not verified 
20.1
B 
Verification/assurance statement     Not applicable 
     2.
5 
Denominator  
  20.1 "No selection made and no statement 
provided" route 
  
20.1
A 
Scope 3 - % of reported emissions 
verified/assured 
    No selection made 
20.1
B 
Verification/assurance statement     No statement provided 
     2.
5 
Maximum denominator selected as 
no answers given. 
Emissions trading & offsetting       
  Emissions Trading and Offsetting     
  21.1 "Yes, we do trade emissions" route        
21.1 Do you participate in any emission trading 
schemes? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Yes  
21.2 Please complete the following table for 
each of the emission trading schemes in 
which you participate. 
      
  Scheme name   0.
5 
Given (0.5), Not given (0) 
  Start date & End date   0.
5 
Both given (0.5), One or both not 
given (0) 
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  Allowances allocated   0.
5 
Given (0.5), Not given (0) 
  Allowances purchased   0.
5 
Given (0.5), Not given (0) 
  Verified emissions - number & units   0.
5 
Both given (0.5), One or both not 
given (0) 
  Details of ownership   0.
5 
Given (0.5), Not given (0) 
21.3 What is your strategy for complying with 
the schemes in which you participate or 
anticipate participating? 
  1 Strategy given (1) Not given (0) 
      5 Denominator 
  21.1 "Not currently, but anticipate 
doing so within the next two years" 
route 
      
21.1 Do you participate in any emission trading 
schemes? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: We don’t 
currently, but anticipate participating 
in emissions trading within the next 
two years.  
21.3 What is your strategy for complying with 
the schemes in which you participate or 
anticipate participating? 
  1 Strategy given (1), Not given (0) 
      2 Denominator 
  21.1 "No, we don't participate nor do we 
currently anticipate participating in any 
emissions trading scheme within the 
next two years." route 
      
21.1 Do you participate in any emission trading 
schemes? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: No, we 
don’t participate nor do we currently 
anticipate participating in any 
emissions trading scheme within the 
next two years.  
      1 Denominator 
  21.1 "No answer given" route       
21.1 Do you participate in any emission trading 
schemes? 
 5 No selection made from the drop-
down menu 
     5 Maximum denominator selected as 
no selection made. 
  Carbon credits       
  21.4 "Yes, we have 
purchased/originated credits" route 
      
21.4 Has your company originated any project-
based carbon credits or purchased any 
within the reporting period? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: Yes 
21.5 Please complete the following table.       
  Credit origination/credit purchase   2  1-2 data items from list covered - 
0.5 point. 3-4 items - 1 point. 5-6 
items - 1.5 points. 7 items - 2 points 
  Project identification        
  Project documentation URL       
  Verified to which standard?       
  Number of credits        
  Credits retired?       
  Purpose        
      3 Denominator 
  21.4 "No, we haven't 
purchased/originated credits" route 
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21.4 Has your company originated any project-
based carbon credits or purchased any 
within the reporting period? 
 1 Drop-down menu option: No 
     1 Denominator 
  21.4 "No answer" given       
21.4 Has your company originated any project-
based carbon credits or purchased any 
within the reporting period? 
 3 No selection made from the drop-
down menu 
     3 Maximum denominator selected as 
no answer given. 
Communications       
  Climate Change Communications     
  22.1 "Yes, we do publish" route       
22.1 Have you published information about 
your company’s response to climate 
change/GHG emissions in other places 
than in your CDP response? 
 1 Drop down menu option: Yes 
22.2 In your Annual Reports or other 
mainstream filing? Please attach your 
latest publication(s). 
  1 Attachment provided in Further 
Information (maximum 1, even if 
more than 1 report is attached), no 
attachment (0) 
22.3 Through voluntary communications such 
as CSR reports? Please attach your latest 
publication(s). 
      
      2 Denominator 
  22.1 "No, we don't publish" route       
22.1 Have you published information about 
your company’s response to climate 
change/GHG emissions in other places 
than in your CDP response? 
 1 Drop down menu option: No 
     1 Denominator 
  22.1 "No, answer given" route       
22.1 Have you published information about 
your company’s response to climate 
change/GHG emissions in other places 
than in your CDP response? 
 2 No selection made from the drop-
down menu. 
     2 Maximum denominator selected as 
no selection made. 
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Appendix 2: Regression normality test 
 
It is vital to confirm that the regression results acquired are meeting the assumptions 
of regression analysis. There are three assumptions which need to be addressed for 
the individual variables are linearity, constant variance (homoscedasticity), and 
normality. A key issue in interpreting the regression variate is the correlation among 
the independent variables called multicollineraity. A measure of multicollineraity is 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) and a common cut-off threshold is a VIF value of 
10 (Hair et al. 2010).  The maximum VIF value of this model is 2.50, which indicates 
that no multicollineraity problem exists in this regression model. 
 
A perfect regression model should have a residual which is normally distributed. 
Therefore, it is important to test the residual calculated from the regression model is 
normally distributed or not. For this purpose, this thesis adopts Kernel density plot 
and histogram Kernel density plot to check the normality of the regression residuals. 
Figure 1 and 2 shows the Kernel density plot and histogram Kernel density plot 
respectively.  
 
Figure:  Kernel Density Plot 
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Figure: Histogram Kernel Density Plot 
 
 
 
The figures confirm that the residual calculated from the regression in model 1 of 
Table 6.3 are normally distributed. Since the above two figures appear to be normal, 
figures confirms that there is no normality problem. To test the heteroskedasticity 
problem, this study relies on Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity.  The significance of chi square of test is 0.1330 and indicates that 
it does not present of heteroskedasticity problem. We follow the same procedures for 
other regressions run in this study but not reported.  
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